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Abstract
The purpose of this edited collection is to appraise the role of the UN in 
relation to the principle of self-determination. This book takes a practical 
approach to discussing what role the UN plays in cases of self-determination 
and, importantly, it also ventures beyond this area’s usual discussions of the 
inherent conflict between self-determination and sovereignty. 
The chapters address the pursuit of the right to self-determination through a 
variety of case studies, such as post-statehood in South Sudan and East 
Timor; Indigenous peoples; hybrid self-determination in post-intrastate 
conflict; the balancing of the human rights approach in Cyprus; remedial right 
to secede in the cases of failed states; Palestinian and Sahrawi resistance; 
geopolitics in Jammu and Kashmir; and the forgotten story of micro-states. 
Overall, this collection shows that the solutions might be in moving the 
paradigm beyond the state-centrism of the system and the UN itself.
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Introduction
The Precarious History of the UN towards 
Self-Determination
JAKOB R. AVGUSTIN
The principle of self-determination found its way into international law with 
Articles 1 and 55 of the United Nations (UN) Charter in 1945, followed by the 
UN General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960. With the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations in 1970, the UN General 
Assembly then expanded the concept of self-determination beyond 
decolonisation. However, the practical complications with sometimes violent 
effects of various interpretations of the concept have only been exacerbated 
by the ‘absence of any institutional framework or guidelines for the 
examination of self-determination claims under international law’ (Quane 
1998). Despite this legal void, the UN has continued to attempt to facilitate 
self-determination processes in many cases. While there is some evidence 
that UN Security Council involvement can significantly reduce the possibility 
of self-determination movements ‘turning violent’ (Beardsley, Cunningham 
and White 2015), there is no comprehensive evidence characterising the 
general role of UN actions in upholding the principle of self-determination. 
The record varies for example from promises to facilitate a self-determination 
vote in Western Sahara to final success after massive failures in East Timor. 
The question therefore remains, whether the UN and its actions have enabled 
self-determination movements to succeed and to what degree, or whether the 
UN has in fact generally hindered self-determination claims contrary to its 
own Charter.
The purpose of this collection is therefore to appraise the role of the UN in 
relation to the principle of self-determination by illustrating through case 
studies and real-world examples. This book takes a very practical approach to 
discussing what role the UN has played in cases of self-determination and 
importantly, it also ventures beyond the usual discussions of the inherent 
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conflict between self-determination and sovereignty. The contributing authors 
have looked at the application of the principle of self-determination, each 
through their own lens of circumstance – not just in terms of case studies 
presented, but in the framework used. Each chapter can be seen as a stand-
alone study of the role of the UN. Though together they demonstrate a holistic 
representation of the complexity that is the UN and the principle of self-
determination itself.
In the first chapter, Tomiak introduces self-determination as a process, 
arguing that the achievement of independence and sovereignty as a result of 
the (successful) implementation of self-determination is not and should not be 
understood as an endpoint. Using the example of South Sudan, Tomiak 
shows how internal self-determination is a continuing struggle not just in 
terms of all the peoples of South Sudan and the accompanying violence and 
power struggles, but also due to the lingering role of the UN in this post-
independence phase. Similarly, R. Avgustin, in the second chapter 
showcasing the example of East Timor, argues that even after the 
independence referendum was finally held and its results implemented, the 
people of East Timor gained a new master in the form of the UN. In both 
cases, it could be concluded that the UN eventually could be understood as a 
friend to the principle of self-determination in terms of the two nations 
achieving statehood, and both cases are hailed as eventual success stories 
in that respect. However, both authors also uncover that the role of the UN 
must be appraised not only in the phases leading up to independence, but 
very critically also in the phases post-independence with regard to internal 
self-determination, i.e. sovereignty even from the UN itself.
Internal self-determination is very much at the heart of the third chapter, 
where Lightfoot and MacDonald look into the role of the UN when it comes to 
Indigenous peoples and their self-determination. Addressing how Indigenous 
peoples were first excluded from creating and building the UN system and 
then denied self-determination when the world was de-colonising, their study 
demonstrates how the Indigenous peoples gained influence internationally. 
Lightfoot and MacDonald conclude that while the UN has the potential to 
advance the self-determination of Indigenous peoples, its state-centrism 
continues to hinder that progress – for the Indigenous peoples and the UN 
itself. The chapter concludes with venturing even further, exploring 
possibilities and opportunities of future self-determination, which may involve 
multiple and plural sovereignties, thereby challenging the notion of state-
related self-determination altogether.
In the fourth chapter, Carletti provides an in-depth exploration of the UN 
vision in terms of coping with post-intrastate conflict situations and the 
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relevance of the internal pattern of self-determination, taking into account the 
so-called hybrid self-determination. This new interpretation of the principle 
has emerged as an answer to some of the past failures of sustaining peace. 
The last part of this chapter investigates the feasibility of this new concept 
and its impact on the examples of Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka and Nepal. 
The impact of peace agreements which have included this hybrid self-
determination component is evaluated showing the different scopes and roles 
the UN has/would have to adopt accordingly. These in turn set out challenges 
for the UN in testing and renewing its role and mandate in contemporary 
conflict, especially when involving a case of self-determination.
Repeatedly, it would seem that the models of external and internal self-
determination might not be sufficient altogether when it comes to offering 
possible solutions to conflict. As argued by van den Berg and Nowak in the 
fifth chapter, the existing UN state-focused paradigm has been unsuccessful 
in bringing forward a lasting solution for the Cyprus conflict. Suggesting a shift 
from the current UN model, van den Berg and Nowak look beyond existing 
interpretations and explore the balancing approach and the human rights 
approach and test them on the case of Cyprus. Solving conflicts by 
suggesting a (UN) paradigm shift is the framework also used by Brown in the 
sixth chapter examining the cases of South Sudan and Somaliland. 
Investigating the UN stance in cases of state failure and secession, he argues 
that the remedial right to secede which would complement Responsibility to 
Protect activities could effectively be used not only to stop violence occurring 
due to state failure and consequent secession, but would enable the 
international community and the UN to approach and process cases of self-
determination on a more fair basis for all parties involved. Interestingly, it 
seems that the ‘friendliness’ of the UN with regard to self-determination in 
cases of state failure and secession seems to wane when there is no 
immediate threat of violence.
This conditionality of the approach to self-determination is also explored by 
Crivelente in the seventh chapter. Discussions on what makes a people and 
how that influences the right to exercise the right to self-determination shows 
that the UN has been either unable or unwilling to keep decades of its own 
promises in the examined cases of Palestine and Western Sahara. The right 
to self-determination has become part of the resistance struggle and vice-
versa, and the UN has been challenged not only to deal with calls for self-
determination, but also with calls to respond to what is in effect ongoing 
colonisation. However, the UN is often locked by geopolitical considerations 
as is obvious also from Westcott’s analysis of Jammu and Kashmir in the 
eighth chapter. The case study shows that while the UN advocates the right to 
self-determination, in practice – and especially when it comes to major states, 
it definitely favours the principle of territorial sovereignty. The people of 
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Jammu and Kashmir and their say in the matter have been ignored 
altogether, making the UN a foe not only regarding the right to self-
determination, but also towards the violence and human rights abuses it so 
often condemns and deplores in its statements.
Questioning what makes a state enough of a state for the UN, opens up the 
discussions on the accession of micro-states to the UN as explored by 
Simpson in the final chapter. Sovereign and independent after de-
colonisation, micro-states sought UN membership to solidify their self-
determination. Despite all the discussions on size and accession criteria, as 
well as what constitutes full self-governance, Simpson demonstrates that in 
fact none of these bore an impact to their achieving UN membership. 
Although the process may not have been the same for accession during the 
Cold War and since, and even though concerns may have been genuine, in 
this case the UN has been successfully empowering and most clearly a friend 
of self-determination.
While the collection could have been a dry list of case studies, all appraising 
the role of the UN in the process of the right to self-determination being 
pursued and/or achieved, these chapters offer much more. There are critical 
insights into what happens after statehood is achieved, for example in South 
Sudan and East Timor and whether the UN continues to uphold its chartered 
principles. There are argumentations that the classical interpretation of self-
determination, pre-determined by the system’s and the UN’s state-centrism 
which worked for the era of de-colonisation, needs to evolve to encompass 
the issues of today, e.g. intra-state conflict, transnational self-determination, 
secession from failed states, peoples and struggles that do not fit into the 
existing definitions. Strangely enough, it would seem that only in the case of 
micro-states has the UN played an active and positive role throughout. As 
demonstrated with examples from Papua New Guinea, Nepal and Sri Lanka, 
Indigenous peoples, South Sudan and Somaliland, Palestine and Western 
Sahara, the principle has indeed been evolving, even if with very little help 
and impetus from the UN itself. 
Moving away from or beyond the existing UN paradigm might bring forward 
better and sustainable solutions for some of the longest-lasting conflicts, like 
the situation in Cyprus. A paradigm shift would certainly be needed for any 
serious renewed approaches for a UN-brokered solution in Jammu and 
Kashmir. As this collection is going to print, India has been actively 
destabilising the fragile peace currently in place by further deteriorating the 
status of the people in Jammu and Kashmir in spite of all its obligations under 
the UN Charter and numerous declarations and resolutions. This collection 
could have easily concluded that the role of the UN is always circumstantial, 
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and it could have subscribed to the realist interpretation of the UN as merely 
a sum of its members, where the principle of territorial sovereignty and the 
interests of the major powers always dictate the situation. Or that self-
determination only really happens when there are no perceived threats to that 
kind of state of affairs. Perhaps the classical ‘original-sin’ debate on how and 
why the right to self-determination inherently erodes state sovereignty should 
be re-defined; understanding that self-determination of the future is not 
necessarily state-based, as suggested, would require a very different inter-
national community and a very different UN. The most important contribution 
of this collection therefore lies in finding evidence of this evolving principle of 
self-determination and opportunities for its application beyond the existing UN 
paradigm.
References
Beardsley, Kevin, David E. Cunningham, and Peter B. White. 2015. 
“Resolving Civil Wars before They Start: The UN Security Council and Conflict 
Prevention in Self-Determination Disputes.” British Journal of Political Science 
47(3): 675–697.
Quane, Helen. 1998. “The United Nations and the Evolving Right to Self-
Determination.” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 47(3): 
537–572.
6
7 The United Nations Friend or Foe of Self-Determination?
1
Self-Determination as a 
Process: The United Nations in 
South Sudan
KERSTIN TOMIAK
What is the United Nations’ (UN) general stance on the principle of self-
determination? This is a rather complicated question for several reasons. The 
principle itself is, as Summers (2013, 230) says, ‘frustratingly ambiguous’. 
There can be many reasons why self-determination claims are either 
supported or rebuked without this hinting at a general stance of the UN, which 
is not a homogeneous organisation but a conglomerate of different actors and 
interests. Further, an examination of whether and under what conditions the 
organisation supported the claims alone would tell us little; just as important 
as the question of if the UN supported a self-determination claim would be the 
question of what happens after a peoples’ decision, hence if the organisation 
values and supports a new state’s independence and sovereignty. In this 
chapter, I argue that self-determination is not an endpoint that is reached 
once a people have been able to decide whether they want independence. 
Instead, I see self-determination as a process, which comes with the need to 
build a new state and state institutions. In this process of state-building, the 
UN quite often plays an important role. Understood in this way, insights into 
the organisation’s stance towards self-determination that go beyond the 
question of whether the UN supported the original claim are achieved, as are 
insights about the importance of the organisation’s composition. My argument 
is that while the UN might initially be supportive of a self-determination claim, 
events in a newly created state might force it to engage in behaviour that 
violates this state’s sovereignty and shows the organisation as being 
unsupportive of self-determination. 
In brief, I argue that (1) self-determination is a process that does not end with 
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a declaration of independence and recognition of a new state, and (2) the 
stance of the UN in a self-determination case is context-dependent, with 
‘context’ explicitly including the events in the newly created country but also 
the composition of the UN itself and the expectations and ideas of its 
individual staff. I base my argument on the case of South Sudan, where the 
UN was initially supportive of self-determination; nevertheless, the organis-
ation’s actions in the country following the declaration of independence 
showed a disregard of the new state’s sovereignty. One might argue that the 
UN’s actions were justified by the events in South Sudan with the new 
outbreak of violence and human suffering that came with it. 
Whether or not the prevention or easing of human suffering justifies the 
violation of sovereignty is an important question; while a serious engagement 
with it is outside the scope of this chapter, it shows the dilemma the UN might 
be experiencing when it comes to self-determination processes. It also gives 
rise to possible arguments for shared sovereignty or trusteeship (Krasner 
2004, 85). I am well aware that this is a slippery slope, especially in conn-
ection with self-determination claims. 
Self-determination is closely linked to decolonisation (Barnsley and Bleiker 
2008, 121; Del Mar 2013, 85), and a call for shared sovereignty can easily be 
understood as an attempt to keep a population under the thumb of either a 
foreign power or internal forces, and thus as re-colonisation. Further, there is 
a vast literature about the problems that arise when external actors engage in 
state-building (Bliesemann de Guevara 2008 and 2012; Bliesemann de 
Guevara and Kuehn 2013; Duffield 2001; Paris 2002). Nevertheless, South 
Sudan is but one example of self-determination that was followed by violent 
conflict; consequently, this has led to long-term engagements of foreign 
powers, which have subsequently hindered self-determination, as past elites 
have been exchanged for new ones. Shared sovereignty, new forms of 
trusteeship, predetermined timelines, previously agreed upon rights and 
duties of all parties involved, and a gradual transfer of power might be able to 
pave less rocky roads to self-determination. At least, clear terms and 
conditions seem more honest than the international community de facto 
running a newly independent state. 
I will first give background on the principle of self-determination and South 
Sudan; I then turn to an examination of some of the UN’s actions in the young 
state. I conclude by saying that while the UN supported the self-determination 
claim of the Southerners, it nevertheless violated the sovereignty of the young 
state following independence. My conclusions are based on observations and 
interviews during ten months of fieldwork in South Sudan in 2014 and 2015.
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On the Principle of Self-Determination
Since the principle of self-determination is enshrined in the UN’s Charter it 
would be reasonable to assume that the organisation is an advocate of the 
principle. Still, it does not engage in all such claims. In the past, self-
determination has been linked to decolonisation and freedom from forceful, 
illegal occupation; this has limited the number of possible cases. The UN 
sometimes chooses not to engage as some cases are explicitly political, e.g. 
Tibet. Sometimes the organisation is blocked from engagement like in 
southern Yemen (Chang 1972, 37–38). Further, a conflict’s history, the 
possibility of regional contagion and the characteristics of the dispute all play 
a role in the decision of whether to engage (White et al. 2018, 380). In 
general then, the UN, while not exactly a foe of self-determination, cannot be 
named a champion of the principle.  
One reason for the rather wavering position is probably the composition of the 
organisation. Freeman (1999, 357) names it ‘an association of elite states, 
whose primary purposes are to protect and promote the interests of their 
states and to maintain the existing state order. Commitments to the self-
determination of peoples (…) are subordinate to these purposes’ [italics in 
original]. The UN is not a homogeneous organisation; Weiss et al. (2018) 
distinguishes between a first, second, and third UN, thus adding to Claude’s 
older distinction of two UNs (Claude Jr. 1996). The first UN is described as 
‘an institutional framework of member states’ (Weiss et al. 2018, 2). The 
second is stated to be ‘the system of decision- and policy-making by UN 
officials who are independent and not completely instructed by states’ (Weiss 
et al. 2018, 4). Finally, the third is named a ‘network of NGOs [non-
governmental organisations], experts, corporate executives, media 
representatives, and academics who work closely with the first and second 
UN’ (Weiss et al. 2018, 5). There are many actors and interests to consider 
before the UN can decide whether it will engage in a self-determination claim. 
Further issues arise as the principle itself displays a certain degree of 
vagueness. It is not defined who possesses the right to self-determination 
(Freeman 1999, 356), and as the consequence of such a claim is often 
secession, the right to self-determination in principle threatens an existing 
state’s territorial integrity (Barnsley and Bleiker 2008,125–8). Further, the 
threat is not only to the territorial integrity of a minority group’s mother state, 
but to the community of states in general (Berndtsson and Johansson 2015); 
states’ opinions on self-determination consequently differ (ibid.). Many states 
are home to minority groups that might want to ascend to independence and 
states rather avoid such claims (Koivura 2008). Therefore, consideration of a 
self-determination claim is not only based on the rights of the peoples but as 
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much on the right of the state in question and the destabilisation effect the 
claim might have. Consequently, the right to self-determination has been 
named ‘a variable right, [that is] depending on a combination of factors. The 
two most important of these seem to be the degree of destabilisation in any 
given claim (…), and the degree to which the responding government 
represents the people belonging to the territory’ (Kirgis Jr. 1994, 310).  
Further, ethnic groups and Indigenous peoples are rather excluded from 
being heard at the UN; to make their voices heard they need to borrow an 
identity. ‘A native American would thus sit and speak as a delegate of the 
International Committee of Jurists or other NGO, and a Maori would relay his 
people’s concerns in his role as a New Zealand trade unionist’ (Clech Lam 
1992, 617). It is the exception rather than a rule for a UN forum to permit 
‘concerned parties to speak in their true representative capacity’ (ibid.). 
Henceforth, claiming the right to self-determination at the UN is rather 
problematic for ethnic or minority groups. 
An Independent South Sudan
In the case of South Sudan these problems were overcome. The United 
States massively supported the Southerners’ claim, based on the hope that a 
referendum and possible secession of the South would end the long and 
bloodthirsty war the country had suffered for decades. Public support, 
enhanced by the American film star George Clooney, also helped. In January 
2011, the South held a referendum under the conditions of the 2005 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and overwhelmingly decided to 
secede; in July 2011 independence was declared. South Sudan joined the UN 
shortly thereafter and became the 193rd member state of the international 
community of states. 
Violent conflict broke out in South Sudan in December 2013 and the UN 
Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) was caught off guard by this (Nzabanita 
2014). UNMISS was a small mission and the lack of numbers and resources 
shows that the potential for conflict in the new state was – surprisingly and 
incorrectly – underestimated. The South is home to roughly 60 different ethnic 
groups. The Southern movement that drove forward the self-determination 
claim, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army / Sudan People Liberation 
Movement (SPLA/SPLM), was led by Salva Kiir Mayardit (a Dinka) and Dr. 
Riek Machar (a Nuer), who have a well-known history of strife and quarrels 
(Akol 2003; Arop 2006; Johnson 2011). Following a relatively brief period of 
celebration, the conflict restarted, and despite a number of mediation 
attempts and sanctions, it is still ongoing. As this situation continued to 
unfold, UNMISS and other international agencies engaged and intervened in 
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decisions concerning the sovereign Government of South Sudan (GoSS). 
UNMISS was originally mandated to support the GoSS in areas such as good 
governance, security-sector reform and establishing the rule of law (S/
RES/1996). Following the outbreak of violent conflict, the mandate changed 
to focus on the protection of civilians (S/RES/2406). 
The UN, the International Community, and the Dilemma of Self-
Determination
It is not unusual for the UN to stay on after a self-determination claim and 
referendum. In Timor-Leste, which voted for secession from Indonesia in 
1999 and became independent in 2002, the UN took over administration as 
the new state needed to be built from scratch following an outbreak of 
massive violence by pro-Indonesian militia and the Indonesian army (S/
RES/1272). The mandate the UN Security Council gave to the UN 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was broad, however, and 
‘left several key questions unanswered, including the roadmap leading to self-
government, the relationship of the governance and public administration 
component to the future East Timorese government, and the mechanism for 
consultation with the East Timorese’ (Martin and Mayer-Riek 2005, 133). 
Chesterman (2002, 63–4) argues that ‘many of the expatriates working for 
UNTAET and the 70-odd international NGOs tend to treat the Timorese 
political system as a tabula rasa’, an approach that effectively excluded the 
Timorese from their state-building project. 
In South Sudan, where the UN’s mandate was nowhere near as broad, a 
similar tendency could be observed. Autesserre (2014) has described that 
international expatriates, working for international organisations and NGOs, 
value technical expertise over local knowledge and reproduce the systems 
they are most familiar with. This might be a reason for the tendency of UN 
personnel to ask counterparts in host governments for certain behaviours – a 
tendency that is understood as dictating behaviours and policies in these host 
governments. Furthermore, the relationship between the international comm-
unity and a host government is asymmetrical, with one party providing, the 
other receiving funds. In South Sudan, this led to conflicting ideas of each 
party what the other was entitled to, which led to the deterioration of the 
relationship between the parties, as I will show in the next section.
The UN’s Behaviour in South Sudan
The problems between the GoSS and the UN were probably most apparent in 
what can be named the ‘Toby Lanzer incident’. In May 2015, the GoSS 
expelled the UN’s resident relief coordinator Toby Lanzer. This was due to 
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Lanzer’s media activities; in particular, an interview given in Geneva, 
Switzerland in which Lanzer had critiqued the South Sudanese government 
harshly and described it as a failure. Supporting reasons were his critical 
tweets and statements on social media where Lanzer is said to have stated 
that South Sudan was on the brink of bankruptcy (Atem 2015). Ateny Wek 
Ateny, spokesperson of the GoSS, said in an interview with the newspaper 
The Citizen, ‘These statements are irresponsible statements from the 
humanitarian coordinator, given the fact that they don’t give hope to the 
people of South Sudan’ (ibid.). Expelling Toby Lanzer generated turmoil in the 
international community. International actors saw their opinion of the South 
Sudanese government as ruthless and authoritarian confirmed. Then UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon condemned the decision, named Lanzer 
‘instrumental in addressing the increasing humanitarian needs of conflict-
affected communities in the country’ (United Nations 2015), called on the 
GoSS to reverse the decision immediately, and urged the government to 
‘cooperate fully with all United Nations entities present in South Sudan’ (ibid.). 
The South Sudanese government felt unfairly criticised by Lanzer and reacted 
by expelling him. This was certainly not a wise decision and probably an 
overreaction; nevertheless, the GoSS was within its rights to do so. The UN 
Secretary-General, however, requested the government of an independent 
sovereign country to revoke its decision and to cooperate with the UN, which 
was read by the government and by many South Sudanese as a call to obey 
the UN. This did not bode well with the government. The GoSS views the UN 
and the international donors and expat community as guests in the country; 
as such ‘they do have to obey the rules of South Sudan and not make their 
own rules. They have to follow our rules’.1 The international community on the 
other hand, viewed itself as supporting the country and as having a voice in 
how it is run. A civil servant from the European Union stated in an informal 
discussion that ‘governments come and go. We assist the people of South 
Sudan’.2 The same was, phrased in different ways, stated by employees of 
international nongovernmental organisations (iNGOs) in the country. The 
international community feels that because of the amount of money they are 
giving they have a say in the country’s governance. Most prominently, this 
was phrased by an acquaintance working for an iNGO, who said: ‘We have 
literally paid for everything in this country. This country is functioning only 
because of us’.3 
The GoSS on the other hand, does not see a connection between receiving 
1  Interview with a South Sudanese government official in the Ministry of Information 
and Broadcast, conducted in Juba, 30 June 2015. 
2  Field notes, 16 April 2015.
3  Field notes, 23 February 2015.
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donor money and a right to decide. In informal talks, government officials said 
that they are happy to receive advice, but they do not feel an obligation to 
take it. In this regard, it was also quite often stated that foreign experts and 
UN workers, as well as iNGO employees, are rather clueless about realities in 
the country. An explanation for this might be the way the donors and expat 
workers live and work. What has been described as ‘the expat bubble’ makes 
for a tangible barrier between foreigners and the South Sudanese and has an 
effect on the perceptions of the other group (Autesserre 2014; Smirl 2015). 
There is a clear tendency of ‘bunkerisation’ (Fisher 2017), with foreigners 
living and working for security reasons in secure compounds with very limited 
connections to the outside world. The high levels of security for the 
compounds of foreigners, including the UN agencies, make for divisions; 
government officials repeatedly phrased a general feeling of mistrust when 
talking about their relationship with foreigners. 
While this points to a more general problem in the relationship between the 
international community and a host government, a clearer violation of the 
GoSS’s sovereignty was the interference of UNMISS in the government’s 
media policy. In February 2015, the Minister for Information, Michael Makuei, 
threatened to close the UN’s Radio Miraya. Miraya had aired an interview with 
an exiled politician, namely Rebecca Garang, who was placed under house 
arrest in December 2013, before she went into exile. Makuei named her a 
rebel and threatened to shut down the UN’s radio station. The threat was 
retracted after the intervention of Ellen Margrethe Løj, the then head of 
UNMISS. Like the Toby Lanzer incident, the Miraya incident was interpreted 
in two different ways. While almost every international worker in South Sudan 
who I talked to understood it as an affront of the government against press 
freedom and the UN in general, South Sudanese acquaintances were taken 
aback by what they described as ‘another UNMISS-arrogance’.4 It was said 
that no government in the West would allow a radio station to air rebel views 
and that the UN needed to follow the laws in the country.5
The two occurrences had a similar pattern. A member or an institution of the 
international community states or broadcasts something the government of 
the host country understands as hostile; it reacts to this and is rebuffed by the 
international actor and made to reverse its decision. The concern here is not 
if the reaction of the GoSS in both cases was appropriate – this is certainly 
debatable. The concern is that the decision of a sovereign government was 
overrun by an actor that is supposed to support the self-determination of 
people. Instead, both incidents show the UN pushing for the GoSS to behave 
4  Interview with a South Sudanese media consultant and advisor, conducted in Juba, 
20 June 2015.
5 Ibid.
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as they, the UN, saw fit.
This struggle over predominance between the local elites and the 
international actors was further apparent in the international community’s 
reaction to the GoSS’s attempt to regulate iNGOs. In May 2015, the 
government issued a new bill that required them to register with the 
government: a tedious and costly process but not a new or unusual 
requirement. Furthermore, it ordered iNGOs to ensure that no more than a 
fifth of their staff were foreigners. This caused concern among the iNGOs 
working in South Sudan. It was claimed that this regulation would result in 
delays of projects because of a shortage of skilled South Sudanese workers. 
This was dismissed by nationals. ‘We do not have a capacity problem’, I was 
told, ‘…we have a capacity utilisation problem’.6 Another statement was that 
‘the international community is doing capacity building here since ten years. 
How can there not be enough capacity? Did they do something wrong?’7 The 
government and many well-educated South Sudanese have long been 
complaining that iNGOs give too many jobs to foreigners instead of to the 
local population. The NGO bill with its quota for foreigners was seen as 
reasonable and necessary by them and the argument of the internationals 
that there are not enough skilled people for employment in South Sudan was 
understood as an insult. In the end however, the GoSS partly retracted the bill 
in explaining that it concerned only certain professions and management 
levels and the quotas were not enforced.   
The meddling of foreigners in internal affairs was also apparent when six US-
based iNGOs, including Human Rights Watch, sent a letter to John Kerry, the 
then US Secretary of State, and asked for more sanctions against South 
Sudan to force the warring parties to strike a peace deal. Surely this was well 
meant, but it did not soften the GoSS’s approach towards iNGOs or 
foreigners. According to the New Nation, a South Sudanese newspaper, it 
was seen as a ‘blatant interference in the internal affairs of a 
sovereige nation’.8 The government reacted by saying that the iNGOs should 
rather ‘reflect on their current soft-gloves approach towards the rebels and 
start to exercise more pressure on the rebels to motivate them to return to the 
peace talks’.9 This, to be sure, was not the UN or one of its agencies 
behaving in this way, but using the notion of the ‘third UN’, the network of 
iNGOs working with the UN (Weiss et al. 2018), the problem of the 
international community meddling in the internal affairs of a sovereign country 
is evident. 
6  Interview with a South Sudanese project manager, conducted in Juba, 18 April 2015.
7  Interview with a South Sudanese advisor, conducted in Juba, 12 August 2015.
8  New Nation newspaper, 17 June 2015.
9  Ibid.
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Friend or Foe?
Where does all this leave us with the question of whether the UN is a friend or 
foe of self-determination? This question can be answered from two different 
angles. One can examine if and for what reasons the organisation gets in-
volved in self-determination claims. This perspective sees self-determination 
as a result. Self-determination can, however, also be seen as a process. In 
this view, it is not achieved by just a popular vote and a (possible) declaration 
of independence. Instead, self-determination would be achieved when there 
is a functioning state in place, a state that is grounded in its peoples’ 
decisions and whose acts are respected by the international community. Such 
a state cannot be declared, instead, it needs to be built. How the UN engages 
in this process provides a different answer to the question of whether it is a 
friend or a foe of self-determination. Thinking about self-determination as a 
result, South Sudan would count as a rather successful case; independence 
was declared following a popular vote. If seen as a process, South Sudan is 
not a successful case as its declaration of independence was followed by a 
power struggle, outbreak of violent conflict, and human suffering; it can 
certainly not be declared that the peoples of South Sudan have achieved self-
determination. Questions about the UN’s stance towards South Sudan’s 
sovereignty also arise. The UN, mandated at first with supporting the GoSS 
and later with the protection of civilians, butted heads with the government 
about how certain aspects of governance should be managed, giving room to 
the accusation that the organisation might be supportive only of a certain kind 
of state. In Timor-Leste, the organisation that enjoyed a much broader 
mandate was also accused of not engaging and consulting enough with the 
local people but running the country as it saw fit (Chesterman 2002, 64–68). 
Sticking to the notion of the first, the second, and the third UN is helpful here. 
As introduced by Weiss et al. (2018, 2), these include the member states, the 
system of UN-officials and the network of NGOs, consultants and journalists 
working for the UN. In the case of South Sudan, the first UN was positively 
engaged in the self-determination of the South. After the declaration of 
independence and the recognition of South Sudan as a sovereign state, the 
second and the third UN engaged in practices that can be understood as a 
violation of sovereignty. This was due to events in the country. With this, it can 
be said that parts of the UN were a friend while others were a foe. The stance 
of the UN towards self-determination is not necessarily homogenous. 
Stephen Krasner (2004, 85) states that the rules of what he calls ‘conven-
tional sovereignty’, including the principle of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of a sovereign state, are frequently violated in practice. In the case of 
South Sudan, the interference of the international community can be seen as 
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justified by the dire situation in the country. Personally, I do not doubt that the 
UN-personnel in South Sudan genuinely acted with the best interests of the 
South Sudanese people at heart. Still, it seems unclear how interference in 
the media and in the government’s decision to regulate iNGOs working in the 
country would be able to end the conflict or ease human suffering. Instead, 
these interferences worsened the relationship between the government and 
the international community and contributed to growing mistrust between the 
parties. With these practices, the UN acted more like a foe to the process of 
self-determination. 
It is not a rare occurrence that self-determination is followed by violent conflict 
and this begs the question of if there is a way to cope with self-determination 
to solve or prevent such situations. Shared sovereignty or trusteeships have 
been proposed (Krasner 2004). With reference to a people who want to 
decide their fate, this seems unreasonable; still, in cases of potentially weak, 
new states in conflict or in danger thereof, there might be a point in question. 
In South Sudan, self-determination was guaranteed only to have it violated by 
external powers. These interferences did not help overcome the conflict; 
instead, they caused ongoing mistrust and problems between the actors 
involved. Further research might clarify if agreements about shared 
sovereignty or a trusteeship with mutually agreed clear guidelines on such 
points as the partners’ responsibilities, complaint mechanisms, and length of 
the agreement might be better policy tools to overcome or prevent violent 
conflict and help new states on their way to self-determination.
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The United Nations and Self-
Determination in the Case of 
East Timor
JAKOB R. AVGUSTIN
This chapter will look at a case study of self-determination which became 
prominent in the UN in the 1970s and was only indirectly linked to the process 
of decolonisation as such. Portugal as a colonial power either neglected East 
Timor1 or ruled with a heavy hand, leaving its people to eventually gain 
independence from decades of violence under Indonesian occupation. This 
chapter will not discuss the different definitions of self-determination or the 
historic development of this legal right. However, it will discuss the story of 
East Timor, highlighting the practice of the UN, particularly through the 
resolutions of the Security Council (SC), and assess the role of the UN from 
that perspective. Self-determination is understood in this chapter purely 
normatively – as a right of any people to declare and establish a sovereign 
and independent political entity. The underlying assumption being that given 
the UN, and the SC especially, is a political organisation, the road to the 
eventual outcome for East Timor is not expected to even appear 
straightforward. In fact, as this chapter will show, at times the UN actively 
obstructed the claim of the East Timorese people for their sovereignty, casting 
serious doubt on the organisation’s supposedly favourable stance towards 
self-determination of peoples. 
Short History
The small island of Timor, situated only about 500km north of Australia, has 
Officially the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste since 2002, however this chapter will 
use East Timor throughout.
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spent most of its history at the crossroads between major powers dominating 
maritime southeast Asia; it was first used as a trading post for China and 
India, and then in the seventeenth century the western part became colonised 
by the Dutch while the Portuguese took over the eastern part of the island. 
The Portuguese were not very efficient in establishing governance which 
resulted in two parallel systems of rule – the colonial and the indigenous one 
(Taylor 1994, 12). Even though the Sentenca Arbitral codified the border 
between the eastern and the western part of the island in 1915, the Timorese 
people all over the island fought the occupation by Japan in World War II with 
guerrilla tactics under the leadership of Australian commandos (Taylor 1994, 
12–13). Even though Australia left the island in 1943, the Timorese continued 
their guerrilla fighting on the side of the Allies until the end of the war and at a 
high human life cost (Taylor 1994, 13). Despite their efforts and sacrifice, the 
island remained divided between two foreign masters after the war – the 
western part was incorporated into Indonesia while the eastern part remained 
under rather uninterested Portuguese administration which nonetheless used 
violence to rule. In the 1970s, as a civil war broke out between the pro-
Portuguese and pro-independence movements in their Timorese colony, the 
Portuguese simply left, burdened by the coup d’état in their homeland 
(Calvocoressi 2001, 561). Despite official assurances in April 1974 that they 
would not interfere with the Portuguese Timor (Taylor 1994, 25), Indonesia 
took advantage of the opportunity and annexed the eastern part of the island, 
although neither the UN nor Portugal ever recognised this annexation. It is at 
that point that the situation of East Timor appears in the UN SC documents 
for the first time.
In fact, in its very first resolution on East Timor S/RES/384 (1975) the UN SC 
recognises ‘the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-
determination and independence in accordance with the principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in the General 
Assembly (GA) Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960’. The UN SC was 
also ‘gravely concerned about the deterioration of the situation’ and the loss 
of life in East Timor, and deplored the ‘intervention of the armed forces of 
Indonesia in East Timor’. It even regretted that ‘the government of Portugal 
did not discharge fully its responsibilities as administering Power in the 
Territory’. The UN SC at that point called ‘all States to respect the territorial 
integrity of East Timor as well as the inalienable right of its people to self-
determination’, and called upon Indonesia to withdraw and upon Portugal to 
cooperate fully with the UN so as to enable the people of East Timor to 
exercise freely their right to self-determination’. It also requested the UN 
Secretary-General to send a  to East Timor for on-spot assessment. The UN 
GA also adopted its first resolution on East Timor in 1975 and then adopted a 
further resolution each year, all of which basically echoed the UN SC 
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resolutions, but only until 1982.
Clear and unequivocal support of the UN SC for recognising the inalienable 
right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence 
continued in the following year with S/RES/389 (1976) reaffirming the 
previous resolution. The UN SC again called upon ‘all States to respect the 
territorial integrity of East Timor as well as the inalienable right of its people to 
self-determination’ and called upon ‘Indonesia to withdraw without further 
delay all its forces from the Territory’. It also requested that the Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary-General continue their assignment. 
However, it is important to note at this point that S/RES/384 was adopted 
unanimously while S/RES/389 was adopted with Japan and the US 
abstaining, signalling their alliance with the strategically positioned Indonesia.
The next time the UN SC or the UN GA addressed the issue of East Timor 
wasn’t until 1999. In the two decades of Indonesian rule, the people of East 
Timor were subjected to violence and isolation with about 80% of the male 
population killed in the first months of the occupation (Taylor 1994, 68) and 
almost a quarter of the population dying of disease or hunger according to the 
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (Chega! 
2008). It seems as if the international community with all its institutions simply 
forgot about East Timor, even though in 1979 the president and his deputy 
were killed (Calvocoressi 2001, 561) and the agriculture economy and 
infrastructure in East Timor were practically destroyed (Taylor 1994, ix). Even 
the International Committee of the Red Cross didn’t conduct any operations in 
East Timor until 2002. Even more, the UN Secretary-General Special 
Representative was denied access to areas in question and it seems as if 
there was an active effort of the West to support Indonesia and Suharto’s 
regime and keep East Timor off the agenda (Calvocoressi 2001; Wheeler and 
Dunne 2001) despite incredible human rights violations and violence against 
the Timorese people. 
Suharto, President of Indonesia from 1967 to 1998, was determined to quash 
any resistance in East Timor and was implicitly supported by the West with 
the US and the UK regularly supplying the Indonesian military (Calvocoressi 
2001, 561). The international community definitely played a role in keeping 
East Timor off the agenda in terms of maintaining international peace and 
security for more than 20 years. Indonesia was an important strategic ally of 
the West during the Cold War and half of a small island in Southeast Asia and 
its people were not. Australia, its closest Western neighbour, was fully aware 
of Indonesia’s plans to invade (Wheeler and Dunne 2008, 806) and in fact 
accepted the legitimacy of Indonesia’s rule and even used its influence to 
smooth out criticism of Indonesia in the UN (Wheeler and Dunne 2001, 810). 
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Even more, it seems Australia actively prevented the UN Secretary-General 
Special Representative to establish contact with the ‘rebel’ areas by seizing 
the radio transmitter with the order coming directly from the Australian Prime 
Minister (Taylor 1994, 72).
Nonetheless, many efforts were being undertaken in the background, 
particularly towards resolving the role of Portugal and its relationship with 
Indonesia. Even though Indonesia de facto administered the territory, 
Portugal still felt it had a right in deciding the destiny of East Timor despite the 
decision of the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning East 
Timor (Portugal V. Australia) in 1995 which found that East Timor is a territory 
without self-government and the East Timorese are a people with a right to 
self-determination. 
The Road to the Referendum
With Suharto’s resignation in 1998, the ideas of independence gained new 
ground among the East Timorese and the new Indonesian President Habibie 
turned out to be a proponent of the idea of more autonomy for East Timor, 
even if not sovereignty. Further discussions between Indonesia and Portugal 
resulted in an agreement for an independence referendum to be organised 
under the auspices of the UN. However, it wasn’t until May 1999 that 
Indonesia and Portugal signed the so-called General Agreement on the 
question of East Timor which then led to the report from the UN Secretary-
General proposing an independence referendum and a UN observer mission 
which the UN SC enacted in the S/RES/1246 on 11 June 1999 with the 
establishment of the UN Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) which 
was established to assist with the organisation, implementation and 
supervision of the referendum on 8 August 1999. After 23 years of not having 
had the question of East Timor on its agenda, the UN SC suddenly became 
much more responsive to the developments in East Timor, adopting five 
further resolutions in that year.
Despite threats and intimidation, 98% of registered voters took part and 
78.5% voted in favour of independence (Chesterman 2007, 194). What 
followed immediately however was a repetition of old behaviour from 
Indonesia – militias wreaked havoc in waves of violence, which might have 
indeed been coordinated from Indonesian governmental circles (Chesterman 
2007, 195). Approximately 30,000 people were killed with thousands fleeing 
for their lives (Calvocoressi 2001, 562). It must be pointed out that the UN, 
i.e. the international observers, in fact expected and warned of unrest and 
conflict following the referendum, yet the UN sent only a small force of 300 
military troops and 400 police officers to that end (Paris 2001, 773). With this 
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in mind, one could argue that the UN had indeed not learned much from the 
tragic experience in Rwanda, nor applied any of these lessons when it came 
to future cases of self-determination, for example in Sudan/South Sudan.
After the Referendum
Discussing why such grave failures in organising, observing and safeguarding 
the independence referendum process have occurred and whose 
responsibility they were, is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, they 
must be acknowledged as despite all the paperwork adopted via the UN, i.e. 
reports by the UN Secretary-General, and UN SC and UN GA resolutions, 
tens of thousands of East Timorese died as a result of those failures before 
and shortly after the independence referendum in August 1999. Some claim 
that this inability or even incapability of UN Secretariat bureaucrats to foresee 
and prevent such violence constitutes gross neglect (Bolton 2001, 142). With 
the UN SC permanent members tired of sending their troops all over the 
world throughout the 1990s, it was almost miraculous and indeed 
unprecedented that within three weeks of the referendum being held, a peace 
enforcement mission led by Australia had been established by the UN SC 
with S/RES/1264 (1999), and had indeed already been marching into the East 
Timor capital of Dili. What is even more impressive about this case is that the 
peace enforcement operation was undertaken with agreement of the 
‘aggressor’ – even though Indonesia’s agreement would not have been 
necessary for such action with UN SC authorisation. 
The International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) was authorised under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter and was authorised to use all necessary 
means to fulfil its mandate ‘to restore peace and security in East Timor, to 
protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and, within force 
capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations’. To demonstrate 
how acute the situation in East Timor was in terms of the UN SC response, it 
must be explained that the case of East Timor is one in only four instances 
where the UN SC determined under Chapter VII of the Charter that the 
situation constituted a threat to international peace and security, established a 
multinational military peace enforcement operation (not conducted under the 
UN flag), and authorised the use of all necessary means – all in the first 
resolution addressing the outburst of violence (R. Avgustin 2016).2 In six 
weeks, INTERFET took charge of all critical points with Indonesian military 
retreating even before INTERFET units reached all parts of the territory. It 
took, however, two further UN missions – UN Transitional Administration in 
2  The other three in the period till 2012 were Operation Uphold Democracy led by the 
US in Haiti in 1994, Multi-National Force – Iraq led by the US in Iraq in 2003, and 
Multinational Interim Force led by the US in Haiti in 2004 (R. Avgustin 2016, 95).
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East Timor (UNTAET) and UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) – 
and almost three more years for East Timor to become an independent and 
sovereign country on 20 May 2002. In the same month, the UN GA also 
adopted a resolution with which it removed East Timor from its list of non-self-
governing territories (A/RES/56/282). In September 2002, East Timor became 
a Member State of the UN (A/RES/57/3).
UNMISET was replaced by the UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) in 2005 
which was replaced by the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) in 
2006. Importantly, when new outbursts of violence occurred in 2006, East 
Timor did not make a plea for help at the UN but went directly to Australia, 
which again obliged with a new and, again, successful military operation. 
Operation Astute which completed its mission in 2013 included Portuguese 
troops who interestingly remained under their own chained command. The 
operation was not directly authorised by the UN SC, however it was given full 
support and acknowledgment post festum in 2006 with S/RES/1690.
From Independence to Sovereignty
In the process of declaring independence from effectively two masters, it 
would seem that East Timor gained a third one – the UN itself. The UN SC 
and all the missions it authorised practically took over the country and ran it 
for another decade after the independence referendum. UNTAET which was 
authorised to use all necessary means to fulfil its mandate was granted power 
and authority over the entire legislative and executive branches as well as 
administration over the judiciary. Since UNTAET completed its mandate in a 
territory where there was no effective governance, or at least none that could 
satisfy the UN expectations, there might be room to understand the UNTAET 
mandate. Yet, UNMISET which took over in 2002 had a similarly broad 
mandate and was also authorised to use all necessary means. UN 
bureaucrats even negotiated internationally on behalf of East Timor 
(Chesterman 2007, 19). However, one should also take into account 
numerous pleas of East Timor’s representatives for UN missions to be 
prolonged and/or strengthened; for example the Foreign Minister’s February 
2004 request that the UN SC extend the mandate of UNMISET, or the letter 
from the Prime Minister in January 2005 in which he requested the continued 
presence of the UN. In fact, UNOTIL was established in 2005 following a 
proposal from the Prime Minister – it was then that this de facto UN 
administration softened into a political mission which supports further 
development of state institutions, democratic values, rule of law, and the 
promotion of human rights. This mandate continued with UNMIT until 2012 
when it completed its mandate. It was in 2012 that the UN SC and the UN GA 
also adopted the last of their resolutions regarding East Timor. From 1999 to 
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2012 the UN SC adopted 25 resolutions3 regarding East Timor, the Secretary-
General wrote more than 40 reports for the UN SC, and the UN GA adopted 
36 resolutions. 
Evaluating the Role of the UN
Analysis of the UN and its role in the international community can often be 
reduced to debates on its legitimacy and legality (De Wet 2004; Blokker 2005; 
Manusama 2006; Thakur 2006; Hurd 2007; Cronin and Hurd 2008; Dedring 
2008) which lie at the heart of the debate on whether the UN is indeed merely 
a sum of its members. The theoretical frameworks underpinning explanations 
on both sides of that debate nonetheless do not provide any practical 
guidelines on how to evaluate the role of the UN and its actions. In fact, it 
would seem that up until the moment an action is discussed, most will argue 
about positions of certain member states, particularly the permanent 
members of the UN SC. It is only at the point when an action, i.e. resolution, 
is adopted that opinions begin referring to the effectiveness, purpose, 
responsibility, and even cost-efficiency of the UN as such. 
Reasons for the prevalently unfavourable opinions vary widely; increasing 
membership (Snow and Brown 1996; Ziring et al. 2005), more complex 
notions of security (Roper 1993; Rothgeb 1993; Cortright and Lopez 2002; 
Smillie and Minear 2004; Thakur 2006; Trent 2007; Roberts and Zaum 2008), 
changed international relations due to new/different actors (Rothgeb 1993; 
Rupesinghe and Anderlini 1998; Hirst 2001; Malone 2004; Schoenbaum 
2006; Trent 2007; Richmond 2008), changes regarding the nature of armed 
conflict (Snow and Brown 1996; Galtung et al. 2002; Roberts and Zaum 
2008), a non-functioning UN SC during the Cold War (Roper 1993; Kegley 
and Raymond 1994; Snow and Brown 1996; Ryan 2000; Weiss and Collins 
2000; Cortright and Lopez 2002; Malone 2004; Roberts and Zaum 2008), and 
even unclear provisions of the UN Charter (Bailey and Daws 1998). 
Discussions on cases of self-determination inherently expose the internal 
clash of the UN Charter between the principles of sovereignty and self-
determination. That in itself makes for a troubling starting point in evaluating 
the role of the UN in such cases as favouring one principle inevitably makes 
the UN deny the other, almost as if it were a zero-sum game.
Evaluating the case of East Timor through the perspective of the UN SC 
permanent members is interesting as this tiny island really hasn’t been of 
strategic interest to any of them. However, Indonesia was very much a 
strategic ally, particularly for the West and Australia. That state of affairs was 
3  For comparison, the UN SC adopted altogether 23 resolutions regarding Rwanda 
(excluding the ones referring to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda).
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important enough that the UN as well as the UN SC permanent members 
turned a blind eye to blatant human rights violations and suffering. Then, in 
the late 1990s, the balance shifted – first with Suharto’s departure, but more 
importantly, with a significant change in Australia’s public opinion. Indonesia’s 
new President Habibie was going to consider increased autonomy for East 
Timor, but then-Australian Prime Minister Howard suggested postponing a 
referendum for another decade (McDougall 2007, 872). Australia hadn’t been 
a big proponent of self-determination as such until that point anyway 
(Woodard 1999, 9), but the Australian public was appalled and consequently 
demonstrated enough pressure to have the Australian Government offer to 
lead INTERFET (McDougall 2007, 873). Due to media exposure even the US 
ended up contributing some troops and logistical support (Strobel 2001, 684). 
Notably however, Australian foreign policy shifted from a clear strategic and 
trade interest with Indonesia to connecting humanitarian and legal norms with 
concepts of national interest (Woodard 1999, 10). However, one shouldn’t 
forget that East Timor most likely remains very interesting to Australia also 
because of its oil reserves.
Concluding Remarks
The case of East Timor does not provide a clear and definitive answer as to 
whether the UN has been a friend or foe overall. The UN definitely counts 
East Timor as one of its most successful cases and East Timor is a peaceful 
and stable country today, but one should understand that the UN became 
successful only after the people of East Timor finally voted for their own 
independence and due to a member state, whose own people demanded a 
significant change and military action. Now, it is important that the UN SC or 
any of the permanent members didn’t stand in the way of that action – this is 
where East Timor could be counted as ‘lucky’ to have been of no strategic 
interest to any of them.  
That position was also extremely unfortunate for the people of East Timor in 
the decades of Portuguese violent neglect and Indonesian brutality. In those 
years, the UN definitely was not upholding the right to self-determination for 
East Timorese, nor was it upholding any of the several (universal) 
declarations, resolutions and practices which were applied in several other 
situations, more or less successfully. It would seem that from the standpoint 
of the UN SC permanent members, East Timor just never quite made it to the 
top of the priorities list, particularly after the end of the Cold War when so 
many threats to international peace and security were dealt with. For 
example, the military action in Kosovo was taking place at roughly the same 
time. The French Ambassador to the UN at the time stated that the conflict 
over East Timor is an “orphan of the Cold War, where the interests of the 
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major powers are circumstantial at best” (Carey and Walsh 2008, 355). 
However, even in 1999 with all the lessons of Somalia, Rwanda, former 
Yugoslavia, and others, the UN went to East Timor practically blind and deaf 
to all the warning signs. Once again, even though the referendum indeed took 
place, the UN failed the people of East Timor. Was it because the UN was 
pre-occupied with more ‘important’ events around the world once again, or 
was it because the UN SC permanent members were getting tired of policing 
those events around the world?
It would seem that the UN cannot be a friend or a foe to self-determination as 
such until its members, particularly the UN SC permanent members, or a 
strong enough ‘outsider’ like Australia in the case of East Timor, make it one 
or the other. Importantly though in the case of East Timor, it could be argued 
that the UN was definitely not a friend to the people of East Timor even 
without the right to self-determination in the equation. It is in this conclusion 
that the true incapability of the UN lies and continues to be present around 
the world.
References
Bailey, Sydney D., and Sam Daws. 1998. The Procedure of the UN Security 
Council. 3rd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Blokker, Niels. 2005. “The Security Council and the use of force: On recent 
practice.” In The Security Council and the Use of Force. Theory and Reality 
– A Need for Change?, edited by Niels Blokker and Nico Schrijver, 1–31. 
Leiden: Martinues Nijhoff Publishers.
Bolton, John R. 2001. “United States Policy on United Nations Peacekeeping: 
Case Studies in the Congo, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Kosovo, and East 
Timor.” World Affairs 163(3): 129–147. 
Calvocoressi, Peter. 2001. World Politics 1945–2000. 8th edition. Essex: 
Pearson Education Limited.
Carey, Peter, and Pat Walsh. 2008. “The Security Council and East Timor.” In 
The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and 
Practice since 1945, edited by Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer 
Welsh, and Dominik Zaum, 346–368. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chega!. 2008. “Conflict-related deaths in Timor-Leste 1974–1999.” Last 
modified April 2008. http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/en/chegaReport.htm.
29 The United Nations Friend or Foe of Self-Determination?
Chesterman, Simon. 2007. “East Timor.” In United Nations Interventionism 
1991–2004, edited by Mats Berdal and Sypros Economides, 192–217. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cortright, David, and George A. Lopez. 2002. Sanctions and the Search for 
Security: Challenges to UN Action. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Cronin, Bruce, and Ian Hurd. 2008. The UN Security Council and the Politics 
of International Authority. Oxon: Routledge.
De Wet, Erika. 2004. The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security 
Council. Portland: Hart Publishing.
Dedring, Juergen. 2008. The United Nations Security Council in the 1990s: 
Resurgence and Renewal. Albany: State University of New York.
Galtung, Johan, Carl G. Jacobsen, and Kai Frithjof Brand-Jacobsen. 2002. 
Searching for Peace: The Road to Transcend. 2nd edition. London: Pluto 
Press.
Hirst, Paul. 2001. War and Power in the 21st Century: The State, Military 
Conflict and the International System. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hurd, Ian. 2007. After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations 
Security Council. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kegley, Charles W. Jr., and Gregory Raymond. 1994. A Multipolar Peace? 
Great-Power Politics in the Twenty-first Century. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Malone, David M. 2004. The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 
21st Century. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Manusama, Kenneth. 2006. The United Nations Security Council in the 
Post-Cold War Era: Applying the Principle of Legality. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers.
McDougall, Derek. 2007. “‘Intervening’ in the Neighbourhood: Comparing 
Australia’s Role in East Timor and the Southwest Pacific.” International 
Journal 62(4): 867–885. 
30The United Nations and Self-Determination in the Case of East Timor
Paris, Roland. 2001. “Wilson’s Ghost: The Faulty Assumptions of Postconflict 
Peacebuilding.” In Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing 
International Conflict, edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and 
Pamela Aall, 765–785. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.
R. Avgustin, J. 2016. “Analysis of the UN SC authorization of the use of force: 
Challenging the realistic approach.” Ph.D. Diss., University of Ljubljana. 
Richmond, Oliver P. 2008. Peace in International Relations. New York: 
Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
Roberts, Adam, and Dominik Zaum. 2008. Selective Security: War and the 
United Nations Security Council since 1945. London: Routledge za The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Roper, John. 1993. Keeping the Peace in the Post-Cold War Era: 
Strengthening Multilateral Peacekeeping: a report to the Trilateral 
Commission. New York: The Trilateral Commission.
Rothgeb, John M. Jr. 1993. Defining Power: Influence and Force in the 
Contemporary International System. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Rupesinghe, Kumar, and Sanam Naraghu Anderlini. 1998. Civil Wars, Civil 
Peace: An Introduction to Conflict Resolution. London: Pluto Press.
Ryan, Stephen. 2000. The United Nations and International Politics. New 
York: St. Martin’s Press.
Schoenbaum, Thomas J. 2006. International Relations – The Path Not Taken: 
Using International Law to Promote World Peace and Security. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Smillie, Ian, and Larry Minear. 2004. The Charity of Nations: Humanitarian 
Action in a Calculating World. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press.
Snow, Donald M., and Eugene Brown. 1996. The Contours of Power: An 
Introduction to Contemporary International Relations. New York: St. Martin’s 
Press.
31 The United Nations Friend or Foe of Self-Determination?
Strobel, Warren P. 2001. “Information and Conflict.” In Turbulent Peace: The 
Challenges of Managing International Conflict, edited by Chester A. Crocker, 
Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, 677–695. Washington: United States 
Institute of Peace Press.
Taylor, John G. 1994. Indonesia’s Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East 
Timor. London: Zed Books.
Thakur, Ramesh. 2006. The United Nations, Peace and Security: From 
Collective Security to Responsibility to Protect. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Trent, John E. 2007. Modernizing the United Nations System: Civil Society’s 
Role in Moving from International Relations to Global Governance. 
Leverkusen Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers.
United Nations General Assembly resolutions. Available at: https://www.un.
org/en/sections/documents/general-assembly-resolutions/index.html. 
United Nations Security Council resolutions. Available at: https://www.un.org/
securitycouncil/content/resolutions-0. 
Weiss, Thomas G., and Cindy Collins. 2000. Humanitarian Challenges and 
Intervention. 2nd edition. Boulder: Westview Press, Perseus Books Group.
Wheeler, Nicholas J., and Tim Dunne. 2001. “East Timor and the New 
Humanitarian Interventionism.” International Affairs 77(4): 805–827. 
Woodard, Garry. 1999. “Australia’s foreign policy after Timor.” International 
Journal 55(1): 1–14.
Ziring, Lawrence, Robert E. Riggs, and Jack C. Plano. 2005. The United 
Nations: International Organization and World Politics. 4th edition. Belmont: 
Thomson Learning, Wadsworth.
32The United Nations as both Foe and Friend to Indigenous Peoples and Self-Determination
3
The United Nations as both Foe 
and Friend to Indigenous 
Peoples and Self-Determination
SHERYL LIGHTFOOT AND DAVID B. MACDONALD
Since the advent of the United Nations (UN) system, Indigenous peoples 
have been poorly represented, their own self-determining rights and 
aspirations subsumed by assertions of absolute sovereignty by settler states 
such as Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. Settler state 
governments often perceive Indigenous rights as a threat to state sovereignty 
and thus seek to ‘domesticate’ Indigenous nations, preventing them from 
participating in the UN system as sovereign actors. While the UN has 
historically been a foe to Indigenous self-determination efforts, changes in 
recent decades suggest that the UN may be seen increasingly as a friend, 
providing a base for international coordination, advocacy, and policy change. 
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part explores the challenges 
and opportunities afforded by the UN system to Indigenous peoples, paying 
close attention to their exclusion from its creation, and their denial of 
sovereignty during the 1960s as other colonies gained independence. The 
second part focuses on how Indigenous peoples have gained influence 
internationally through the work of the International Indian Treaty Council and 
other organisations. It also covers how they have attained better recognition 
of their right to self-determination with the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples adopted in 2007. Representation, apart from settler 
states, also takes place at the UN through the Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues (formed in 2000), the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (established in 2001), and the Expert Mechanism on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007). The third part balances the potential of 
the UN for advancing Indigenous sovereignties, while also critiquing the state-
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centric nature of the system. 
The United Nations and the Exclusion of Indigenous Peoples 
According to data from the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs 
(IWGIA), there are more than 300 million Indigenous peoples in the world, 
over 5000 distinct peoples living in 72 countries recognised by IWGIA as 
‘Indigenous’. A precise and objective definition of Indigenous peoples has 
been exceedingly difficult to achieve due to the vast diversity of Indigenous 
peoples. After years of heated debate, the UN developed a working definition, 
centred on three primary elements: 1) a pre-colonial presence in a particular 
territory, 2) a continuous cultural, linguistic and/or social distinctiveness from 
the surrounding population, and 3) a self-identification as ‘Indigenous’ and/or 
a recognition by other Indigenous groups as ‘Indigenous’ (Lightfoot 2016).
From its formation in 1945, the UN was, in a sense, a foe to the aspirations of 
Indigenous peoples for sovereignty because it privileged the sovereignty of 
many imperial and settler states. This marked a continuation from the former 
League of Nations, which also favoured Western state sovereignty at the 
expense of Indigenous peoples and other colonised peoples. A clear example 
can be seen in the League Mandates, which gave Western powers increased 
control over Germany’s former colonies, without the input from and respect 
for the Indigenous peoples living there. The League also proved unwilling to 
help intervene when member states violated their treaties with Indigenous 
peoples (MacQueen 2018).  
Indigenous representatives such as the Tahupōtiki Wiremu Rātana (Ngati Apa 
and Ngā Wairiki ) from Aotearoa New Zealand and Levi General or Deskaheh 
(Six Nations Haudenosaunee) whose lands are located in present-day 
Canada, both petitioned the League (Hauptman 2008)  to compel the British 
crown to honour its treaties with Indigenous peoples, only to have the League 
more or less turn a blind eye (Lightfoot 2016).
After 1945, UN members adopted instruments which advanced their state-
centric goals while removing protections for Indigenous peoples. For 
example, UN members passed the Genocide Convention in 1948, but 
removed references to cultural genocide which were in the 1947 draft 
(MacDonald 2019). This was done because many of the policies prohibited in 
this earlier draft including cultural genocide were actually being performed on 
Indigenous peoples by settler states. Forced assimilation in residential 
schools and through fostering and adoption outside of Indigenous 
communities are two such examples (MacDonald and Gillis 2017). 
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In the 1960s, UN policies favourable to decolonisation for Africa, Asia, and the 
Caribbean were deliberately withheld from Indigenous peoples (Anaya 2004). 
UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (1960) contained an inherent 
contradiction: Article 1 asserted the right of all peoples to self-determination, 
while Article 6 prevented any disruption to ‘the national unity and the territorial 
integrity’ of member states. Indigenous peoples were not however considered 
‘peoples’ for the purposes of self-determination and thus had a more difficult 
time accessing these rights (Anaya 2004). Indigenous peoples were 
specifically excluded from the UN decolonisation project by the 1960s 
‘saltwater’ or ‘blue water’ thesis, which asserted that only overseas territories, 
non-contiguous to the colonial power, were eligible for decolonisation and 
independent, sovereign statehood (United Nations General Assembly 1960). 
Thus, as the UN decolonisation project proceeded over the next several 
decades, Indigenous peoples were left, as Chickasaw legal scholar James 
(Sa’ke’j) Youngblood Henderson (2008, 34) describes, as ‘the unfinished 
business of decolonisation.’
Indigenous Organisation and International Institutions
While the UN has been largely beholden to state interests, Indigenous 
peoples have gained influence internationally through the development of 
networks outside and inside the UN system. Modern activism found its roots 
during the 1960s and 1970s. While other discriminated groups wanted equal 
rights, Indigenous peoples wanted both equality and collective recognition as 
nations, and to regain land stolen by government. The 1960s would herald 
changes – a sense of collective supratribal Indian identity was appearing as 
the Indian National Youth Council (established in 1961) grouped members of 
over 60 different tribes, issuing a Declaration of Indian Purpose (MacDonald 
2008). They would eventually stage protest ‘fish-ins’ – fishing in traditional 
waters guaranteed by treaty where access was banned by government 
legislation. Vine Deloria Jr. was the first to use the term ‘Red Power’ at the 
1966 convention of the National Congress of American Indians, which he 
defined as gaining ‘the political and economic power, to run our own lives in 
our own way’ (Quoted in MacDonald 2008). Together with the primarily urban-
based American Indian Movement (AIM) (established in 1968) activism began 
in earnest as the National Indian Brotherhood in Canada was formed in 1968 
to represent Status and Treaty Indians, the Inuit Tapirissat was founded in 
1971 and organised Inuit in all provinces and territories, and the Grand 
Council of the Crees was established in 1974 (Lightfoot 2016; Josephy and 
Nagel 1999). 
The 1970s heralded new opportunities for linking local, national, and 
international efforts through international Indigenous non-governmental 
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organisations (NGOs), such as the International Indian Treaty Council (IITC) 
(established in 1974), the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) (established in 
1977), and South American and Caribbean regional organisations. During the 
1970s, Indigenous peoples came into a number of serious and spectacular 
conflicts with their respective states. 
To name but a few of the most important: the Indian occupation of Alcatraz 
Island (1969–1971) by ‘Indians of All Tribes’ – a collective force which claimed 
‘right of discovery’ over the island and offered to buy it for $24 (Johnson, 
Nagel and Champagne 1997). This is often seen as a cathartic moment for 
many, a time of solidarity between very different peoples. In Australia, 
Aboriginal peoples raised their own tent embassy in front of the federal 
parliament in 1972 while Indigenous groups and police and military 
confronted one another at Wounded Knee in 1973. In Aotearoa New Zealand, 
the Brown Power movement formed around the same time, and the Māori 
also organised the famous 1972 Land March through the country to protest 
Crown land sales. Canada too saw concerted action against the 1969 White 
Paper introduced by the federal government to do away with the treaties and 
treaty rights (Cairns 2011). 
One of the early efforts in bringing Indigenous peoples from all parts of the 
world together seems to have originated with the president of the National 
Indian Brotherhood in Canada, Chief George Manuel. The first International 
Conference of Indigenous Peoples was then held in British Columbia, 1975, 
which resulted in the establishment of the World Council of Indigenous 
Peoples (WCIP). The WCIP was one of the first Indigenous organisations to 
pursue observer status in the United Nations, had a secretariat based in 
Canada, and represented over 60,000,000 Indigenous peoples worldwide; 
before dissolving in 1996, it was a powerful force for Indigenous peoples, 
giving its members a concrete experience in international politics (Lightfoot 
2016).
Since 1945, the UN has been involved in Indigenous issues through its 
overall human rights work. Indigenous direct involvement began in 1970 when 
the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities (formed by the UN Commission on Human Rights)  recommended 
a study of the problem of discrimination against Indigenous populations, 
which was carried out by the UN’s Special Rapporteur Jose Cobo, who 
completed it in 1984 (Sanders 1989). The report addressed a wide range of 
human rights abuses and called on governments to formulate guidelines 
concerning Indigenous peoples on the basis of respect for their ethnic 
identity, rights, and freedoms (Sanders 1989). 
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UN organisations relevant to Indigenous peoples are the Security Council and 
the General Assembly (there is no hierarchy between these two main bodies), 
followed by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the UN 
Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), and the Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (Sub-Commission). In 1982, the 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) was created under the 
auspices of the Sub-Commission, which provided a new avenue for 
Indigenous peoples to be heard at the UN level. However, given the low 
status of working groups within the UN system, recommendations took some 
time and needed to ascend through many layers before they could be read at 
the General Assembly level (Charters and Stavenhagen 2009).   
The WGIP was instrumental in drafting what later became the Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, beginning this process in the early 1980s 
and producing the first draft in 1993 (Lightfoot 2016). In 2007, the same year 
that the Declaration was passed by the General Assembly, the structure of the 
WGIP transformed into the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (EMRIP). EMRIP is mandated to provide advice and expertise to the 
Human Rights Council, while also providing recommendations for ways in 
which the Declaration can be implemented. Seven independent experts, 
appointed by the Council, communicate regularly and hold an annual meeting 
on the rights of Indigenous peoples which are appointed by the Human Rights 
Council (Lightfoot 2016). EMRIP holds an annual meeting which gathers 
together representatives from Indigenous nations, organisations, state 
governments, NGOs, civil society organisations, academics, and many others 
(Assembly of First Nations n.d.; Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights n.d.a).
Of central importance to Indigenous voices in the UN system is the 
Permanent Forum, which was established in 2000 as an advisory body to the 
ECOSOC. It has a mandate to discuss ‘Indigenous issues related to 
economic and social development, culture, the environment, education, 
health and human rights’ (UN Permanent Forum 2019).  The Forum holds 
two-week sessions in New York once a year, usually in May, in which a range 
of groups participate, including Indigenous organisations, state represen-
tatives, UN bodies and organs, inter-governmental organisations and NGOs 
with ECOSOC consultative status. The first meeting was held in New York in 
2002. Sixteen independent experts on Indigenous issues sit as members of 
the Forum; eight members are nominated by state governments, with election 
by ECOSOC, while the other eight members are appointed by the President 
of ECOSOC as regional representatives following wide ranging consultation 
with Indigenous peoples’ organisations. 
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The Permanent Forum is useful for Indigenous peoples to share information 
about best practices, common concerns, and strategies to improve 
Indigenous rights. Much of the Forum’s utility lies in its extensive Indigenous 
Caucus system, a matrix of consultative groups organised according to region 
or theme. The caucuses are open to all Indigenous delegates and constitute 
an important locus for meeting, sharing concerns, drafting and promoting joint 
statements and policy proposals, as well as trying to secure space for specific 
topics on the Forum agenda (Indigenous Peoples’ Centre for Documentation, 
Research and Information 2012). 
In recent decades, the international community has given special attention to 
the human rights situations of Indigenous peoples. Beginning in 2001 the 
Commission on Human Rights appointed a Special Rapporteur on the Rights 
of Indigenous peoples (Charters and Stavenhagen 2009). The Special 
Rapporteur is tasked with ‘promoting good practices, including new laws, 
government programs, and constructive agreements between Indigenous 
peoples and states, and to implement international standards’ (Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights n.d.b). They also deliver regular rep-
orts including focused country reports on how Indigenous peoples are being 
treated. The focus is on human rights, and the Special Rapporteur meets with 
Indigenous peoples and state representatives throughout the countries 
concerned, paying special attention to cases of human rights violations and 
abuses (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights n.d.b).
These are useful organisations in changing the culture of the UN and also in 
promoting different norms. Norms are key here, and if we see liberal instit-
utionalism and constructivism as playing important roles in understanding IR, 
Indigenous mobilisation in the UN system can produce positive effects. 
The UN Declaration and the Potential to Enhance Indigenous 
Sovereignties
As we noted above, the UN Declaration was adopted by the General Ass-
embly in 2007 after several decades of joint drafting and negotiation with over 
100 Indigenous organisations. It is a precedent setting document, and as one 
Indigenous organisation has noted, is: ‘the most comprehensive statement of 
the rights of Indigenous peoples ever developed, giving prominence to 
collective rights to a degree unprecedented in international human rights law’ 
(Cree Nation Government 2015).  
In the end, the Declaration passed the General Assembly with 144 votes in 
favour, 11 abstentions, and 4 against. The only 4 opposing votes came from 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States, often known as the 
38The United Nations as both Foe and Friend to Indigenous Peoples and Self-Determination
CANZUS states (i.e. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, US). The process was 
instructive: when states face collective pressure from Indigenous peoples 
asserting their decision-making capacity at the UN, it is hard for them to 
exclude Indigenous representatives from formal UN procedures. The fact that 
only four states opposed the Declaration showed it is possible to shame and 
pressure states as well as negotiate with them to support Indigenous self-
determination at UN plenary meetings. In this context, states that support 
Indigenous rights are more likely to influence the positions of other states by 
amplifying the voices of Indigenous representatives. The fact that those four 
recalcitrant states changed position, and that all endorsed the Declaration by 
the end of 2010, was the result of much domestic lobbying and the operation 
of a regular procedure for the Special Rapporteur to monitor the plight of 
Indigenous peoples in particular countries (Lightfoot 2016).
It is no coincidence that the first two of those four countries to renounce their 
opposition to the Declaration, Australia and New Zealand, were among the 
first seven countries investigated by Anaya after he took over the role in 2008. 
Australia announced its support for the Declaration four months before 
Anaya’s scheduled visit in August 2009, while New Zealand announced its 
support three months before Anaya visited that country in July 2010. For both 
countries, Anaya’s reports (2010; 2011) were critical of entrenched 
discrimination against Indigenous peoples, though his criticism would have 
been much stronger if the governments had not changed their policy to 
support the Declaration.
Prior to the passage of the Declaration in 2007, international human rights 
law and discourse excluded the two elements that are critical to Indigenous 
peoples. First, the international human rights regime did not include collective 
rights to maintain such things as Indigenous culture, language, religion, 
identity, or their own educational systems in the face of assimilative press-
ures. Second, Indigenous peoples’ self-determination and their collective right 
to maintain their lands were specifically excluded from the post-World War II 
UN decolonisation regime by the ‘salt water’ thesis. These were the ‘hard 
rights’ that states, especially settler colonial states, resisted most fiercely and 
still do. The UN decolonisation era interpretation of self-determination meant 
independent statehood; the Indigenous rights movement aimed to secure 
self-determination and land rights for Indigenous nations, with or without 
statehood, a shift that ultimately requires a global rethinking of how self-
determination and land rights can be successfully decoupled from territorial 
sovereignty. 
We can divide rights into ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ categories (Lightfoot 2016) to draw 
out state responses to them. Hard rights strike at some important 
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fundamentals of the existing international system of states: land, territory, 
sovereignty, and self-determination. These are both difficult to achieve in 
negotiations and are also a perceived threat to the ‘hard core’ of the 
international system, that is, state territorial sovereignty. ‘Soft’ rights, such as 
rights to culture, language, education and religion, are collective rights 
extensions of existing human rights. While recognition and protection of soft 
rights involves some change to thinking about the inclusion of collective 
rights, the changes required by states and the UN system are not as 
fundamental and thus the majority of states accepted them much more readily 
(Lightfoot 2016). 
Global Indigenous politics exerts a particular pressure on the international 
system to accept a new, non-state-centric interpretation of self-determination, 
and it therefore is leading a shift in the meaning of self-determination so that 
it can also be ‘interpreted as the right of ...peoples to negotiate freely their 
political status and representation in the states in which they live’ (Daes 
1993). The earliest norms literature aimed to show that ideational factors do 
matter in international politics. Norms, which are understood to mean the 
behaviour that is appropriate for actors with a certain identity, have been 
examined in multiple ways. The first studies examined the structure of norms, 
aiming to counter dominant rationalist understandings of strategic, self-
interested international behaviour, show that ‘norms matter’ (Adler 1997; 
Kratochwil 1989; Katzenstein 1996; March and Olsen 1998) and demonstrate 
that states often act in ways that follow a logic of appropriateness (Wendt 
1999) based upon inter-subjectively shared norms (Risse 2003; Rues-Smit 
1997), rather than maximising their individual benefit. Norms were argued to 
be constitutive, shaping the interests and identities of state actors (Kowert 
and Legro 1996; Checkel 1998) yet also regulative and limiting the range of 
legitimate action (Barkin and Cronin 1994). 
Substantial research has been conducted on norm emergence, diffusion, and 
change, including the ‘boomerang effect’ of transnational advocacy network 
campaigns on state behaviour (Keck and Sikkink 1998), the ‘spiral model’ of 
human rights norm socialisation (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999), and the 
study of scope conditions impacting a move from commitment to compliance 
(Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 2013). 
Regarding norms, the nature of global Indigenous rights and politics is dual, 
operating on the one hand within the existing international order. On the other 
hand, such rights also serve as a transformational norm vector, helping to 
move global politics from one norm space to another. The second category of 
more difficult and problematic Indigenous rights norms and the new ways of 
doing global politics presented by global Indigenous politics together present 
40The United Nations as both Foe and Friend to Indigenous Peoples and Self-Determination
challenges to the existing international order. In this the Declaration plays a 
key role. 
Lightfoot’s work on the Declaration process (2016) demonstrates several 
important points about how the final text largely lives up to its original intent, 
which also represents several important global shifts. It’s important to note 
that the Declaration was always intended to be a set of guidelines for state 
implementation of Indigenous rights, providing a framework for new Indige-
nous-state relationships grounded in mutual respect, not state domination. It 
was also intended to be a persuasive tool, a set of international standards 
that would be utilised morally and politically in Indigenous rights struggles 
around the world and, like all human rights declarations, was never intended 
to be a legally enforceable or legally binding document. As a United Nations 
declaration and not a convention, it is a political document that became part 
of the international human rights consensus and its principles are, in some 
sense, morally binding on all state conduct whether or not an individual state 
voted for it. Further, the Declaration was always seen as a document of global 
consensus, not just among UN member states, but also including the active 
participation of Indigenous peoples in the consensus building process. It is 
therefore important to understand that this was necessarily a compromise 
document, ultimately accepted by both states and the Global Indigenous 
Caucus. As such, Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination (Article 3) 
sits alongside the right of states to their sovereignty and territorial integrity 
(Article 46). 
The guiding framework of the Declaration therefore expects states to recog-
nise, negotiate and protect a variety of possible self-government or autonomy 
arrangements for Indigenous peoples, dealing with them as ‘peoples’, even if 
not as states. At the same time, it expects Indigenous peoples to negotiate 
the same with states and not seek secession from or dismemberment of 
them. However, the UN decolonisation framework remains available for 
Indigenous peoples who wish to pursue a statehood claim. 
The global Indigenous rights regime has forged a set of global changes, with 
wider implications. First, it seeks the inclusion of a broad set of collective 
rights into the human rights regime, alongside individual rights, for the first 
time in history, which Rhiannon Morgan (2011, 2) has described as a radical 
‘bridging of a paradigmatic gulf’ between individual and collective rights. From 
its earliest beginnings, the Indigenous rights movement has asserted that an 
exclusively individual rights focus of human rights was insufficient to protect 
Indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples also needed protections as 
collectives, to protect their cultures, societies, and existence as distinct 
peoples. 
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Passage of the Declaration by an overwhelming majority of UN member 
states indicates a fundamental global shift in the human rights regime 
towards the acceptance of collective rights, although how collective rights will 
be protected alongside and without disrupting individual rights is not yet 
entirely clear. 
Second, understandings of decolonisation and self-determination have also 
fundamentally shifted with the passage of the Declaration towards new future 
constructions. Old colonial doctrines, such as the Doctrine of Discovery and 
terra nullius, have been delegitimised. The Doctrine of Discovery held that 
European countries who ‘discovered’ lands inhabited by Indigenous peoples 
could claim them as part of their own territories and administer and rule over 
those territories.  Indigenous ownership was not recognised in colonial law, 
and Indigenous peoples were not seen to have rights over their own 
traditional lands (Miller et al. 2012). Terra nullius is a Latin term signifying 
land without human habitation, meaning that Indigenous peoples were not 
recognised as humans capable of owning land. This allowed European 
colonisers to acquire title to the land simply by planting a flag or occupying 
territory (O’Malley 2014). With the UN Declaration, however, Indigenous 
peoples’ exclusion from the UN decolonisation project has been technically 
corrected, and Indigenous peoples are now officially included as agents of 
decolonisation since Indigenous peoples are now specified as enjoying the 
rights of self-determination equal to all other peoples. 
However, the terms and meaning of decolonisation are not as clear as they 
were in the 1960s era of UN decolonisation, since decolonisation for Ind-
igenous peoples will not, most often, be as independent sovereign states, as 
Article 46 of the Declaration states: 
Nothing in this declaration may be interpreted as implying for 
any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity 
or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United 
Nations or construed as authorising or encouraging any action 
which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territ-
orial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent 
States.
The new challenge, therefore, is to imagine and create means of Indigenous 
self-determination that do not revolve around or rely on state structures. This 
necessarily involves a decoupling of sovereignty from self-determination, 
which will eventually impact not only Indigenous peoples, but also all peoples. 
The wider implication is that self-determination can now mean something 
other than independent, territorial, sovereign statehood – although the 
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formidable challenge is to create a new meaning that does not result in a 
diminished, second-class self-determination for Indigenous peoples. The 
meaning of both self-determination and decolonisation are therefore evolving 
on the global level and Indigenous rights have an important role to play in the 
global conversation surrounding that evolution. Due to the intervention of 
global Indigenous politics, a future imaging of self-determination will likely 
involve sovereignties that may be plural and multiple, and political relations 
that are grounded in mutual respect and ongoing negotiated power relations 
(Lightfoot 2016).
Tracing back to the intellectual tradition of Vine Deloria, Jr. (1979), who 
argued that the inherent right of self-determination, unbounded by state law 
and institutions, is a preferable starting point for asserting Indigenous 
nationhood, political theorist Kevin Bruyneel (2007, 218) promotes an under-
standing of a ‘third space of sovereignty’. Under this conception, Indigenous 
nations operate neither fully inside nor outside of state structures, which is 
distinct from both assimilation and secession, and thus offers ‘a location of 
Indigenous postcolonial autonomy that refuses the choices set out by colonial 
society’ (Bruyneel 2007.) Likewise, Audra Simpson (2014) sees the potential 
for new and better state forms, arguing that various sovereign political orders 
can be nestled within and between states, although she readily recognises 
that such an undertaking will involve significant change and problem-solving 
by all parties.
Third, Indigenous global politics demonstrates that new forms of political 
relations are possible on the global level. Indigenous global diplomacies have 
shown that transnational relations can successfully conform to Indigenous 
ontologies of mutual respect, consensus decision making, non-hierarchical 
relations, sustainability, and ongoing negotiations. In other words, these ‘new’ 
and alternative forms of political practice are actually rooted in very old forms 
of Indigenous political relations.
Conclusions
As we have sought to demonstrate here, while the UN was originally created 
to uphold the sovereign power of existing states, and to the detriment of 
Indigenous peoples, developments since the 1970s point to the UN as a 
vehicle for Indigenous peoples to organise collectively in favour of their rights. 
This has included the creation of organisations within the UN system, as well 
as the passage of the UN Declaration, which is spreading new norms and the 
potential for what Lightfoot has termed a ‘subtle revolution’ in how we think 
about sovereignty, self-determination, and the rights of Indigenous peoples. 
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This cluster of changes in both the structure and practice of global politics is 
fundamental enough that Indigenous global politics can be argued to serve as 
a transformational norm vector, a subtle revolution in global politics. For, if 
implemented, Indigenous rights involve significant global change not only for 
Indigenous peoples but change that would alter IR not only in theory, but in 
practice, thereby pointing the way toward a future beyond the current 
Westphalian international system, a liberal construction of human rights, and 
state-centric diplomacies.
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4
Sustaining Peace and Internal 
Self-Determination in the UN 
Perspective
CRISTIANA CARLETTI
The new challenges to prevent, manage and find profitable exit-out solutions 
from contemporary civil conflicts have called on the International community 
and the United Nations (UN) system to provide for a renewed promotion of 
global peace and security for all peoples.
Primary attention in this chapter is firstly put on exploring the new UN vision 
to cope with critical challenges descending from complex preventive, 
contextual and post-conflict situations and to improve local knowledge to deal 
with root causes of conflict towards permanent positive peace and 
development opportunities. To this purpose the United Nations has recently 
promoted the new concept of ‘sustaining peace’ as introduced by both the 
Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the UN 
Peacebuilding Architecture and the Report of the High-Level Independent 
Panel on UN Peace Operations. Its meaning was translated into the UN 
Security Council (UNSC) and UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolutions 
adopted in 2016 (S/RES/2282; A/RES/70/262). According to this relevant 
approach, also endorsed by the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) 
(A/72/707–S/2018/43), it is evident that peace and security, human rights and 
development are interlinked and mutually reinforcing, and that this 
interlinkage is a profitable means to confirm the crucial importance of self-
determination as a key-component of the post-intrastate conflict environment.
Secondly, the relevance of the internal pattern of self-determination is 
explored. The codification of the right to self-determination in the UN Charter, 
its legal assertion in the International Human Rights Covenants as well as in 
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the 1960 UN General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence 
to Colonial Countries and Peoples has extended the legal contents of self-
determination by the UN system as a whole. This has steered for the 
inclusion of the right to take part in public affairs, to have access to the public 
service of one’s own country, to determine a political status and to freely 
pursue economic, social and cultural development. In last decades the UN 
has strongly favoured the recognition and implementation of the internal 
component of the right to self-determination (Pomerance 1982; Rosas 1993; 
Salmon 1993; Kirgis 1994; Klabbers 2006; Saul 2011a and 2011b; Summers 
2013; Demir 2017). This occurred particularly when the UN involved local 
actors to make the peace process more legitimate and sustainable. Internal 
self-determination as local ownership should infer the UN intervention for 
sustaining peace (Donais 2009, 2012; Saul 2011a and 2011b). This impacts 
the assessment of national needs and capacities, the nature of the country’s 
legal system, the will of concerned parties and – to overcome intra-state crisis 
– the facilitation of a country-owned and country-led exit built upon the 
effective use of local capacities and institutions. But, in recent times, a new 
interpretation of the principle of self-determination, the so called hybrid self-
determination (Richmond 2009; Weller 2009; Mac Ginty 2010; Senaratne 
2013; Bell 2016), has been investigated due to its proved relevance in 
overcoming past failures and to redefine a new constitutional setting along 
the lines of the peace agreement’s contents.
In the last part of the chapter an alternative reading of the set of peace 
agreement models that entered into force from 2000 to 2018 is proposed to 
investigate the feasibility of hybrid self-determination and its ability to 
strengthen the internal component of this principle as a core target of the 
post-conflict sustaining peace process promoted and guided under UN 
leadership. Analysis of some specific provisions of selected peace 
agreements already in force and the role of the UN in facilitating their 
negotiation and helpful implementation is provided to demonstrate how much 
the internal self-determination/hybrid self-determination component could 
positively influence post-conflict sustaining peace- and nation-building 
processes.
The Concept of Sustaining Peace: A New UN Approach to Dealing with 
Conflict Issues
The issue of conflict in the 21st century is a complex matter. The common root 
causes that typified the most part of civil wars in the late 1990s and that were 
identified also since the beginning of the present century are represented by 
fragile institutional settings (Hannum 1990; O’Connell 1992; Werner 2001; 
Paris 2004). 
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Partially unexpected contingency of dynamics has played a significant role in 
adding more complexity to contemporary conflicts, thus contributing to a 
higher fragmented idea of traditional drivers and of a right approach to 
positively deal with them. This has incentivised emerging forms of violence 
and extremism (Chen 1991; Chadwick 1996; Hilpold 2017) as well as new 
populist movements which aimed at excluding ethnic, religious and cultural 
minorities to be politically treated and controlled, avoiding any form of 
revenge for joint public governance. These minorities have further suffered 
from a concrete marginalisation from access to and exploitation of economic 
and environmental resources (Thornberry 1989, 1993; Hannum 1991; Green 
1995). A higher percentage of domestic conflicts and related relapses have 
been produced by weak administration of public resources such as land and 
water, which puts at risk the stability of the concerned areas and becomes a 
strong factor in regional and local conflicts. Further, the high-level involv-
ement of vulnerable and disadvantaged peoples in criminal activity has 
translated into intractable rebel movements (Tomuschat 1992; Quinn 2007; 
Summers 2007; Sriram 2008). The emergency has become a permanent out-
of-law setting where the absence of a robust and credible institutional actor 
has undermined the traditional concept of state sovereignty at the core of the 
international legal order.
This has prompted reflection on the relevance of international players, the UN 
system in particular being confronted with the critical ability of national 
authorities to prevent and, if it is the case, to manage the new features of 
contemporary conflicts. Following the collapse or prolonged absence of a 
central government in a failed state, the traditional international system has 
also considered the opportunity to assume a different position (Lund 2003; 
Tschirgi 2004; Chetail 2009). In this context the UN has tried to adapt its 
original statutory mandate into ‘sustaining peace’, so far expanding it to be-
come flexible enough to encompass the promotion and protection of human 
rights. This has supported the principle of self-determination to be considered 
as an essential prerequisite to prevent and manage contemporary conflicts.
From the UN Agenda for Peace to the Reform of the UN Peacebuilding 
Architecture
Since the first revision of the UN approach to deal with international peace 
and security at the beginning of the 1990s, as illustrated by the UNSG in 
1992 in its Agenda for Peace (A/47/277- S/24111), progressive deterioration 
of nation-state contexts was tackled through the establishment and the 
gradual improvement of the following three entities: the Peacebuilding 
Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Fund and the Peacebuilding Support 
Office. 
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A different operational approach was provided in the Supplement to an 
Agenda, adopted in 2001 by the UNSC (S/PRST/2001/5), where 
peacebuilding was considered a relevant complement to the first two UN 
actions, and followed by the creation of the UNSG Advisory Group of Experts 
on the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture 
(A/69/968-S/2015/490; A/64/868 – S/2020/393). This intervention has been 
aimed at giving tailored assistance to prevent and solve intra-state conflicts, i.e. 
to sustaining peace with the active participation of populations directly 
affected by intra-state conflicts as a one-off precondition (Bell 2017a and 
2017b). 
The UN ‘Sustaining Peace’ Approach: The Conceptual Analysis and its 
Operational Practicability
The UN ‘sustaining peace’ approach is aimed at managing peace embracing 
prevention, handling exit out and post-conflict strategies. Sustaining peace 
means to restore dialogue and consultation with local communities, to rely on 
the credibility and support from public and private individuals and collective 
stakeholders, to frame new settings and to encompass critical root causes 
and dynamics that have contributed to fuel the conflict” (A/72/707–S/2018/43). 
The inclusive component of the ‘sustaining peace’ approach is based on the 
trust of national authorities and domestic actors’ categories: minorities, 
representatives of vulnerable individuals, the private sector, civil society, 
under-represented groups or peoples. It has the ‘broaden ownership’ concept 
at its core: it means to ensure a high-intensity participatory approach from the 
first stage of the post-conflict process; at the same time it lets non-institutional 
counterparts give their contribution in the definition of policies, actions, 
programmes and projects, in the implementation of predetermined measures, 
and in the monitoring and evaluation of results, to avoid any form of re-
collapse into the conflict (Brown and Grävingholt 2011; de Coning 2016).
The ‘sustaining peace’ approach should ensure the active participation of 
peoples, also encompassing vulnerable individuals that are the most likely to 
be excluded from contributing to the creation of a positive post-conflict 
setting. From one side this has meant the reinforcement of the central role of 
the organisation in conveying the maximum engagement of international 
stakeholders and the taking of root causes, basic needs, dynamics of the 
country-situation into consideration. When the UN has not reserved specific 
attention to the principle of self-determination, only an in-depth preliminary 
analysis of all political and economic drivers has been proved as effective 
enough in the short, medium and long term. To this goal the UN Headquarters 
are requested to work in close cooperation with local bodies to perform the 
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common tasks for consolidating peace in the exit-out strategies and in 
contributing to rebuild the nation-state moving from the self-determination 
vision. Particularly, the UNSG has played and plays nowadays a key role, 
directly or through his representatives, to get into contact and dialogue with 
national public and private stakeholders. The common aim has been to define 
a political roadmap in order to overcome emergency needs and to implement 
a series of cross-cutting measures impacting the three pillars of the organ-
isation – i.e. international peace and security, development and human rights 
– to achieve concretely a ‘sustaining peace’. 
On the other side, the new UN approach has evidently resulted in adjusting 
the original peace operations’ substantial and procedural fundamentals. The 
recent proposal of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on 
this point has been based on the elaboration of a package of sequenced 
actions with few and clear priorities and operational tasks: they should all 
respond to primary needs of the affected population and their need to restart 
by its own self-determination.
The ‘sustaining peace’ approach will work also in a preventive perspective to 
avoid any form of short-term re-collapse into the conflict but also to update 
the guiding principles of the UN peace interventions. As reminded by the 
UNSG in his last report, conflict prevention and mediation are core-tools that 
must be re-prioritised to respond to the political and social dynamics of 
national and local communities at risk. This will lead to the primacy of political 
solutions in relation to existing or potential conflicts; indeed, political solutions 
have to be considered as a relevant and complementary tool in association 
with the military component of UN peace operations and apart from any direct 
link to the self-determination principle. 
In other words, the transition from peace-making to peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding calls primarily for a new and stronger partnership among all the 
national and international concerned stakeholders, preserving enough 
flexibility to deal with cross-cutting problems at the normative and operational 
level.
To sum up, investing in ‘sustaining peace’ encompasses the international and 
national actors’ will to be fully committed for a long-term implementation of a 
peace agreement. This engagement goes along the lines of a virtuous cycle. 
It starts from preventing conflicts before their escalation; it passes through the 
management of violent conflicts by using political tools and achieving good 
compromises by mediation; and it is completed when good governance, rule 
of law, democracy, human rights protection and internal self-determination are 
really guaranteed in a positive peace setting. 
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Internal Self-Determination Impacting the Substantial Elements of Peace 
Agreements: For a New Challenging Peace Sustaining Vision
The original legal definition of the principle of self-determination was strictly 
linked to the notion of the nation-state emerging in the 1960s decolonisation 
process. It was claimed by populations in order to change their status of 
independence as well as to confirm the relevance of the concept of territorial 
integrity (Cassese 1981 and 1995; Tomuschat 1993; Koskenniemi 1994).
Beyond this historical context the opportunity to expand the aforementioned 
principle by giving it a comprehensive legal relevance was endorsed by the 
UN system in the 1970s: in line with articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter, the 
common article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provided 
that “all peoples have the right to self-determination […] to freely determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development”.
On one side the chance for a wider interpretation was frustrated and limited to 
internal struggles against the former or new governmental authorities in order 
to achieve the full enjoyment of fundamental rights via a secessionist-based 
process (Moore 1998; Walter et al. 2014). On the other side the individual and 
collective commitment to accomplish self-government has required the cross-
examination of the concept of territorial integrity; its application has been 
critically proved when it was related to secessionist claims from populations 
or minorities as relevant component of the same population (Crawford 2001).
To overcome these inconsistencies with the aim to highlight the internal 
component of the principle of self-determination, two proposals were 
formulated by the best doctrine which have a common background: the 
negotiation of peace agreements following an intra-state conflict, whereas the 
UN has often played a relevant and positive role also for the recognition and 
the concrete respect of the principle itself. 
Firstly, the principle has been considered as a procedural right to be enjoyed 
by the peoples who have a high interest in participating in decision-making 
processes directly affecting them. This has encompassed not only the rights 
related to direct democracy in a post-conflict setting but also the regular 
participation in all decisions concerning the protection and promotion of civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights (Klabbers 2006). 
Subsequently, a different meaning of the principle of sovereignty has been 
used to confirm the internal legitimacy and the external independence of a 
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nation-state. As to the former, the development of international law has 
contributed for an advanced relevance of the principle of self-determination. It 
was defined as a core right to be fulfilled at the domestic level in favour of 
individuals and peoples. And it was envisaged as a core obligation imposed 
on governmental authorities: the duty to ensure the exercise of democratic 
rights; participation in electoral processes which freely determine the political 
status of the nation-state; the protection of minority rights; and the progres-
sive accomplishment of economic, social and cultural rights. The latter 
observation deserves specific attention and should be explored in relation to 
positive peace, following negotiation and the entering into force of a peace 
agreement, in the view of avoiding a re-collapse into intra-state conflict and of 
promoting the new UN model of ‘sustaining peace’.
In general terms the peace agreement – embracing the different legal 
patterns of the cease-fire agreement, the framework agreement and the 
agreement for the implementation of legal commitments at the national level – 
is the tool that lets the institutional and non-institutional counterparts of a 
conflict compose their contrasts according to primary political, economic and 
social interests (Bell 2006; Carletti 2008).
There are three main stages where the principle of self-determination could 
emerge and be treated in order to contribute to a lasting peace (Bell 2008). At 
the first stage, the aim is to redefine the nation-state setting: it means to give 
new emphasis to the legitimacy of the governmental system at the central and 
local levels as well as to amend or include key constitutional principles for its 
functioning – i.e. democracy, rule of law, human rights, inclusiveness and 
participation in decision-making processes (Aroussi and Vanderginste 2013; 
Kaldor 2016). Then, according to the principle of territorial integrity and full 
sovereignty of the nation-state, a complete institutional framework should be 
built into central governance bodies and mechanisms and disaggregated 
territorial powers. The latter are useful to take into account the demand for 
participation from those ones vindicating the self-determination principle 
within a non-violent power disaggregation process (McWhinney 2007). The 
third stage is represented by the recognition of an external support: it is 
represented by the external power temporarily dislocated from the national 
territory to uphold the ‘sustaining peace’ process and to reinforce the linkage 
between the renewed legitimate institutional setting and the population in the 
implementation of the peace agreement (Barnett and Zürcher 2009; Chandler 
2015). 
This approach, as mentioned above could be extremely relevant to avoid any 
secessionist movement. This fear could be managed only if the international 
presence in domestic governance management is really temporary and if it is 
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aimed at accommodating the different but complementary interests of the 
groups composing the entire population. So far, the exercise of national 
sovereignty is not completely ascribed to one internal or external power but is 
shared between them. It is dislocated to facilitate the relationship among 
political and social competitors and it might offer a new interpretation of the 
principle of self-determination (so called ‘hybrid self-determination’) to 
overcome past failures and to redefine a new constitutional setting along the 
lines of the peace agreement’s contents (Boege et al. 2008; Mac Ginty 2010 
and 2011; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2015).
The Hybrid Self-Determination: Substantial and Procedural Features
The hybrid self-determination concept moves from the need to translate its 
international content into a constitutionalising process to endorse the peace 
agreements provisions at the post-conflict domestic level (Bell and Zulueta-
Fuelscher 2016). The success of this process is driven by the full recognition 
of the aforementioned concept both in substantive and procedural terms and 
the UN contribution has proved to be nearly effective to this scope. 
The substantial content is acknowledged as the right to an effective and fair 
participation to institutions and to public decision-making mechanisms. If the 
normative relevance of the principle of self-determination is out of the 
question at the international level and within the UN legal framework, the 
compromise between its core elements and the principle of territorial integrity 
and full sovereignty is yet questionable. It means that the principle, to be 
accepted and to support the revitalisation of the legitimacy of the cons-
titutional power in a post-conflict situation, should be conceived as hybrid and 
facilitated by external actors – e.g. the UN – into the new domestic setting 
(Fox and Roth 2000). The latter are required to work to develop new internal 
legal standards consistent with international law (Kymlicka 2007; Knop 2008; 
Valadez 2018). In this sense the hybridity is considered not an obstacle but a 
driver substantially – and also linguistically – apt to reconcile opposing visions 
and interests into a composite and appreciable nation-state setting. Indeed, it 
grants representation and participation as a precondition of the relationship 
between the government and its population. In other terms, hybridity impacts 
a common legal standards baseline that is strong and weak at the same time. 
Under UN leadership the constitutional contents have been included in the 
peace agreement so as to overcome negative violent reactions from 
populations; at the same time the institutional framework has been soft-
contractualised as the optimal solution for the entire community (Sapiano et 
al.  2016).
The last observation reminds of the procedural component of the concept that 
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is enshrined in the right to freely express opinions and be seriously heard in 
the negotiation of the peace agreement and its full implementation. Though 
the UN is tentative in granting this precondition throughout the post-conflict 
process, it is a matter of fact that the procedural component has a complex 
and dynamic feature. The fair and active participation for the redefinition of 
the nation-state, the disaggregation and the dislocation of power appear as a 
proper right: it should be completed by the definition of a multiple set of 
governance issues to be negotiated and implemented at the national level – 
i.e. power levels, reform of the judiciary, management of the military and 
police forces, human rights domestic machinery. These institutional 
arrangements are quite relevant per se but not enough valid in their own 
substance. The hybridity of self-determination is also a dynamic process that 
should be tested regularly and, if it is the case, to be amended to ensure the 
political and social inclusiveness of populations in legitimating the institutional 
powers. In other terms hybridity is placed among the notions of representative 
and participatory democracy: the first is certified by the strong but 
circumstanced relation between governmental bodies and their electors; the 
latter is enshrined in the exercise of the citizenry, in its high qualitative level 
and in the preservation of a factual inclusiveness into the governance system 
as a whole beyond the electoral process. Really power-sharing principles and 
mechanisms for joint governance responsibility let the peace agreement 
inform the constitutionalising process based on an equal and fair recognition 
of individual and collective participatory rights.
Peace Agreement Models Including Hybrid Self-determination as a Core 
Target of the Post-conflict Sustaining Peace Process
An alternative reading of the set of peace agreement models that entered into 
force from 2000 to 2018 is here proposed to investigate the feasibility of the 
hybrid self-determination and its impact to strengthen the internal component 
as a core target of the post-conflict sustaining peace process (Melandri 
2015). At the same time the role and action of the UN in the cases reported 
below could confirm the relevance of this target, as endorsed, to positively 
and concretely help concerned countries deal with the criticalities arising from 
the post-conflict setting.
As it concerns intra-state conflicts aimed at claiming secessionist targets 
hybrid self-determination has led to the following three results: the esta-
blishment of a new state identity; the recognition of groups previously 
excluded from democratic participation; a constitutional and institutional 
reform encompassing basic standards of representative and participatory 
democracy. At the same time the disaggregation of powers has entailed 
autonomous solutions, granting a higher level of protection of human rights, 
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equality rights and political and social inclusiveness. Finally, the dislocation of 
powers has deserved a temporary contribution from international actors, with 
a gradual governance devolution and the decision to postpone territorial 
integrity and constitutional setting solutions at a later stage. One example 
could be mentioned in such contexts – the Papua New Guinea Bougainville 
Peace Agreement (S/2001/988).
In Papua New Guinea the hybrid nature of the principle of self-determination 
has been introduced since the adoption of the draft basic agreement of 24 
December 1998. The agreement aimed at establishing the new governmental 
framework moving from the formal recognition of the self-determination 
principle in a proper act – in this case a resolution was explicitly mentioned – 
in order to regulate the matter and the manner for implementing it. At the 
same time the hybridity was encompassed by the availability of options that 
could be adopted in view of ‘developing a peaceful outcome to the 
negotiations’. Indeed in the following step pursuing the drafting and formal 
approval of the Bougainville Peace Agreement, on 30 August 2001, a mutual 
compromise was introduced: it reflected the hybrid idea of self-determination, 
as endorsed in the autonomy objectives jointly accepted by the contracting 
parties – i.e. the National Government and the Bougainville Government. 
Assuming the sovereignty of Papua New Guinea, the arrangements provided 
by the aforementioned Peace Agreement confirm the Bougainville identity but 
the promotion of fruitful relationships with ‘the rest of Papua New Guinea’. 
Moreover a multifaceted purpose (S/2001/988) was pursued to gain a double 
and mutually effective approach for both contracting parties: to recognise 
their formal and functional roles and to work together to achieve the same 
objective, i.e. the unity and prosperity of Papua New Guinea (Peace 
Agreement Access Tool 1998). 
The UN’s helpful and coherent intervention in Papua New Guinea has had a 
twofold objective which reminds of the proper hybrid nature of the self-
determination principle. From one side the reinforcement of the inclusive 
approach was pursued in relation to governmental authorities and civil society 
representatives in order to improve a democratic, transparent and accoun-
table governance. On the other side a targeted assistance to local authorities 
of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville was sought. This meant to prevent 
any form of violence attempting the political, economic and social security 
and personal safety of peoples, and to support the local parliament in 
facilitating the exchange of information, and active participation of the people 
of Bougainville towards the next referendum, scheduled for 2019. 
In relation to solutions for intra-state conflicts grounded on historical ethnic 
struggles, the opportunity for a re-definition of the status of the nation-state is 
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introduced. This tentative was explored by referring to multiple factors 
enabling alternative solutions inspired by the utmost inclusive approach of 
minorities. Among the most relevant factors, the following are worth 
mentioning; full recognition of their fundamental rights, respect of the principle 
of equality, promotion of dialogue and mutual understanding, reinforcement of 
democracy, rule of law and good governance. The power has been 
disaggregated providing for concrete and balanced institutional participation 
at the central and local levels. The dislocation of power has been granted 
through a progressive translation of competences from international to 
domestic bodies. This has meant to negotiate firstly a cease-fire agreement; 
then to promote a process aimed at ensuring the gradual establishment of a 
constitutional and legislative framework under the monitoring of international 
observers; and finally the compilation of a definitive constitutional text to be 
confirmed by referendum as the precondition for democratic elections. In such 
contexts the hybrid self-determination has been put at risk to be partially 
accomplished, due to the predominant transitional setting waiting for an 
agreed consolidated alternative from all the contenders (Bell and Pospisil 
2017). A relevant example of Sri Lanka could be mentioned in this scope.
Here the hybrid nature of the self-determination principle emerged during 
peace talks carried out by the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam. On the occasion of the release of the Oslo 
Communique on 5 December 2002 the need to explore a balanced solution 
was reported. It encompassed the internal self-determination as well as the 
establishment of a governance federal option within a united country. In the 
following debate promoted in 2003 concerning the human rights component – 
to be safeguarded as a key factor for the success of the peace process – the 
principle was reaffirmed as the precondition for the enjoyment of collective 
rights. In the last stage, i.e. the Agreed Statement adopted by the parties on 
21 March 2003, internal self-determination was considered the core 
prerequisite to the development of a federal system ‘within a united, federal 
Sri Lanka’ by introducing the preliminary organic setting to launch and 
manage this process (Peace Agreement Access Tool 2002; Peace Agreement 
Access Tool 2003a; Peace Agreement Access Tool 2003b). 
The achievement of a condition of positive peace within the country has 
facilitated the UN action to sustain the National Unity Government in the 
peacebuilding and national reconciliation process launched in 2009. A 
concrete support was particularly ensured in 2015 through financial support 
granted by the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (by the so called 
Peacebuilding Fund – Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility); also the release 
of technical assistance in developing a Peacebuilding Priority Plan was 
provided, anticipated by an ad hoc assessment and based on four priority 
areas: Transitional Justice, Reconciliation, Good Governance, and 
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Resettlement and Durable Solutions. The Plan was finalised in close 
consultation with civil society in June 2016 for a three year cycle. UN 
assistance concerning the good governance area was inspired by the 
hybridity of the self-determination principle for the accomplishment of a 
‘political solution’. It encompassed the opportunity for a merged territorial unit 
covering the Northern and Eastern Provinces of the country – where reluctant 
Muslim and Sinhalese communities lived – and the extended self-
administration, through the power devolution in favour of the Tamil people. 
This approach, which could be considered as having had a positive impact 
until now, is under implementation to avoid any relapse into ethnic conflict 
and to catch the present challenges for going forward.
Intra-state conflicts, which are basically characterised to replace institutional 
authoritarian systems and are partially intended to stress the relevance of the 
principle of self-determination, claim the need to reaffirm the nation-state’s 
key values and democratic standards. As for the redefinition of the state, a 
comprehensive renewed commitment to the protection of human rights, 
inclusiveness and democratic accountability is the prerequisite for a stronger 
linkage between institutions and peoples to reinforce the sovereign legitimacy 
of the former over the latter. The disaggregation of powers is represented by 
the reconfiguration of the political parties’ setting: it involves all contenders – 
former military parties and civil society organisations – in democratic elections 
as well as in participatory decision-making processes other than the electoral 
ones. The power has been also dislocated in favour of international actors 
that were requested to facilitate the best implementation of peace 
agreements. 
The most exemplificative case is the one of Nepal. Here the agreement 
reached between the Government Talks Team, including the basic Seven 
Political Parties, and the Federal Limbuwan State Council, signed on 19 
March 2008, was based upon a balanced compromise to avoid any form of 
government inspired by feudalist and strongly centralised patterns and to 
involve all peoples for a unitary state model well beyond the original demand 
for a Limbuwan Autonomous State. This encompassed a common state 
rebuilding commitment ‘along with the right to self-determination’, joined with 
the ‘right to ethnic identity and autonomy’, according to the former historical 
context and the will of creating a ‘peaceful, prosperous and modern new 
Nepal’. So far the hybrid self-determination rested on the intention to 
establish a federal democratic republic – the so called ‘national main-
streaming’ – and to preserve the ethnical components and the respective 
autonomies of the Nepalese peoples (Agreement Reached between the 
Government Talks Team comprising Seven Political Parties and the Federal 
Limbuwan State Council 2008). 
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To achieve this objective the UN established in 2007 the United Nations 
Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), with a progressively renewed, peculiarly light 
military mandate to monitor and assess the implementation of the peace 
agreement in the political and governance perspective. The risk of deter-
ioration of the situation and reiterated tensions led UNMIN to support the 
conflicting parties: on 13 September 2010 the Nepalese Government and the 
UCPN-Maoist party signed a new agreement in which they pledged to take up 
the remaining tasks of the peace process to complete them by 14 January 
2011. It is a matter of fact that the preliminary and latter results from the UN 
contribution clearly diverge as for the peace process. Different analytical 
positions were expressed about the successful UN assistance for the 
stabilisation of the domestic framework and the relevance of the principle of 
hybrid self-determination, for the implementation of peacebuilding activities 
and in the view of preventing any re-collapse into the war. The UN 
intervention was probably inspired by the tentative of hybridisation of the 
principle of self-determination; the UN took into account the institutional 
centralisation and the exclusion of local powers for multiple and comple-
mentary root causes such as caste, ethnicity, religion, gender. However, the 
international early military and political engagement was shifted into a lower-
intensity capacity to facilitate the dialogue among conflicting parties: this left 
ultimately to local power the control over the peace consolidation towards a 
federalist solution. This means that the hybrid self-determination principle 
whenever managed by local elites, marginally supported by international 
actors, could turn into new tensions and violence. This occurred firstly in 2013 
with the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, then with heavy protests 
recorded since September 2015 against the constitution-making process. 
Finally, with an ongoing silent opposition by the Joint Democratic Madhesi 
Front was recorded for a federalist option which is embedded in the broader 
institutional reform process and that could fuel the discriminatory component 
of the forthcoming governance system.
Some Concluding Observations
The inclusion of the principle of hybrid self-determination in peace agree-
ments could be a relevant tool to support the new UN ‘sustaining peace’ 
model. As proposed by the best doctrine before the launch of the UN 
revitalisation of the peace-building architecture, there are four nuanced 
outcomes to this scope (Bell 2008).
Within a potential first setting the peace law could be used to provide for an 
alternative and creative solution: it could be based on a ‘disaggregation of 
concepts of statehood, territory, peoples and nationalities’ that inform the 
ongoing process of defining the relationship among international legal order, 
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statehood, nationhood, principles of self-determination, territorial integrity and 
sovereignty. This background gives the peace agreement a transitional and 
constitutional value to resume all the claims of contenders in a ‘complex 
multinational post-sovereign state’. In this framework the UN leadership could 
positively contribute to this scope through the reinforcement of the legal 
framework and the empowerment of the participatory approach, as occurred 
in some circumstances in previous years. 
In a more creative manner peace agreements including the hybrid self-
determination component could be considered as the right tool to cope with 
co-factors that had led to the complete dysfunctionality of the state. Here the 
constitutional requirements enshrined in the peace agreement are used to 
move from the international legal order towards the rebuilding of nationhood, 
ensuring a full engagement of all the contenders. Within this context the UN 
could only play a strong but preliminary role; the organisation leaves the pave 
for a proper translation of the principle under reference into the new domestic 
legal framework, avoiding a useless and counterproductive perpetuity of its 
presence on the field. 
The impact of peace agreements including a hybrid self-determination 
component could be evaluated in a stricter manner, taking into consideration 
only the immediate results of the transitional process to liberal democracy. 
Here te hybridity entails a partial short-time result represented by the 
reinforcement of human rights protections and the planning and performing of 
elections. This preliminary outcome is remarked as an expected technical 
result to be forcibly completed by further steps in the transitional process 
leading the international legal order to be superseded by the domestic 
constitutional order. Along this line it could only be demanded that the UN 
monitor the full respect of international human rights law and recommend its 
implementation by nation-building actors. 
The last option to use the peace agreement including a hybrid self-
determination component is the most conservative. Due to existing and not 
yet solved conflicts between contenders, the real impact of the peace 
agreement is limited. Neither could it support the transitional powers process 
– maintained by the older governmental authorities – nor could it provide for a 
comprehensive transformation of the statehood which responds to the basics 
of liberal democracy. Along these circumstances the same substantial and 
formal features of peace agreements are not fluid and flexible enough to 
encourage a positive transitional process. The narrative could only lead to 
review of the institutional setting without a real contribution from below. The 
UN has experienced several cases where its contribution has not enabled the 
contenders to really exit out from the conflict. There is also, however, a worst-
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case scenario: the preservation of the older statehood. It could mean that the 
provisions of the peace agreement are so hybrid to induce to destroy the self-
determination concept and to facilitate the adoption of a new imperialist set of 
policies and practices. In other terms the institutional setting is not only 
preserved but also aims to grant less independence and less equality and to 
strengthen the exclusion of the underrepresented who fight for the creation of 
a new liberalist nationhood framework. These are the cases where the UN 
has been mostly criticised for the powerlessness to hold its statutory mandate 
and the inactivity to prevent, restore and maintain international peace and 
security. Critics have been summarised in pushing for a comprehensive 
reform of the first pillar of the organisation in favour of the elaboration of the 
new concept of ‘sustaining peace’.
All the above-mentioned options to read the peace agreement’s hybrid self-
determination component demonstrate how international and national actors 
could impact the establishment of a post-intrastate conflict environment 
domestically. In doing so to maintain international peace and security, to 
protect human rights and to promote human development, ‘sustaining peace’ 
could be properly guaranteed. For the UN this challenge could be considered 
a concrete tool for testing the need for a renewed reading of its role and 
mandate to tackle contemporary conflicts and to strengthen international 
human rights law and the principle of self-determination.
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Whether the United Nations (UN) discourages or encourages self-
determination of peoples is a question that is not easy to answer. The position 
of the UN on self-determination must first be distilled from General Assembly 
(GA) and Security Council (SC) resolutions and the case law of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). International law on self-determination is 
criticised for being vague; UN GA Resolution 1514 (XV) (1960), Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 
suggests, for example, both by the wording of the title and the preamble, that 
the intended subject of the resolution would be colonial peoples. 
Nevertheless, the drafters of the text chose to use general terms (‘all peoples 
have the right to self-determination […]’ and ‘Convinced that all peoples have 
an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and 
the integrity of their national territory’). International law on self-determination 
is also criticised for representing the interests of existing states and thus 
protecting the status quo in international relations. Furthermore, the answer to 
the question of whether the UN discourages or encourages self-determination 
depends on what form of self-determination we are talking about: internal or 
external self-determination? According to Senese (1989, 19) external self-
determination is the idea ‘that each people has the right to constitute itself a 
nation-state or to integrate into, or federate with, an existing state’ and 
internal self-determination refers to ‘the right of people to freely choose their 
own political, economic, and social system’. This does not necessarily require 
the creation of a new state but can be achieved by receiving autonomy inside 
existing states. 
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In this contribution, we argue that the current international legal framework, 
referred to as the UN paradigm, has a number of shortcomings and is 
therefore inadequate to answer modern claims involving self-determination, 
such as the Cyprus conflict. Although internal self-determination is 
encouraged in limited circumstances, we argue that this approach 
fundamentally disregards other interests besides state interests and is 
therefore not able to bring the long-lasting Cyprus conflict to an end. Would 
alternative approaches to self-determination be more successful?
Inspired by Musgrave’s (1997, 148–167) initial distinction between definitions 
of a people, we explored alternative views on self-determination found in 
academic literature. These views could be grouped under at least two other 
schools of thought outside the UN framework (Figure 1). One of these, the 
balancing approach, suggests that finding a sustainable solution to a conflict 
should be attempted by respecting and balancing the interests of all groups 
involved. The outcome of such negotiations is much more open than under 
the UN approach. The other school, the human rights approach, sees self-
determination as a fundamental human right that could hypothetically belong 
to every ethnic group under very different circumstances. They define a 
people on the basis of subjective factors of self-consciousness, thereby 
focusing on ethnic criteria and identifying factors such as a shared history, 
language, religion and geographical, economic and quantitative factors.
Figure 1: Schools of thought
Each of these schools of thought has consequences for the circumstances in 
which a successful claim to self-determination can be made, and for the 
range of peoples that may rightfully do so. To answer the question of whether 
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the UN discourages or encourages self-determination, we will describe how 
the UN paradigm has fared in the Cyprus conflict. We will then see if either of 
the other schools offers a better resolution to this conflict than the UN 
approach does.
The Cyprus Conflict in a Nutshell
Cyprus is an excellent case study of how different visions of self-
determination could apply to post-colonial situations. Discussions about the 
constitutional future of Cyprus were organised after the Second World War. 
Britain, as the formal administrator of Cyprus, proposed partition of the island, 
but this idea was refused not only by Greek and Turkish Cypriots themselves, 
but also by the international community. Greek Cypriots had been advocating 
their desire for the union of the island with Greece (enosis). This in turn led to 
a Turkish Cypriot call for partition, and thus for Turkish Cypriot independence. 
The goals of Greek Cypriot irredentism and Turkish Cypriot separation have 
been totally irreconcilable, yet both have been justified by reference to self-
determination (Musgrave 1997, 227). 
In 1960, Cyprus became a republic with a constitution based on the political 
representation of both Cypriot communities. However, political tensions 
between the two communities remained. Since the outbreak of violence and 
consequent 1974 division of Cyprus into northern Turkish and southern Greek 
parts, the UN undertook several efforts to reunite the island under one 
political administration. Both communities took turns rejecting UN proposals 
for reconciliation and the reinstitution of a bi-communal (con)federation.1 See 
for example UN GA Resolution 37/253 (1983) where the General Assembly 
deplores the current state of affairs and calls for the continuation of 
constructive bi-communal deliberate efforts. 
In 1983, the Turkish Cypriot Parliament unanimously proclaimed an 
independent Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which was 
immediately condemned by the Security Council in Resolutions S/RES/541 
(1983) and S/RES/550 (1984). The Annan plan was the latest serious effort 
by the UN to unify Cyprus; it and can be found in report S/2004/437 (2004) of 
the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus. However, 
Greek Cyprus rejected this plan in 2004. Later attempts, not only by the UN 
and by the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, but also by 
the European Union, did not amount to much either. Thus, the story of a 
divided Cyprus continues.
1  www.cyprusun.org provides an overview of GA and SC resolutions concerning the 
Cyprus conflict (Cyprusun 2012). 
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UN Paradigm
As the first school of thought, the UN paradigm represents the current and 
general interpretation of self-determination held by the main organs of the 
UN. This approach is also supported by contributions in academic literature 
(Brilmayer 1991, 177–202; Buchanan 2004, 205–208; Gudeleviciute 2005, 
48–74; Kirgis 1994, 308). First, we will discuss the general position of the UN 
with respect to self-determination. Then, we will see how the UN paradigm 
fared in the context of the Cyprus conflict. 
UN Practice
In a sense, the UN has been an advocate of self-determination. Much is owed 
to the UN for advancing the development of self-determination from a political 
principle into a legal right, for example by including self-determination as one 
of the organisation’s purposes in the UN Charter.2 Also in later UN GA 
resolutions, the right was recognised as a human right and fundamental 
principle of international law; for example: the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, GA Resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 1948; the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries, GA 
Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960; the International Covenants on 
Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA 
Resolution 2200 (XXI) of 16 December 1966; the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Resolution 
2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970; the Declaration on the Occasion of the 50th 
Anniversary of the UN, GA Resolution 50/6 of 24 October 1995.
The effect of these political acts of the UN has perhaps been clearest with 
respect to the widespread wave of anti-colonialism that went through the 
world, culminating in the assertion of the right by many colonial peoples in the 
period from the 1940s to the 1960s. The ICJ, in landmark cases such as the 
Namibia, Western Sahara, and East Timor cases, approved of the exercise of 
self-determination by peoples under colonial or foreign occupation.3 It has 
also emphasised that self-determination is an erga omnes right, which means 
2  See articles 1(2), 55, and Chapters XI, XII, XIII of the Charter, which provide 
regulations with regard to non-self-governing territories.
3  See the Namibia case (Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence 
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)) notwithstanding Security Council 
Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, 16), the Western Sahara 
case (Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, 12) and the East Timor 
case (East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, 90), all 
concerning decolonization.
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that it can be asserted against any state that infringes this fundamental 
people’s right.4 Moreover, the ICJ clarified that the right also applies outside 
the colonial framework, however, within the territorial framework of 
independent states.5
Despite these positive contributions, the UN’s practice also suffers from 
shortcomings and indeterminacies. For example, none of the UN’s resolutions 
contain a formal distinction between internal or external self-determination. 
Neither does the ICJ, in its extensive set of judgments, make this distinction, 
nor does it give legal clarification of the circumstances required for a 
successful claim to external self-determination outside a colonial context. In 
the Secession of Quebec6 case, the Canadian Supreme Court restated 
common UN practice, emphasising that ‘international law expects that the 
right to self-determination will be exercised by peoples within the framework 
of existing sovereign states and consistently with the maintenance of the 
territorial integrity of those states [emphasis added], respecting its borders as 
they have been since independence’, in accordance with the principle of uti 
possidetis iuris. The UN has indeed consistently opposed any attempt at the 
partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a 
country for reason of maintaining international peace and stability (Shaw 
2017, 202). This raises questions of legitimacy and representativeness, 
especially if these borders were drawn by former occupying parties 
regardless of historical or ethnic claims to the territory. 
While there have been cases in which the ICJ approved of the use of external 
self-determination, for example in the Palestinian Wall case,7 this seems to be 
limited to situations in which human rights are violated as a result of foreign 
military intervention, aggression, or occupation (including colonialism), or in 
4  See the East Timor case (East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 1995, 90) par. 29, the Barcelona Traction case (Barcelona Traction, Light and 
Power Company, Limited, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, 3) par. 33, and the advisory 
opinion in the Palestinian Wall case (Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, 136) par. 
88. 
5  Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali case, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, 554–567, 
supported by the Canadian Supreme Court in the Secession of Quebec case, 
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217, 1998 CanLII 793 (SCC).
6  Secession of Quebec case, Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217, 
1998 CanLII 793 (SCC). Emphasis added. The principle of uti possidetis iuris was also 
mentioned in relation to self-determination in the Burkina Faso v. Mali case (I.C.J. 
Reports 1986, 554–567), and the Arbitration Commission of the European Conference 
on Yugoslavia, Opinion no. 2, 92 ILR, 167–168.
7  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion (I.C.J. Reports 2004, 136).
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the most extreme of cases including formal underrepresentation of a minority 
and serious violations of human rights.8 Kirgis (1994, 308) formulates this 
view in the following way: 
If a government is at the high end of the scale of democracy, 
the only self-determination claims that will be given intern-
ational credence are those with minimal destabilising effect. If 
a government is extremely unrepresentative, much more 
destabilising self-determination claims may well be recognised. 
In all other cases, the population of a territory may internally pursue political, 
economic, social, and cultural development through a participatory dem-
ocratic process. Moreover, the UN and other international organisations have 
developed some legal frameworks to protect minorities inside existing states. 
See for example the Copenhagen Document of what was then called the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (29 June 1990), a charter 
for regional and minority languages (5 June 1992) and a framework con-
vention for national minorities (February 1995) of the Council of Europe (both 
entered into force in 1998) and a GA Declaration 47/135 on the rights of 
persons belonging to certain minorities. Thus, despite promoting the impor-
tance of self-determination of all peoples in its official documents, the UN 
seems to adopt a rather conservative approach in practice. State interests 
generally prevail over the subjective interests of groups in society, so as to 
prevent the independence and stability of states from being endangered by 
the challenging of frontiers. 
The emphasis on state interests is also reflected in the UN’s involvement in 
peace agreements and negotiations following conflicts concerning claims of 
self-determination. Although the UN generally takes an optimistic approach by 
inviting both sides of the conflict into a mediation process, emphasising the 
importance of non-violent conflict resolution, it nevertheless directs the entire 
process and does not allow for deviations by either party from the peace 
agreement. Crucial in this process is the maintenance of political stability and 
security of state boundaries; see for example S/RES/1410 (2002) on the esta-
blishment of a United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). 
Full cooperation of both government and rebellion groups is mandatory and 
should ideally lead to an inclusive democratic restructuring, thus excluding 
options that involve territorial changes or extensive political alterations. 
8  GA Resolution 72/159 of 19 December 2017, on the universal realization of the right 
of peoples to self-determination.
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Applied to the Cyprus Conflict
How does the UN paradigm fare in the context of the Cyprus conflict? Both 
key aspects of the UN paradigm – maintaining territorial integrity and 
interpreting self-determination as an encompassing democratic process – 
have shaped the UN’s policy in the Cyprus conflict. As far back as the late 
1950s, when the British proposed partition of the island as the most viable 
solution to the conflict, the GA asserted their opposition to partition, and 
therefore external self-determination (Kattan 2015, 22–23). Prior to the 
colonial declaration (1960), partition was seen as a method or technique of 
decolonisation and had been applied in a number of cases, for example in the 
Japanese colony of Korea and French Indochina in 1945 and in British India 
in 1947 (ibid.). Consecutive resolutions urged the involved parties to respect 
the full sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of 
the Republic of Cyprus and to cease any form of interference with internal 
affairs.9 In S/RES/367 (1975) and S/RES/1251 (1999), any attempts at 
unification with another state or at the partition of the island were expressly 
condemned. Moreover, the UN SC stated its expectations in S/RES/1251 
(1999) about a Cyprus settlement as follows: ‘[it] must be based on a State of 
Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single 
citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and 
comprising two politically equal communities […].’ General state interests, 
meaning keeping the territory intact, have thus prevailed over either 
community’s wishes of partition or unification. 
From this perspective it makes sense that the UN SC immediately rejected 
the unilaterally proclaimed independence of the TRNC in S/RES/541 (1983) 
and repeated in S/RES/550 (1984). Instead, the Greek-Cypriot government of 
Cyprus has been regarded as the single representative administration of the 
entire island until today. In 1993, Greek Cyprus entered into negotiations with 
the European Union to assess eligibility to European Union membership. In 
the same year, the European Court of Justice imposed a trade embargo on 
the TRNC. As tensions on the island remain, the UN SC keeps urging the 
communities to commit to finding a sustainable solution because the status 
quo is unacceptable. On this basis, the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP) is also continued on a yearly basis as confirmed in the latest 
Resolution S/RES/2453 (2019). Solving the conflict is considered an internal 
affair that should be solved by both communities on an equal basis and 
comprising the entire population on the island. In 2001, it was estimated that 
the ratio of Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the island is nearly 80% to 20% 
respectively (World Population Review 2019). However, determining the exact 
9  See primarily UN GA Resolution 3212 (1974) and UN SC Resolution 365 (1974), 
and subsequent resolutions. 
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number of Greek and Turkish Cypriots is not an easy thing and numbers vary. 
It is unclear who actually counts as a Greek or a Turkish Cypriot. Additionally, 
both parties tend to exaggerate their own number in this ‘war of numbers’ 
(Hatay 2007, 4). Despite numerical differences between the communities, 
both are referred to by the UN as together being one people. In this way, the 
UN clearly sees self-determination as an encompassing democratic process.
It is uncertain whether the Cyprus conflict can be solved in the near future as 
long as the UN paradigm constitutes the standard interpretation. Both 
communities are confronted with an imposed form of self-determination that 
depends on their collaboration, while they are scarcely on speaking terms. 
Maintaining the TRNC does not fit into the picture; the Turkish Cypriots can 
only receive international recognition for invoking the right to external self-
determination if they fall under the exceptional circumstances of non-
representation or gross human rights violations. Since UN representatives 
have made numerous attempts to reconcile both groups, hearing their political 
expectations and concerns, these exceptional circumstances do not exist. To 
conclude, the continuous efforts of the UN to bring both communities together 
into one state structure is an ambitious, but also an unattainable goal which 
keeps negotiations in a stalemate. 
Alternative Approaches
The two alternative views that we composed from academic literature – the 
balancing and the human rights approach – are both more accommodating 
towards self-determination than the UN paradigm. The balancing approach 
discourages the creation of fixed categories of people, and the development 
of a rigid single legal framework. Rather, flexibility is recommended when it 
comes to evaluating diverse claims to both internal and external self-
determination. The state is no longer considered the most important factor in 
(inter)national affairs. The human rights approach even takes it a step further 
by seeing self-determination as a group right potentially belonging to diverse 
nations or ethnic groups living in the same state. These groups have the right 
to defend their identities and claims to self-determination must be taken 
seriously. It therefore takes a sympathetic attitude towards both internal and 
external forms of self-determination. Both schools will be discussed below. 
Balancing Approach 
In the balancing approach, flexibility is central. Proponents of this approach 
argue that neither complete adherence to territorial integrity nor unconditional 
approval of external self-determination can assure satisfaction on all sides of 
a dispute (Babbitt 2006; Cassese 1995; Griffiths 2003; Hannum 2006; 
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Horowitz 1998; McCorquodale 1994). Thus, in each specific situation, a 
negotiation or reconciliation process involving all parties is recommended. By 
consent, the parties can choose either to terminate the struggle for self-
determination, or to allow for increased internal political rights and autonomy. 
Claims for external self-determination could even overrule territorial integrity. 
Hannum (2006, 76–77), for example, argues that the international community 
should look for the most appropriate solution to separatist aspirations, in 
exceptional cases allowing for the creation of a new state.  In a similar vein 
Cassese (1995, 344–362) argues, that the regulation of the right to self-
determination is blind to the demands of ethnic groups, and national, relig-
ious, cultural, or linguistic minorities, who often find themselves unequipped 
with rights to improve their situation within existing states. He wants 
international customary law to develop in such a way as to allow for the free 
and genuine choice of government in addition to the static model of 
representative government adopted by the UN. Robert McCorquodale (1994) 
suggests considering the concept of self-determination as a human right but 
limited in scope by compelling societal interests, which are protected by the 
state, but may under no circumstances lead to the oppression of peoples. 
Horowitz (1998, 181) emphasises that the solution to ethnic territorial claims 
requires careful balancing to accommodate all interests involved. He sug-
gests that external self-determination would not likely be in everyone’s 
benefit. Martin Griffiths (200, 3) agrees that aspirations to secession are 
permissible under certain circumstances. Since secession is generally unable 
to provide the most agreeable solution and will often even appear inadequate, 
he calls to consider alternatives for secession, such as minority rights. To 
summarise in the words of Eileen Babbitt (2006, 165): 
As we gain greater understanding of the causes of self-
determination conflicts and a better appreciation of the many 
alternatives that might be put forward to resolve these con-
flicts, ‘negotiating self-determination’ may become the norm, 
rather than the exception.
Balancing Approach Applied to the Cyprus Conflict
Taking a balanced approach to the Cyprus question would first mean not 
rejecting the aspirations of the Turkish Cypriots to self-determination outright 
as the UN approach basically does. The goal would be a peaceful solution 
with which all parties can live, negotiated between the parties. Third parties 
are helpful if they act as impartial mediators who facilitate meetings between 
representatives of both sides. Under this approach, an international forum of 
negotiation would be established. However, contrary to the UN attempts, 
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territorial integrity would not be the ultimate goal. Instead, the outcome is 
open-ended and could be the status quo, regional autonomy or external self-
determination. The revival of the 1960s bi-communal state structure would be 
a viable option, as would the creation of two states or becoming part of 
Turkey or Greece. Following the balancing approach, finding the most 
appropriate solution to the conflict and creating (a) safe and stable political 
unit(s) on the island in which both peoples are respected and at least 
sufficiently satisfied, should be an ultimate goal. 
Human Rights Approach
The human rights approach comprises diverse critical positions in academic 
literature against the current standard interpretation of self-determination 
(Koskenniemi 1994; Margalit and Raz 1990; Pavković 2003; Philpott 1995). 
Instead of seeing self-determination as a democratic process that involves an 
entire population, as the UN does, the human rights approach focuses on 
ethnicity and nationality as the binding elements in societies. According to 
Daniel Philpott (1995, 353), self-determination is equally essential to a people 
as is freedom to an individual. For a group, it is the most important instrument 
in the process of social growth towards their specific social (or economic, 
legal, political) ideals. As self-determination is a human right that belongs to 
every (ethnic) group, this approach is also very lenient on the admissibility of 
many forms of self-determination to assert this right in practice. For instance, 
secession from an existing state could be an option under certain 
circumstances. However, a necessary restriction of the prima facie right to 
self-determination is sought by each author from a different perspective; all 
groups of peoples do possess a fundamental right to self-determination, but it 
would not be preferential if each group were in a position to assert this right.
Margalit and Raz (1990, 439–461), for example, find the necessary restriction 
in the applicability of ethnic and social factors. Self-determination would 
qualify as an instrument for social groups to retain or preserve their identity 
and to protect themselves against (cultural) oppression by other cultures. It is 
a right that may belong to a group that forms a majority in a certain territory 
and shares the same political ideal (Margalit and Raz 1990, 457): 
That importance makes it reasonable to let the encompassing 
group that forms a substantial majority in a territory have the 
right to determine whether that territory shall form an indep-
endent state in order to protect the culture and self-respect of 
the group, provided that the new state is likely to respect the 
fundamental interests of its inhabitants, and provided that 
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measures are adopted to prevent its creation from gravely 
damaging the just interests of other countries. 
In this view, the possibility of changes in a state’s territory is made subor-
dinate to subjective group interests, provided that the group acts responsibly. 
Human Rights Approach Applied to the Cyprus Conflict 
In general, the human rights approach seems most promising to minorities 
within states that wish to pursue their political aspirations. The notion of 
cultural distinctness of a group, which is central to the human rights 
approach, implies that the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot communities 
should not be considered one people. Both communities differ on aspects of 
ethnicity, language, culture, and history. They have a different set of social 
ideals and have different ideas about how politics or law can accommodate 
their group identity. From this perspective, the UN’s solution, namely, forcing 
these distinct groups to commit to the same political ideas under one 
constitution, appears unrealistic. Both the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-
Cypriot communities may qualify as encompassing groups as they constitute 
a numerical majority on their respective territories on the island. If they acted 
responsibly and represented the political will of the majority, then external 
self-determination could be a vital method in the preservation of each group’s 
identity and cultural distinctness. There would be more respect and under-
standing from the international community for the Turkish-Cypriot feeling of 
cultural distinctness and, accordingly, their declaration of the TRNC. Since the 
human rights approach adopts a less fixed notion of the execution of the right 
to self-determination, diverse claims of self-determination can be made – 
including secession. In this respect, the division of the island along the lines 
of the two communities could be a viable solution to the conflict.
Conclusions
So, does the UN discourage or encourage self-determination of peoples? 
Under the exceptional circumstances of the decolonisation process, the UN 
supported self-determination of colonial peoples. Nowadays, the UN has a 
clear preference for internal over external self-determination. Especially in the 
last decade of the twentieth century, efforts have been made – not only by the 
UN – to ensure that minorities should enjoy the greatest amount of self-
determination as is possible in their particular situation. Thus, alternative 
solutions to secession have been created. This way, the state would remain 
intact, but a political process of devolution and the granting of partial auto-
nomy would meet minorities in their aspirations to self-determination. When it 
comes to external self-determination, however, the UN is more reluctant to 
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give in. Claims to secession take second place behind the territorial integrity 
of a state. For the Cyprus conflict this means that a single state including both 
communities is the only acceptable solution. 
The alternative approaches suggested in the academic literature are much 
less state-centric and more favourable towards external self-determination. 
When compared to these approaches, the UN approach looks like a strong 
opponent of external self-determination. Although looking at the Cyprus 
conflict through the eyes of the alternative approaches revealed different 
solutions that cannot be imagined under the UN paradigm, they are far from 
providing a realistic solution to the conflict. For any of the alternative app-
roaches to have a real impact on international politics, a paradigm shift 
supported by the international community away from the UN paradigm 
towards one of the alternative approaches has to occur.
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The United Nations, Self-
Determination, State Failure 
and Secession
ED BROWN
As this chapter will find, the United Nations (UN) has made several 
declarations concerning self-determination; the stance of the UN on self-
determination can appear somewhat contradictory at times, expressing 
support at various times for both self-determination and for territorial integrity 
(the inviolability of borders). Despite such ambiguity, the position of the UN on 
secession and any subsequent recognition is particularly important since 
accession to the UN is considered by the international community as 
tantamount to near-universal recognition. To become a member, a state must 
be recognised by at least two-thirds1 of existing members after gaining 
approval of the UN Security Council, which implies that it has the recognition 
of the major world powers, i.e. the permanent members (P-5) (UN 2019). 
The chapter investigates whether the UN stance on self-determination and 
secession, makes it a friend or foe to self-determination in the context of 
failed states. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the balance of 
legitimacy between the secessionists and the parent state, given the 
argument that a failed state has a deficit of legitimacy, and to analyse the UN 
stance from both an ethical and a practical perspective in light of this. Firstly, 
what the stance of the UN on self-determination might be is considered, and 
then the concept of state failure is introduced, while noting how secession 
from a failed state fits within the UN stance. Finally, two actual cases of 
secession from failed states will be examined; the secession of South Sudan, 
1  Whilst accession to the UN does not necessarily mean a state has achieved 
universal recognition, most members who vote in the UN General Assembly are 
generally recognised to be states (Aust 2005, 18).
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which became a UN member, and the de facto secession of Somaliland, 
which so far has not acceded to the UN. This will allow the chapter to 
ascertain whether the UN stance makes it a friend or foe to self-determination 
in this particular context. 
The main conceptual framework comes from the situation when a people are 
not having their security protected by their parent state, which then fits into 
what is known as the ‘Remedial Right to Secede’ (RRS) (Buchanan 1997, 
35). This is loosely based on John Locke’s ‘Right to Revolution’ (ibid.); the 
idea that if a group has their rights abused by the sovereign, then they have a 
right to look for a new sovereign. Whilst this could be achieved through 
democracy or revolution for individuals, writers such as Buchanan (1997, 37) 
have argued that this could include creating a new sovereign by establishing 
a new state. Essentially, it means that if the government is not upholding its 
side of the social contract, i.e. providing security to its citizens, including the 
individuals within a secessionist entity, then it forfeits a degree of legitimacy. If 
a secessionist state is able to better provide said security, then the legitimacy 
of their claim to statehood may increase and a stronger case for recognition 
can be made. 
The idea of the RRS can be seen, in this way, to complement the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the idea that sovereignty is dependent on 
responsibility, in so much that sovereignty and legitimacy are based upon the 
responsibility of the state in question (Brown 2018, 88–89). This in turn shows 
that with R2P being brought to the fore in the UN, self-determination through 
the RRS can be tacitly supported to admit new members to the UN, as the 
case studies in this chapter both infer. The RRS is compatible with the idea 
that sovereignty is based on responsibility, and thus if R2P is ostensibly 
supported within the UN, so too can remedial secession be.  This chapter 
further argues that this right can apply when a parent state is unable to 
uphold the security of all of its citizens, thus passively undermining the basic 
rights of its citizens (including those in a secessionist entity) and where a 
secessionist entity is better able to do so, thus gaining the balance of 
legitimacy. Whether states take this into account when considering 
recognition of new states can determine whether a state accedes to the UN. 
Therefore, it is important to consider how UN principles on self-determination 
apply to secession from failed states and how UN principles on self-
determination can be interpreted in such a context and particularly, if and how 
these principles are followed by the international community in this context.  
This chapter analyses the ambiguities in the UN stance towards secession in 
the context of failed states. It assesses whether the UN is a friend or foe in 
these cases by looking at where exceptions could be or, in the case of the 
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first case study, have been made to what is ostensibly an anti-secessionist 
stance and the reasoning behind these exceptions. Also, in the second case 
study, it examines where the conditions for these exceptions are arguably 
present, but not made. The chapter concludes by arguing that whilst this 
stance is inconsistent and possibly in need of reform, by keeping its stance 
ambiguous the UN can act pragmatically in cases where secession from a 
failed state may ease a conflict without setting a precedent that may 
undermine the international system of states. This shows that, in this context, 
the UN can show itself to be a friend to self-determination, but only if 
expedient to do so (i.e. it helps to resolve a conflict) and does not go against 
the interests of major powers.  
Definitions
Self-Determination
Whilst this chapter deals primarily with self-determination through secession, 
the UN describes the different modes of self-determination that can occur as 
‘The establishment of a sovereign and independent state, the free association 
or integration with an independent state or the emergence into any other 
political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implem-
enting the right of self-determination by that people’ (A/RES/2625(XXV)). The 
ambiguity arising from the multiple definitions of self-determination can be 
dangerous, since it may lead to impasse and conflict where a group believes 
that they have a right to full independence whilst other actors, such as the 
parent state, may believe  that they have the right to a degree of autonomy or 
representation in exercising their right to self-determination, but not have a 
right of secession. For example, James Anaya (1996, 333) differentiates 
between different modes of self-determination, looking at two specific models: 
1. ‘Constitutive self-determination’, whereby a people decide on their future 
status, opting for or rejecting secession, as has been illustrated in 
independence referenda such as those in recent times of Scotland, South 
Sudan and Montenegro (the latter two resulting in independence, the 
former not); and 
2. ‘Ongoing self-determination’, whereby a group exercises a degree of 
political control over its own people and/or territory, although not 
necessarily through full independence as the constituent countries of the 
United Kingdom currently do (2019),2 or federal subjects of federal 
countries such as Russia or the United States of America. 
2  Scotland can be seen as an example of both forms of self-determination, since it 
held a referendum on independence as well as holding a degree of autonomy through 
the Scottish Parliament.
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The extent of self-determination and self-government is difficult to quantify 
given the number of forms such an arrangement could take. With this in mind, 
Buchanan (2004, 333) notes that ‘[I]t is extraordinarily unhelpful to talk about 
“the” right to self-determination (or autonomy).  Yet existing international law 
contains dangerously ambiguous references to “the right of self-determination 
of peoples”’. The many different forms which self-determination has taken 
throughout the world in the past suggests there is a degree of method to the 
madness when it comes to the ambiguous nature of states’ approaches on 
the matter. Having multiple definitions of self-determination allows the poten-
tial recognising actors to adopt a degree of pragmatism in their approach, as 
it allows all options to be explored before resorting to recognising the 
independence of a secessionist state. It also allows for each case to be 
approached on an individual basis. This is beneficial to the UN approach 
since, whilst cases of secession may bear similarities to each other, no two 
cases will be exactly the same. Each instance will have a unique set of needs 
and will have to be approached in a unique manner. Keeping the law 
ambiguous allows the UN to tailor its approach to the specific situation, which 
more specific and rigid laws on the issue would prevent.
This chapter looks at the use of the definition of constitutive self-
determination as self- determination exercised through secession. However, it 
acknowledges that the definition of self-determination is open to interpretation 
and forms of ongoing self-determination may be favoured if in the interest of 
states within the international community.
Secession
Secession is the act of defying the rule of the parent state, not through 
revolution or otherwise trying to change the government of the state, but to 
exclude the jurisdiction of the parent state from the claimed territory of the 
secessionists (Buchanan 1991, 10). Whether or not a secessionist entity is 
indeed a state depends on the theory of state one is using. The declaratory 
theory of secession echoes the Declaration of the Montevideo Convention on 
the Rights and Duties of States, in that a state exists if it possesses a 
permanent population, a defined territory, a government and the capacity to 
enter into relations with other states; if a state fulfils these criteria then it 
exists regardless of recognition (Eckert 2002, 21). On the other hand, the 
constitutive theory of secession puts more emphasis on recognition of 
statehood rather than statehood alone (Eckert 2002, 24). Whilst the 
declaratory theory asserts that the existence of a state is independent of 
recognition, the constitutive theory stresses that for a state to exist it must 
receive formal recognition specifically, as well as possess the capacity to 
enter into relations with other states, which many unrecognised states have 
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the ability to do (ibid.).
It would appear that it is the constitutive theory of state that is important for 
accession to the UN (how this chapter would define a successful secession), 
since an entity must be recognised as a state by at least two-thirds of the 
General Assembly (GA) and by the Security Council (SC) to become a 
member. The implications of this for this chapter are that UN admission is 
dependent on recognition from states within the international community, thus 
prospective member-states are at the mercy of how UN declarations based 
on the right to self-determination are interpreted by the current member-
states, who may interpret and apply them differently based on self-interest 
and/or pragmatism.
State Failure
The concept and definition of a so-called failed state is varied and contested. 
This is reflected in the sheer number of different indices, such as the Fund 
For Peace/Foreign Policy ‘Fragile States Index’, the Global Peace Index, 
George Mason University’s State Fragility Index, World Bank Group’s 
Harmonized List of Fragile Situations and the Center for Systemic Peace’s 
Polity project (Brown 2018, 132–139). These indices use a range of factors. 
However, for the sake of conciseness, we will use a definition based on the 
works of Max Weber, who stated that a successful state is one that has the 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force and thus a failed state is one which 
either loses the monopoly or the legitimacy (Weber 1919).3 This phenomenon 
can be seen in most of the states that rank highly in the aforementioned 
indices (Brown 2018, 122 and 138). States can lose the legitimacy of their 
use of force by using it in an illegitimate manner, for example by persecuting 
a group. A state can lose the monopoly on the use of force by losing control 
over its territory, for example if non-governmental armed groups become 
active within their recognised borders and cannot be controlled by govern-
mental forces. At times, an oppressed group will fight back, and civil war will 
ensue, as happened in Sudan, in which case the parent state can be said to 
have lost both the monopoly and the legitimacy of the use of force.  
Security
For the purposes of this chapter the definition of security is taken from the 
Fragile States Index by Fund For Peace (2019, 34):
3  It must be noted that Weber was a sociologist, however, in this context he was 
discussing the role of force in statehood, an issue which crosses the disciplines of 
sociology and politics.
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The Security Apparatus indicator considers the security threats 
to a state, such as bombings, attacks and battle-related 
deaths, rebel movements, mutinies, coups, or terrorism. The 
Security Apparatus indicator also takes into account serious 
criminal factors, such as organised crime and homicides, and 
perceived trust of citizens in domestic security.
When this chapter refers to the ability of a state to uphold citizens’ security, it 
is referring to its ability to mitigate the threats to security outlined above, and, 
as it says, the confidence a state’s citizens have in their ability to do this. A 
state can fail to mitigate security threats and/or maintain the confidence of its 
citizens either passively, by lacking the means to mitigate threats, or actively, 
by undermining security through abuses of power such as oppression and 
persecution.
Conceptualisation
The UN, Self-Determination and Secession
The UN Charter (1945) expresses the position that peoples have the right to 
self-determination in Article 1 of Chapter 1, however in Article 2 it also makes 
clear that the integrity of states is vital. According to the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples this can be 
applied to the promotion of secession within a third-party country as ‘any 
attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the 
territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations’ (A/RES/1514(XV) [emphasis 
added]). Whilst this declaration concerns decolonisation rather than secession 
and aims to differentiate between the two by advocating decolonisation but 
not secession, one of the arguments of this chapter is that secession often 
occurs when a people are oppressed by a parent state that does not 
represent them. This is, in principle, similar to a colony working towards 
independence. Indeed, in the context of South Sudan, Sharkey (2008, 6) 
referred to the rule over the South by the oppressive, non-representative 
North as ‘cultural colonialism’.
A rationale for this ambiguity is implied by the UN in so much that the 
territorial integrity of sovereign states is an international norm. This is 
because allowing a general right to self-determination through secession 
could result in a proliferation of states that would undermine the international 
system of states. As Buchanan (1991, 102) points out, ‘If large groups are 
allowed to secede, why not small groups…why not individuals?’. Such an 
argument paints secession as something of a Pandora’s box, that once 
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opened would undermine global order, security and stability as we know it. 
This concern has been shared by other International Relations scholars such 
as Pavkovic and Radan (2007, 129) who talk of ‘recursive secession’, that is, 
secession from a state that has itself seceded, and ‘sequential secession’, a 
further secession from the same parent state. An example of the former would 
be the secession of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia, and an 
example of the latter would be the different states that seceded from 
Yugoslavia.
With this in mind it would seem logical for the UN to favour the concept of 
ongoing self-determination rather than constitutive self-determination where it 
can. However, as Buchanan (1991, 102) rightly goes on to say, this argument 
is based on the premise that the right to secede is an unlimited right to 
secede, in other words an inherent right to secession held by all peoples. In 
reality however, there are limits to such sovereignty and territorial integrity.  
This is observable in the UN Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations (A/RES/2625(XXV)), which, amongst 
many principles surrounding the promotion between states of cooperation and 
friendly relations, includes ‘the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples.’ Pavkovic and Radan (2007, 235) observe in this principle that ‘A 
state’s right to territorial integrity prevails over the right of any of its peoples to 
self-determination, provided that state conducts itself in accordance with the 
principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples’ [emphasis 
added]. 
This is most observable in the Declaration’s section on the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, where it is stated that territorial 
integrity is only protected if the state in question has ‘a government 
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as 
to race, creed or colour’. This can be interpreted as the state having a 
responsibility to represent minorities within its territory (Pavkovic and Radan 
2007, 235). It also implies that should a state fail to uphold the rights of these 
minorities or, worse, persecute the peoples involved, then secession could be 
justified, and the secessionist entity recognised. To this extent territorial 
integrity appears conditional upon the sovereign’s ability to uphold it 
responsibly, since a state cannot expect to have its sovereignty and therefore 
its borders respected if a) it abuses its sovereignty to perpetrate human rights 
breaches, and b) it appears unable to uphold said sovereignty by failing to 
provide security for its citizens. This would suggest that territorial integrity is 
conditional upon the state upholding its duties towards its citizens, including 
minorities and thus proving itself responsible for their rights.  This fits in with 
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the idea of remedial secession as previously discussed.
A/RES/545(VI) goes even further, reaffirming the right to self-determination by 
noting that ‘the violation of this right [to self-determination] has resulted in 
bloodshed and war in the past and is considered a threat to peace’. Whilst 
this can apply to violation of self-determination through colonisation, it is also 
true, as will be seen in the case study on South Sudan, that bloodshed and 
war can also result through a denial of ongoing self-determination of a group 
within a state’s borders. Thus, the right to self-determination is reaffirmed in 
this instance.
The argument of this chapter that secession from failed states is distinct from 
general secession is based on the idea that sovereignty is conditional. This 
idea is supported by the evolving consensus on R2P within the UN; that is, a 
state has the responsibility to protect the security of its population, in 
particular to protect it from ‘genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity’ (UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the 
Responsibility to Protect 2019). The third pillar of the R2P doctrine states that 
‘If a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international 
community must be prepared to take collective action to protect populations, 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’ (UN 2012). A report from 
the UN Secretary-General on R2P noted that ‘Responsible sovereignty is 
based on the politics of inclusion, not exclusion’ (A/63/677). This implies that 
a state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are dependent upon upholding 
them. Thus, there can be a legitimate claim for recognition of a prospective 
secessionist state based around such a minority or group if the parent state is 
not upholding the rights of these people.4 The idea that the breaching R2P 
principles can undermine a state’s sovereignty has in general been used as a 
rationale for humanitarian intervention rather than secession. However, Janik 
(2013, 57–58) hypothesised that humanitarian intervention may lead to 
intervention in support of secessionist groups if said secessionists are facing 
persecution, invoking the remedial right to secede and suggesting that such 
support could in fact encourage secessionist movements. The idea that the 
Responsibility to Protect could encourage secessionist movements is 
supported by Kuperman (2009, 22), who suggests that ‘[G]enocide and ethnic 
cleansing often represent state retaliation against a sub-state group for 
rebellion, or armed secession’. Should this be the case then states may 
intervene on the side of secessionists under the responsibility to protect, thus 
potentially increasing support for the secession that could conceivably lead to 
4  It must be noted that it is not always mistreated minorities that want to secede; 
however, this chapter is exploring the idea that minorities within a failed state which is 
unwilling and/or unable to uphold minority rights, and in some cases have been actively 
persecuted, have a case for UN membership based on the remedial right to secede.
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recognition, as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example (Janik 
2013, 57–60).
The Issue of State Failure
The issue with states that either lose the monopoly or the legitimacy of the 
force as outlined in the Weberian definition of state failure, is that they will 
generally either be unable or unwilling to provide basic rights such as security 
to their citizens. This arguably means that they are unwilling or unable to 
adhere to the principles of the norm that is the R2P since the state would be 
‘manifestly failing to protect its populations’ as supported in the UN resolution 
following the 2005 World Summit Outcome (A/RES/60/1). Additionally, such a 
state would be unlikely to be willing or able to uphold minority rights and thus 
support the self-determination of peoples within its borders as extolled by the 
UN Declaration on Friendly Relations (Pavkovic and Radan 2007, 235). This 
would be the case for a failed state almost by definition, since if it were 
unable to maintain the monopoly of legitimate force it would be unable to 
uphold such rights. If the use of force was illegitimate, i.e. being used for the 
purposes of oppression, then the government in question would not be 
representative of such a minority. The above definition of state failure refers 
to the state’s ability to provide basic rights and security to all its citizens. 
However, it is of particular interest and importance if there is a distinct 
minority within that state who are being directly oppressed by the parent 
state, are otherwise disproportionately disadvantaged by the failings of the 
state. It is also of particular interest if said minority has managed to establish 
order and effective governance within their own region where disorder and 
lack of legitimate government control is spread throughout the rest of the 
parent state.  
Both phenomena arguably fit in with the aforementioned remedial right to 
secede, as in both cases the parent state is not upholding its side of the 
social contract. The first of these phenomena is seen in the first case study of 
this chapter, South Sudan, whose security and basic human rights had been 
actively undermined by persecution from the parent state of Sudan. The 
second of these phenomena is seen in the second case study of the chapter, 
Somaliland, which has managed to establish a stable government despite the 
lack of control of the government of parent state Somalia over its claimed 
territory. The case of South Sudan, as will be seen, would suggest a shifting 
paradigm within the UN towards further emphasis on the conditions being put 
on sovereignty such as those observed in ‘the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples’ of the UN Declaration on Friendly Relations 
and as endorsed by R2P. This in turn has the potential to create a more 
conducive environment for self-determination within the UN for peoples 
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whose parent states lack legitimacy. This means that the predilection in the 
UN for supporting territorial integrity over self-determination via secession, as 
observed earlier in the chapter, could be diminished in cases where the 
sovereignty of the parent state is compromised by state failure i.e. losing the 
legitimacy of its use of force, or losing its monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force. This is shown through the fact that whilst Somaliland has yet to become 
a UN member, in both cases the ability of the state to provide basic human 
rights and security is greatly compromised and the remedial right to secede 
can be invoked.
Additionally, it has been claimed by former UN Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali in reference to Somalia that the inability of a state to govern 
erodes its sovereignty (UN 1996, 87): 
A state that loses its government…loses its place as a member 
of the international community…The charter of the United 
Nations provides for the admission to the international 
community of a country which gains the attributes of sover-
eignty…It does not, however, provide for any mechanisms 
through which the international community can respond when 
a sovereign State loses one of the attributes of statehood.
It is important to note, however, that this lack of sovereignty does not 
preclude the existence of the state in question, whilst the sovereignty of a 
failed state may be compromised in practice, it is still a state in international 
law and a member of the UN. For example, Somalia, a state whose 
government has had extremely limited control over its territory for decades, is 
still a member of the UN. States that lack the ability to govern are still 
recognised because, as  Potter (2004, 11–12) writes, there are two practical 
aspects of sovereignty that exist side by side: external and internal 
sovereignty; external sovereignty refers to the recognition of a state by other 
states, while internal sovereignty refers to the state upholding its 
responsibilities to its citizens. As this chapter argues, this loss of internal 
sovereignty among other factors can be used to justify the admission of a 
secessionist state to the UN if it is governing its territory more effectively than 
the parent state as a case for remedial secession exists. However, this does 
not preclude the existence of the parent state, the remainder of the parent 
state can remain recognised despite its compromised sovereignty leading to 
secession.  
The lack of legitimacy and sovereignty of the parent state, along with the 
perceived rising legitimacy of the secessionist state has been used to justify 
the recognition of secession in the past. The example of this phenomena that 
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this chapter will look at is the secession of South Sudan. It must once again 
be stressed that the UN did not have a direct role in the recognition of these 
secessions, it is not the UN itself that ‘recognises’ states, but the member 
states that make up the UN. However, it is important to analyse the way in 
which these secessions were handled by the states involved in order to show 
how secession from failed states has been handled by states within the wider 
international community, how South Sudan came to accede to the UN and 
how its recognition fits in with the UN principles on territorial integrity and self-
determination. Likewise, the as-yet unrecognised secession of Somaliland will 
be examined in order to assess why it has not gained membership despite 
the case for it. This will in turn enable the chapter to understand more about 
the attitude of the UN towards secession from failed states, as well as a 
consideration of the suitability of this approach in moral and practical terms.
Case Study: South Sudan
Fitting in with the idea of secession based on R2P and RRS, South Sudan 
acceded to the UN in 2011. Its split from Sudan had been based upon both 
resolution of the civil war that had been continuing intermittently for decades 
and the oppression and subjugation of the South by the Khartoum 
government prior to, and during, said civil war which had demonstrated 
Khartoum’s inability to protect its citizens, which, as argued in this chapter, 
can be grounds for remedial secession (Brown 2018, 230). Importantly, many 
in the South saw this subjugation as ‘cultural colonialism’ on the part of the 
Khartoum government (Sharkey 2008, 36). This was due to the ‘Arabisation’ 
movement, whereby the Christian, English-speaking identity of the South was 
denied, indeed, the Southern Federal Party’s request that English and 
Christianity be included as an official language and religion alongside Arabic 
and Islam, were met with criminal prosecutions (Sharkey 2008, 34–36). This 
can be seen to contravene UN General Assembly Resolution 2625(XXV), 
which as seen earlier stipulates that a government must represent all its 
citizens regardless of race or religion. The ensuing Civil War also invokes UN 
General Assembly Resolution 545(VI), which reaffirms the right to self-
determination when its violation leads to war and bloodshed. 
This indicates that, whilst UNGA resolutions are not obligatory for states, it 
does show that the UN is, in principle at least, something of a friend to self-
determination in this context, since in this instance violating this UN principle 
indeed initiated a process whereby a remedial secession achieved UN 
membership, as South Sudan did.
Here we see two potential motives for the recognition of a secessionist state, 
pragmatic conflict resolution, and a moral case based on the oppression of a 
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people. Indeed, both the need to end the civil war, and the past injustices 
towards the South were noted in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
(UNMIS 2005).
It is important to note that the pragmatic course of action can also be the 
moral one, whilst achieving peace and achieving justice can be seen to be 
different things, in this case the one could arguably have come with the 
other.5 The referendum on the independence of South Sudan was won 
overwhelmingly, 99.57% voting in favour of South Sudanese secession (BBC 
2011). This referendum was part of the CPA under the auspices of the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), with which the UN was 
heavily involved, to end the civil war, in the course of the negotiations such a 
concession had seemed necessary. UN involvement included providing 
‘technical and logistical assistance to the CPA parties’ referendum 
preparations through support from its peacekeeping missions on the ground 
in Sudan, as well as the good offices function provided by the Secretary-
General’s panel aimed at ensuring the impartiality, independence and 
effectiveness of the process, and by the UN Integrated Referenda and 
Electoral Division (UNIRED)’ (UNMIS, 2005).
This necessity can be seen as being due to a lack of trust in Khartoum by the 
South. This mistrust is illustrated by the failure of previous peace agreements 
such as the Addis Ababa Agreement (UN Peacemaker 1972; Brown 2018, 
207). This agreement had granted a degree of autonomy short of 
independence to the South but failed after President Ga’afar Nimeiri enforced 
Sharia Law over the predominantly Christian South, again plunging the 
country into civil war (Woodward 1990, 156–157; Brown 2018, 233–234 and 
254–255). This also illustrates the tip in the balance of legitimacy towards the 
secessionists, since a decline in legitimacy of the parent state due to rights 
abuses was met with a perceived rise in legitimacy of the secessionist state, 
as illustrated by the referendum.6
It is worth mentioning at this point that the religious aspect of the conflict may 
have influenced the recognition of South Sudan in that the independence 
movement became supported by the Christian lobby in the US. The interest 
and involvement of the US was due to the influence of American Evangelical 
Christians; according to Huliaras (2008, 163), this group of Christians took an 
interest in Sudan as they considered the Muslims of the North to be 
5  A detailed discussion of the difference between achieving peace and achieving 
justice is outside the scope of this chapter.
6  An analysis of the legitimacy of South Sudan following secession is outside the 
scope of this chapter as the chapter is concerned with the current attitude of the UN 
towards membership of secessionist states rather than the aftermath of secession.
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persecuting Christians in the South). It was due to their influence that the US 
became more involved in the Sudanese peace process, and ‘under strong 
pressure from Washington, Khartoum and the rebels finally reached an 
agreement in Machakos, Kenya that acknowledged the right of the Southern 
Sudanese to self-determination’ (Huliaras 2008, 171–172). This went on to 
develop into the CPA, which, at the behest of the United States, included the 
provision of a referendum for South Sudanese independence to be held in 
2011 (Copeland 2013, 26).  
From this it can be seen that the internal workings of third-party states, 
particularly democratic, powerful states, have a considerable impact on the 
likelihood that a secessionist movement will receive official recognition. This 
in turn shows how the recognition of secession can be affected by powerful 
states’ self-interest. From a UN perspective it is worth noting that the US 
would be less likely to use its Security Council veto right to block admission of 
a new state if the admission of said state was in the US interest.
As previously seen in this chapter, whilst the UN Charter ostensibly supports 
self-determination, it cannot be interpreted as a general right to secede due to 
the detrimental effect such a precedent would have on the international 
system of states as we know it. However, the granting of recognition to the 
independence of South Sudan can be justified morally both as an act of 
remedial secession, upholding R2P and as an act of conflict resolution. 
Although, as will be seen in the next case study, the same pragmatism and 
principle is not always employed by the international community and does not 
always lead to accession to the UN leading to an argument that the UN only 
supports remedial secession from failed states in cases of ongoing civil war.7 
Case Study: Somaliland
Somaliland is a secessionist state in the north of Somalia that does not have 
a seat in the UNGA, nor is it recognised by any UN member state. Somalia 
itself is the archetypal Weberian failed state. It has been without an effective 
government, at least in terms of providing security for its citizens, since the 
fall of Siad Barre in 1991 and groups around the country control various 
regions, meaning that the Mogadishu government does not have the 
monopoly on the use of force (Stremlau 2019). It topped the Foreign Policy/
Fund for Peace failed/fragile states index from 2008–13 and has been ranked 
in the top two to date (Fund For Peace 2018). In the north of the country there 
is a secessionist entity known as Somaliland, which has been shown to have 
7  For the purposes of studying the UN attitude to secession from failed states, the 
post-independence conflict within South Sudan will not be considered as it is outside 
the scope of the chapter.
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its own functioning democratic government (Stremlau 2019).  
Somaliland arguably fits the criteria for remedial secession under the 
auspices of R2P. This is due to the Mogadishu government not upholding its 
side of the social contract in so much as it is unable to provide security to its 
citizens. This is illustrated by the Somali government not being in control of 
the majority of its territory, Somaliland included, for decades and therefore 
being unable to protect its citizens from atrocities (such as attacks by Al-
Shabaab) or to provide basic security. This is compounded by the fact that 
there have been reports of government forces raping, murdering and looting 
Somali citizens, the looting being attributed to the fact that these forces were 
often not paid by the government and are therefore forced to rely on looting 
for survival, further undermining the legitimacy of the Somali government 
(Hanson and Kaplan 2008). Further to this, the Federal Government of 
Somalia (formerly Transitional Federal Government) is not representative of 
Somaliland. Whilst the Somali Government claims Somaliland as a federal 
entity within a united Somalia, the Issaq clan (the dominant clan in 
Somaliland), have so far refused to participate, meaning that the Somali 
government cannot claim to have ‘a government representing the whole 
people belonging to the territory’ as expressed in UNGA Resolution 
2625(XXV). Somaliland’s lack of UN membership could possibly refute the 
earlier point about the violation of UNGA Resolution 2625(XXV) being a 
catalyst to UN membership for a remedial secession.  
One could argue that this discrepancy is due to the fact that the citizens of 
Somaliland are not an ethnic minority, however it can be argued that the 
Isaaq clan is still a distinct group within Somalia that have suffered past 
persecution and discrimination at the hands of the central government, as this 
chapter will see, and the current recognised government of Somalia is 
incapable of protecting this group from future persecution. As such, in this 
case at least, the desired quality for a government to be ‘representing the 
whole people belonging to the territory’ as UNGA Resolution 2625(XXV) 
stipulates, does not necessarily refer to ethnic minorities alone.  
Importantly, an overwhelming majority (97%) of the population of Somaliland 
voted in favour of the constitution, which reaffirmed support for independence 
(Farley 2011). As seen in the South Sudan, referendum supporting 
independence among other factors, which combined with a lack of legitimacy 
of the parent state, led to recognition and UN membership. Yet this has not 
been the case with Somaliland. This shows a major inconsistency in the 
attitudes of the UN and its members towards secession from failed states 
when looking at this particular set of factors. The difference here is that the 
secession of Somaliland is not causing conflict on the scale of the Sudanese 
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Civil War.8 It can even be said that Somaliland is a victim of its success now, 
its relative stability and peaceful existence mean that it can be more easily 
ignored by the wider international community (Keating 2018). Geldenhuys 
(2009, 139) elaborates on this, stating that ‘its peace and stability amid the 
turmoil of Somalia did not capture media headlines or arouse humanitarian 
concerns’. This also shows that when self-determination through secession 
from failed states is condoned in the UN, it is linked to the UN’s role as a 
peacemaker. It also shows that secession attempts, even when not 
recognised by anyone, can lead to a relatively stable and peaceful co-
existence. The UN role in the conflict mediation in the Sudanese Civil War 
showed that such negotiations can lead to self-determination through 
secession. However, if there is no major conflict to mediate, then it appears 
unlikely that a secession from a failed state will achieve UN membership, as 
the case of Somaliland illustrates.
Another somewhat anomalous feature about Somaliland’s lack of UN 
membership is that the secessionist claim of Somaliland is based upon the 
original colonial border between British Somaliland and Italian Somalia. 
Indeed, Somaliland had briefly been a separate nation following 
decolonisation and prior to a union with Somalia a matter of days later. Thus, 
Somaliland’s claim for independence could be seen as the dissolution of a 
union rather than a unilateral secession, and so fears over setting a 
precedent that could undermine the international norm of territorial integrity 
should be less of a concern. This is because it will be a reversion to previous 
borders rather than creating new ones, as has previously been accepted by 
the international community in cases such as the dissolution of the USSR, the 
breakup of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. It seems there is something of an 
inconsistency here in how secessionist states in post-colonial Africa have 
gained UN membership. Post-colonial secessions such as Eritrea and, as we 
have seen, South Sudan have gained UN membership, yet Somaliland has 
not. One can argue that this is due to the oppression that the Eritreans and 
South Sudanese faced at the hands of their respective parent states, giving 
them the right to remedial secession under the auspices of R2P. However, 
Somaliland has a similar claim due to the persecution the Isaaq clan faced 
under the presidency of Barre. For example, according to Worthington (2004), 
opposition to Barre’s rule amongst the Issaq had been met with:
[T]he extraordinary situation in which Barre’s aircraft would 
take off from Hargeysa [sic] airport, bomb and strafe the city, 
load up again at the airport and carry on. They continued until 
8  Whilst the Somali civil war is ongoing and was a factor which led to Somaliland’s 
secession, the secession itself is not causing a highly destructive war on the scale of 
that in Sudan (border skirmishes with neighbouring Puntland notwithstanding).
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there were 50,000 dead in Hargeysa and hundreds of 
thousands of dead in the rest of Somaliland…the rest of the 
population fled. That was the most extreme attempt at 
genocide against the dominant Isaq [sic] clan.
However, related to the aforementioned point about Somaliland’s current 
relative peaceful existence, the fact that there is no ongoing, highly 
destructive conflict specifically regarding the secession of Somaliland can 
explain a lack of UN mediation on the issue and be a possibility as to why 
Somaliland has yet to achieve UN membership. However, the Mogadishu 
government remains both unrepresentative of Somaliland and unable to 
uphold security in the region. Importantly, Somaliland has proven to be 
relatively secure, even showing the beginnings of democracy, having held a 
number of elections and being classified as ‘partly free’ and an ‘emerging 
democracy’ by Thinktank Freedom House (Keating 2018). This means that 
Mogadishu’s claim on Somaliland can be seen as illegitimate based on both 
UNGA Resolution 2625(XXV) and R2P.
Analysis
In the case of the secession of South Sudan it was an apparent lack of 
legitimacy of the parent state that allowed the secessionists passage to UN 
accession based around UNGA Resolution 2625(XXV) (Brown 2018, 227–
229; Gettleman 2011). In addition to this, when one considers the UN 
principle of R2P, it compounds the case for allowing UN membership based 
on the principle of remedial secession. However, it would seem that this is a 
case of principle justifying pragmatism, and that allowing a seat to remedial 
secessionists, from a failed state or otherwise, is the exception rather than 
the rule. We have seen that Somaliland remains unrecognised. This is 
despite having many similar features to the secession of South Sudan, in 
which the secessionists succeeded in becoming UN members. Such features 
include, being unrepresented in its parent state, having suffered oppression 
at the hands of the state and holding the balance of legitimacy over its parent 
state based on these factors, plus the parent state’s inability to govern.  
Whilst conflict resolution can be seen to have played a part in the admission 
of South Sudan to the UN, it must be noted that even in cases of conflict 
resolution secessionist states have not necessarily been admitted to the UN; 
an example of this would be South Ossetia and Abkhazia. An analysis of 
these conflicts is outside the scope of this chapter; however, it is important to 
note that the interests of the global powers, most notably the P-5, have a 
great bearing on whether new states become UN members. For example, the 
secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was opposed by NATO (2008), of 
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which the US, France and the UK are members. The interests of these 
countries in opposing this secession is shown by the fact that the parent state 
in question, Georgia, is a prospective member of NATO (2019). This 
illustrates that the self-interest of states, particularly those on the P-5, can 
hinder a secessionist state’s hopes of becoming a UN member. Likewise, 
support of a powerful patron-state (along with a lack of opposition from other 
powerful states) can increase the likelihood of a state gaining recognition. 
This was seen in the US support for the independence of South Sudan. 
Conversely it would appear that the secession of Somaliland is largely 
inconsequential to the global powers.
As previously mentioned, it is not the UN that recognises states as such, but 
grants membership based on the recognition of its member states; however, 
its member states can, ostensibly, use UN principles such as the UN Charter, 
UNGA Resolution 2625(XXV) and R2P, as supported in the UN resolution 
following the 2005 World Summit Outcome, in order to inform their decision to 
recognise a secessionist state. It would seem that it is in the general interest 
of states to uphold the primacy of territorial integrity, even in cases where a 
secession is causing conflict. These principles that can be interpreted to 
support remedial secession from a failed state are only interpreted as such in 
cases where pragmatic conflict resolution is combined with recent oppression 
of the people of the secessionist state. They are also only interpreted as such 
when the secession in question does not go against the interests of the P5. 
This is in order to uphold the international states system as we know it. This 
chapter will conclude by assessing how appropriate this stance is.
Conclusions 
The UN line on self-determination through secession is such that secessionist 
states are unlikely to gain membership as the principle of territorial integrity 
holds primacy, which initially would show it to be a foe to self-determination 
through secession. However, as has been seen in cases such as South 
Sudan, the principle of territorial integrity is not absolute and has limits, most 
notably when the parent state is not fulfilling its side of the social contract by 
failing to provide security for its citizens. However, so far, the UN has not 
voiced support for the admission of secessionist states without the consent of 
the parent state (Orakhelashvili 2008, 8). This has sometimes been as part of 
a peace settlement, such as in the case of South Sudan, and if the failure of 
the parent state to provide security is down to direct oppression and 
persecution that is an ongoing concern. The principle of allowing these 
exceptions to the primacy of territorial integrity can be linked to UNGA 
Resolutions 545(VI) and 2625(XXV) and R2P, which would show the UN to be 
a friend to self-determination through secession in this instance. However, 
103 The United Nations Friend or Foe of Self-Determination?
there is an argument, as noted in the introduction, that cases of passive 
failure to provide basic security and rights. This was evident in the case of 
Somalia, as illustrated by the aforementioned inability of the Somali 
government to prevent its forces raping and looting. This can invoke the same 
principles. The fact that Somaliland is not a UN member would show the UN 
to be a foe to self-determination through secession in this instance.  
As previously noted, the settlements that saw South Sudan become 
recognised were part of a negotiation for the resolution of conflict between the 
secessionists and their parent state. This indicates that the eventual 
admission of these states to the UN was a pragmatic move in order to create 
stability in the respective regions. This pragmatism can be further morally 
justified by the remedial right to secede and R2P, and its legitimacy justified 
by caveats such as UNGA Resolution 2625(XXV). However, arguably it would 
be just as pragmatic and moral to allow Somaliland to join the UN. It can be 
seen as compensation for the past wrongs of Barre, as well as promoting 
stability in at least part of Somalia, a country that is otherwise a failed state. 
This inconsistency can be explained since, as noted, Somaliland itself is not a 
major international security concern and thus does not warrant UN mediation 
in negotiations that could lead to recognition and UN membership. It was also 
not in the interests of any of the P-5 to recognise; both of these factors are in 
contrast to the case of South Sudan. Thus, keeping a somewhat ambiguous 
approach allows the UN to admit new members in cases of pressing threats 
to international security such as ongoing conflict, yet prevents a mass 
proliferation of states that could undermine the international states system, 
and also allows the P-5 to uphold their interests.
The issue of state failure has been observed to be taken into account by the 
UN in the case of South Sudan. Thus, ostensibly one could argue that the UN 
is a friend to self-determination via secession if the balance of legitimacy is 
tipped towards the secessionists. However, the fact that Somaliland is not yet 
a UN member can be argued to refute this observation, thus it could  be 
argued that the lack of legitimacy of a parent state and potential increased 
legitimacy of the secessionist state is only taken into account in cases of a 
pragmatic response to conflict resolution and when such secession does not 
contravene the interests of the P-5. The case of South Sudan showed that the 
UN can be a friend to self-determination through secession in the context of 
state failure when required to facilitate mediation of conflict resolution that 
may result in secession (possibly at the behest of a major power). In such an 
incidence UN resolutions and principles can be interpreted as supporting 
such secessions, so long as none of the P-5 object. However, the UN is a foe 
to self-determination through secession in the context of state failure when 
there is not an immediate security threat and such a secession is not 
supported by a major P-5 power, as Somaliland has shown. This, however, 
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fits in with the principle of territorial integrity which is a major principle of the 
UN and supported throughout the international community as it prevents a 
precedent that could undermine the international system of states. This 
means that the UN being a friend to self-determination via secession, even in 
the case of secession from failed states, is the exception rather than the rule.
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7
Self-Determination as 
Resistance: Sahrawi and 
Palestinian Struggle for the UN
MOARA ASSIS CRIVELENTE
This chapter1 draws on the cases of Western Sahara and Palestine to begin 
exploring the United Nations’ (UN) role in realising the peoples’ right to self-
determination. It addresses the UN’s role in conflicts perceived by actors as 
protracted due to its lack of resolve, due to manipulation by world powers and 
due to the ‘international community’s lack of political will’, as diplomats, 
parliamentarians, party cadres and activists said in almost every interview 
conducted for this research.2 Considering Sahrawis’ and Palestinians’ growing 
scepticism, but also how they continue to claim the fulfilment of the self-
determination promise by and through the UN, I address their persistence as 
resistance conducted through continuing participation. 
The parallel does not imply that both cases are identical. Still, they share 
many attributes and goals, beginning with their characterisation as struggles 
for self-determination against protracted foreign occupation and colonisation. 
The chapter starts by sketching a conceptualisation of self-determination and 
its development. The first part discusses the concept’s development and the 
1  This piece is part of ongoing research; its topic is certainly not exhausted here. 
Many aspects of the discussion on self-determination, the UN’s limits and the cases 
addressed had to be left out, for now. I wish to express my sincere gratitude for the 
editor’s invaluable comments and amendments to the initial draft and, as per usual, 
state that remaining flaws are my own responsibility. 
2  Interviews with civil society actors, diplomats and other officials from Western 
Sahara, Palestine and other countries, as well as participant observation of side events 
in the UN Human Rights Council were conducted in 2017–2018. Quotations are 
included here with the sources’ consent. 
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second overviews UN approaches to both cases, addressing Palestinian and 
Sahrawi expectations and action. It briefly contextualises the cases within a 
colonial framework sustained by a significant asymmetry and structured by 
Israel’s and Morocco’s enduring military occupation of Palestine and Western 
Sahara respectively. The conclusion reflects on how resistance to negligence 
and manipulation translates into a struggle for the very UN, for its promises 
and, ultimately, for liberation. 
A Developing Principle or an Accommodating Promise?
The conceptualisation of self-determination has long advanced according to 
international dynamics. This section offers a non-exhaustive chronology 
exemplifying debates on the peoples’ freedom from foreign domination and 
freedom to choose their own political systems based on national and 
territorial claims, which have promoted the right of self-determination.  Many 
genealogies identify Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech as the 
principle’s liberal parent, but neglect debates with which Karl Marx, Friedrich 
Engels, Vladimir Lenin, Rosa Luxembourg and others engaged, and the role 
of peoples’ struggles in pushing for the principle’s development (Cassese 
1995; Bowring 2008). For instance, for Bowring (2008, 9), the right of peoples 
to self-determination, ‘the most significant gain of post-World War II 
international law’, was ‘welded’ to it ‘in the context of the Russian Revolution, 
in theoretical and practical struggles’. Although the latter is the reading my 
research builds on, this section deals with self-determination within the UN 
framework. 
The 1945 UN Charter defines self-determination as essential for 
strengthening universal peace in Chapter I, while Chapter XI sets the 
framework for decolonisation. In 1960, in a period of intensifying anti-colonial 
struggle, UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 1514(XV) adopted the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples, referring to principles of national unity and territorial integrity. The 
Declaration brings important points to the UN register. It deems the process 
of liberation ‘irresistible and irreversible’ and argues for an end to colonialism 
‘and all practices of segregation and discrimination associated therewith’ in 
order to ‘avoid serious crises’. It also declares that alien subjugation, 
domination and exploitation of peoples violates their human rights and the UN 
Charter’s principles, preventing ‘the promotion of world peace and 
cooperation’.
However, discussion on whether self-determination was indeed graduated 
from a political principle into a legal right, or when that happened, is ongoing. 
Laing (1992) argues that, through a ‘humanitarian universalism’, the 1941 
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Atlantic Charter issued by U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt and British 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill – later endorsed by others in the 1942 
Declaration of the United Nations – establishes the norm of self-
determination. Three years before the signing of the UN Charter, the 
Declaration by the United Nations ‘pledged the signatory governments to the 
maximum war effort and bound them against making a separate peace’ 
(United Nations 1942). Bowring (2008) argues that the right is defined as 
such in common Article I of the 1966 international covenants on civil and 
political rights and on economic, social, and cultural rights (ICCPR and 
ICESCR). The article states: ‘All peoples have the right of self-determination’, 
they may ‘freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development’, as well as ‘freely dispose of their 
natural wealth and resources’. It also declares that all state parties to the 
Covenants shall promote the realisation of the right of self-determination and 
respect that right. 
Moreover, self-determination is usually defined by three categories: a) that of 
colonial peoples, b) that of secession, and c) that of groups demanding 
recognition or collective rights within states (Archibugi 2003). Respect for the 
diversity of democratic systems ‘as important element for the promotion and 
protection of human rights’, urged for in a report adopted by UNGA Resolution 
60/164 (2005), has also been promoted. Some still argue that self-
determination cannot be concluded in one historical event and must be 
considered a process, ‘subject to revision and adjustment’, one that ‘cannot 
be understood as a one-time choice (…) because, like the rights to life, 
freedom and identity, it is too fundamental to be waived’, as put by Alfred-
Maurice de Zayas (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2014, 
3). This line of argument raises concerns with a relativization of certain 
sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity and the instrumentalization 
of conflicts by regional and world powers. An example is the secession of the 
Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohija, aided by the 1999 military 
intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This operation was an aggressive act 
(Jovanovic 2019) and a violation of the UN Charter (Momtaz 2000).3 
Authors regarding the ‘revolutionary and unclear character’ of self-
determination (Koskenniemi 1994, 241) or arguing for its historical recovery 
as an achievement of struggle (Bowring 2008) scrutinise its provenance, 
operationalization and emancipatory potential. I engage with the cases of 
Palestine and Western Sahara, and am concerned with the kind of struggle 
3  A resolution on the crime of aggression was adopted at the 2010 plenary meeting of 
the International Criminal Court in the framework of the Kampala Review Conference of 
the Rome Statute (International Criminal Court 2010).
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through which the principle and right of self-determination is fought for. 
Hence, I draw from works focused on the role of resistance in the historical 
development of international law such as those of Cassese (1995), Rajagopal 
(2003), Bowring (2008), among others. This perspective supports my 
approach to struggles conducted within an institution said to be the promoter 
of self-determination (the UN), while considering that this being a struggle 
shows that the right of self-determination is disputed depending on the cases 
at hand, as discussed ahead.
The UN Approach to the ‘Right of Peoples’ from Palestine and Western 
Sahara
Colonial historical continuity is manifest in the cases of Palestine and 
Western Sahara.4 Persistence in conducting liberation struggles through 
international institutions and legal instruments appears to reflect resistance to 
a historical closure that leaves people behind. But the variation in UN 
approaches to different cases shows how politically charged disputes are. 
Susan Akram (2014, 78) engages in this discussion by addressing the 
reasons for change in a territory’s status, with emphasis on military 
occupation and the lack of clarity in defining colonisation in Palestine and 
Western Sahara. She notes specifically the UN’s inability to enforce the 
prohibition of territorial aggression, prolonged occupation, and settler 
implantation, which constitute ‘major barriers’ to the realisation of both 
Palestinian and Sahrawi self-determination. This section offers an overview of 
each case, showing how these peoples’ recent histories were impacted by the 
UN.
Western Sahara was put under Spain’s control at the 1884 Berlin Conference 
and has been listed by the UN special committee for decolonisation as a non-
self-governing territory since 1963.5 In 1965, the General Assembly requested 
that Spain ‘take immediately all necessary measures for the liberation’ of the 
territory through UNGA Resolution A/2072 of 1965, and repeatedly urged the 
administering power to organise a referendum on self-determination. 
Confrontation ensued against the Sahrawi liberation movement – organised in 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguía el-Hamra and Río de Oro 
(Polisario) in 1973. A UN mission of inquiry visited Western Sahara, Morocco, 
Mauritania and Algeria, reported that ‘support for Polisario and for 
4  Colonialism or more specifically settler-colonialism has also been employed as a 
framework for discussing both cases; see for instance Khoury 2011, Zunes and Mundy 
2015, Greenstein 2016, and for the conceptualisation of settler colonialism, see Wolfe 
1999 and Veracini 2010.   
5  Western Sahara features at the top of the UN list at: www.un.org/en/decolonization/
nonselfgovterritories.shtml. 
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independence in Western Sahara was widespread and recommend[ed] the 
holding of a referendum for self-determination’ (Fadel 1999). The mission was 
requested by the UN General Assembly in the same resolution where it 
requested the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (A/
RES/3292(XXIX) 13 December 1974). Spain first resisted, then accepted the 
consultation, starting preparations by conducting a census, but Morocco and 
Mauritania rejected it (ibid.). This was among the first chapters of ineffective 
UN attempts. 
Spain left the territory in 1975 without organising the referendum, 
questionably transferring control to Morocco and Mauritania. Secret 
negotiations resulted in the 1975 Madrid Agreements, which does not legally 
mean that Spain’s responsibility as an administering power was thus 
transferred (Zoubir 2007, 162; Ojeda-García et al. 2017). Polisario declared 
the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in 1976 and Mauritania 
abandoned its claims in 1979, while Morocco stayed in the territory, claiming 
that it was part of the kingdom before Spanish colonisation. However, a 1975 
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) did not find enough 
evidence supporting Morocco’s claim and reaffirmed the Sahrawi people’s 
right to self-determination (International Court of Justice 1975). Morocco 
interprets the opinion as favourable to the kingdom’s claim over Western 
Sahara, thus justifying invasion, annexation of and settlement in the territory 
(Zartman 2014, 60). Armed conflict dragged on for almost two decades.
Through the UN and the Organisation of African Unity’s facilitation, a 
settlement plan established the 1991 cease-fire and ‘the holding of a 
referendum without military or administrative constraints to enable the people 
of Western Sahara to choose between independence and integration with 
Morocco’.6 It also established the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western 
Sahara (MINURSO), tasked with organising the consultation. The first 
deadline was January 1992, but the referendum was repeatedly postponed, 
until it disappeared from sight (Fadel 1999; Zunes and Mundy 2010). Partial 
proposals to revive the process, presented by the UN Secretary-General’s 
personal envoy James Baker in 2001 and 2003 and Morocco’s 2007 
Autonomy Plan to grant Western Sahara autonomy have downplayed or 
neglected commitments with a referendum that could include independence 
as an option (Zartman 2014, 66–67). Despite essentially limiting self-
determination to autonomy from the outset, Morocco’s plan was praised for 
‘serious and credible efforts’ by the UN Security Council and representatives 
from the US, France, Mali, and others (Morocco World News 2018).
6  For records of the plans, see the UN Security Council report at: www.un.org/en/sc/
repertoire/89-92/Chapter%208/AFRICA/item%2008_Western%20Sahara_.pdf. 
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As for Palestine, the UN has grappled with the question since its own 
establishment. With the end of World War I and the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire, the United Kingdom and France divided the Levant. Soon, the 
nascent League of Nations established a Mandate System, putting Palestine 
under British administration, from the 1920s to 1948. The socioeconomic 
impacts on Arab inhabitants of colonisation and massive immigration bred 
growing conflicts, and the British administration tried to appease both Arabs 
and the Zionist movement (Halliday 1972; Masalha 2003; Said 2003; Pappé 
2006). Variations of a partition plan were promoted until the UNGA adopted 
one, through Resolution 181, in 1947, even though most of the Arabs rejected 
the proposal, which they saw as continuing colonisation (Jamal 2005; Saleh 
2014). While the Mandate System did little towards decolonisation, being 
what Akram (2014, 76) describes a ‘compromise between the notion of self-
determination and the interests of the colonial powers’, when the League was 
dissolved, some territories were put under the UN Trusteeship System and 
have either achieved independence or association with other states. 
However, when the British Mandate ended and the State of Israel was 
declared, in 1948, Palestine’s question was not transferred to UN Trusteeship 
but to a Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). War ensued leaving 
around 15,000 Palestinians dead and about 500 villages destroyed, driving 
more than 700,000 to seek refuge in neighbouring villages or countries, 
creating an enduring ‘refugee problem’ (Masalha 1992, 2003; Said 2003; 
Pappé 2006). Refugees are since assisted by the UN Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), created in 1949. 
Other confrontations between Israel and Arab countries had direct impact on 
the question of Palestine, which explains the agency’s growing challenges. in 
2018, six million Palestinian refugees and dependants were registered for 
assistance (UNRWA 2019), a situation that endures despite the refugees’ 
widely recognised right of return, as stated in UNGA Resolution 194(III) of 
1948.
In 1964 the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) was established, soon 
confronting Israel through armed action and initially classified as a terrorist 
organisation. In the 1967 War, Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza Strip and 
other Arab territories that remain under its control, and focus shifted to the 
occupying power’s responsibilities toward the people’s protection under the 
unclearly defined ‘temporary condition’ of an occupation that became 
prolonged (Tilley 2012; Jabarin 2013).7 The conflict’s framework has been 
that of international humanitarian law, but due to the protraction of such a 
7  The 1907 Hague Regulations and 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention outline the 
occupying powers’ obligations and the practices that constitute war crimes in that 
supposedly temporary situation. Article 42 of the Hague Regulations defines that ‘a 
territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the 
hostile army.’  
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situation and the practices and policies sustaining it, looking at it as 
colonialism seems inevitable. After having affirmed the Palestinian people’s 
inalienable national rights in Resolution 3236 (1974), the UNGA subsequently 
invited the PLO, as the representative of the Palestinian people, ‘to 
participate in the efforts for peace in the Middle East’, in Resolution 3375 
(1975). 
Concerned with the situation’s protraction, that same year the UNGA 
established the UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of 
the Palestinian People (CEIRPP). It was mandated with advising the UNGA 
on a programme to realise the Palestinians’ ‘right to self-determination without 
external interference, the right to national independence and sovereignty, and 
the right to return to their homes and property from which they have been 
displaced’, and expressed concern that ‘no just solution to the problem of 
Palestine has yet been achieved’ (UNGA Resolution 3376). The mandate has 
been renewed annually, which reflects how the situation has dragged on. In 
the 1990s, mutual recognition between Israelis and Palestinians paved the 
way for the Oslo Agreements, which should have led to the State of 
Palestine’s independence. However, the territory fragmented and became 
increasingly populated by Israeli settlers in colonies mainly built on expro-
priated land. Palestinian institutions became deeply dependent on foreign and 
Israeli funding, while the people remained under an omnipresent Israeli 
military occupation, in refugee camps or exile. The result was an ever-deeper 
discontentment with the peace process (Said 2001; Shlaim 2005; Khalidi 
2006).
Sahrawis and Palestinians share many aspects in their struggles for self-
determination. They both face a diplomatic dead-end favouring the occupying 
powers, which benefit from world powers’ support, and seek a way out of a 
colonising status quo. For instance, the United States has repeatedly 
prioritised Israeli over Palestinian concerns while declaring itself a mediator, 
financed Israel’s military and declared that it would continue to veto UN 
Security Council resolutions contrary to Israel’s interests (White House 2015). 
However, their cases have different places in the UN. Western Sahara is 
listed as a non-self-governing territory, has its claim mainly dealt with by the 
Decolonisation Committee, and has a UN mission in place. Palestine is not on 
the decolonisation list: its case is dealt with through dedicated committees 
and agencies and has its right to a state clearly affirmed since the UN 
establishment. When addressing Palestine, the UN Secretary-General’s 2017 
Report on UN activities relating to self-determination (A/72/317) recalls that 
‘[t]he right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the right 
to their independent State of Palestine, was reaffirmed by the General 
Assembly in its Resolution 71/184.’
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Since the 1960s, the Sahrawis’ general will for independence has been 
recognised (Fadel 1999; Zunes and Mundy 2010), but this option has been 
missing from recent calls for negotiated settlement (Roussellier 2014). For 
instance, in contrast with Palestine’s case, which is dealt with in a dedicated 
section, the same 2017 Secretary-General Report addresses UNGA activities 
on Western Sahara in the Non-Self-Governing Territories section. The text 
expresses support for negotiations initiated by the Security Council ‘to 
achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which would 
provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara’. Further, 
the report welcomes the parties’ ‘commitment to continue to show political will 
and work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue, in order to enter into a 
more intensive phase of negotiations, in good faith and without preconditions’ 
(A/72/317). 
The State of Palestine was recognised by over 130 countries and by the 
UNGA in 2012 as an observer non-member state, but its territory and people 
remain under occupation. The SADR was recognised by over 80 countries 
and is a member of the African Union (AU) but has a decolonisation process 
pending. Despite protraction and frustration, Palestinians and Sahrawis 
demand commitment with UN principles. They resist a stagnation that 
enables the continuing colonisation of their territories, each facing opponents 
that count on diplomatic and financial support mainly from the US, the UK and 
France (Ojeda-García et al. 2017; Khalidi 2006). There is a clear vision laid 
out by Palestinian and Sahrawi actors of how political their struggle is, a 
perspective that informs their strategies, bent on exposing colonial lineages 
and structures. 
Conditional Self-Determination 
Recently, UNGA Resolution 72/159 (2017) stated ‘firm opposition to acts of 
foreign military intervention, aggression and occupation’, which result ‘in the 
suppression of the right of peoples to self-determination and other human 
rights in certain parts of the world’. Still, the UN has not remedied these 
instances; protraction has fed into direct conflicts and colonisation, while self-
determination becomes an obstacle or a complex variable to be considered in 
policies and diplomatic strategies. Morocco argues that it defends territorial 
integrity, even though the kingdom’s claim over Western Sahara is 
unsubstantiated, as the ICJ stated in 1975. Security, in both Morocco’s and 
Israel’s cases, is also presented as a strategic concern protracting the 
actualisation of self-determination; it is also often used to justify the 
multifaceted control exercised by the occupying powers over people’s lives 
and territory (Turner 2015; Halper 2015), systematic repression and even 
military offensives. Carlos Ruiz Miguel (2001, 344) argues that political 
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manoeuvres and attempts at ignoring the Sahrawi people’s right challenges 
the very evolution of international law. He questions whether this right to self-
determination can be replaced by a political arrangement not contemplated by 
any law, and whether a people’s statehood can be disputed while a 
referendum for self-determination is still pending (ibid). The notion that the 
form of the conflict’s end, however recognised the right of self-determination, 
is up for negotiation is found in UN resolutions and diplomatic attempts, which 
raises concerns of the fact that self-determination itself is relative (ibid.; 
Becker 1998).
Human rights are key to the strategic frameworks of these struggles. 
Palestinians and Sahrawis, in interviews and reports, argue that the struggle 
for self-determination and human rights advocacy are the two faces of the 
same coin.  Bowring (2008, 129) considers that human rights ‘provide a 
ground for judgment, to the extent that they are understood in their historical 
context, and as, and to the extent to which, they embody and define the 
content of real human struggles’. Actors interviewed for this research and 
more denounce the effects of protracted colonisation and military occupation 
with human rights advocacy and complaints to UN mechanisms and special 
procedures. Interviews, my participant-observation in activities and analysis 
of campaign material, reports and publicised debates show that their 
strategies have taken dynamic forms, spurring, aided by these struggles’ 
expansion and growing internationalisation, and also responding to their 
opponents’ equally changing approaches.8 Examples are campaigns against 
Moroccan exploitation and commercialisation of Sahrawi natural resources 
(Sahara Rise 2018), the Palestinian campaign for Boycott, Divestment and 
Sanctions (BDS), or the demand for a database to be released by the UN 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on companies that deal 
with Israeli settlements in Palestine (Al-Haq 2018). 
Archibugi (2003, 488) argues that if the right of self-determination is ‘self-
assessed by conflicting political communities’, and not ‘precisely matched by 
a body of law’, conflict outcomes ‘will likely reflect the power of the contending 
parties rather than the interest of the peoples’. Advocating for a cosmopolitan 
legal order, he argues that self-determination ‘should be fitted into a legal 
system far broader than that of single states or even that of interstates law’ 
(2003, 489). Considering that such an order is not coming about soon, 
Archibugi suggests that ‘independent third parties should assess the 
conflicting claims’ (ibid.). However, could one expect that third parties do not 
8  Examples of publicized debates on strategy abound. For Palestine’s case, see: 
‘Open forum: Strategizing Palestine’ in Journal of Palestine Studies 35(3): 37–82; and 
for Western Sahara’s case, see: ‘Sahara Rise Manifest’ in Sahara Rise International 
Conference for Civil Resistance, 25th to 27th February 2018. 
118Self-Determination as Resistance: Sahrawi and Palestinian Struggle for the UN
project their own concerns onto cases, or that main parties accept opinions 
and/or judgements given by independent institutions such as courts or UN 
bodies? For instance, the 1975 ICJ Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara is 
disputed by Morocco, which interprets the piece’s preamble as favourable to 
its claim, as mentioned before. As for Palestine, the reaction of Israel and the 
US to UN resolutions and reports is to claim that agencies, bodies or experts 
involved in their production have an anti-Israel bias (Ahren 2018). Moreover, 
despite its numerous resolutions and covenants seemingly granting peoples 
the right, as an international organisation, made of states guided by their 
respective foreign policies, the UN is clearly influenced by geopolitical 
considerations. Peoples struggling for self-determination understand that and 
do engage in these dynamics, while insisting on recovering what has 
historically been promoted as principled commitment, such as the right to 
self-determination. 
Conclusions: Struggling for the UN
Fundamental issues outlined in this chapter include a perceived lack of 
definition of the subjects of the right to self-determination, questions regarding 
its status as a legal norm, its implementation and its stance in relation to 
principles such as territorial integrity and national unity. The first argument 
usually unfolds into two: how to define a ‘people’ and, considering specific 
cases of independence/liberation, how to demonstrate or justify historical 
claims over a territory. However, discussions along identity lines may work as 
deflection, keeping conflicts ‘intractable’, in which case the most powerful 
actors benefit from maintaining the status quo. Apparent vagueness and 
ambiguity keep disputes ‘too complex’ and are met with calls for compromise, 
as shown in the overview of Palestine and Western Sahara’s cases, where 
their right to self-determination is put up for negotiation. 
The UN has been perceived as unable or unwilling to make good on its 
promise. During the UN Special Committee on Decolonisation’s session of 
June 2017, its Chair Rafael Darío Carreño (Venezuela) questioned the 
committee’s relevance, stating that it is pervaded by a lack of interest in 
ending colonialism and lack of cooperation from administering and occupying 
powers.9 Departing from the recognition of the Sahrawis’ right to hold a 
referendum and adopting a strategy of denial after the 1991 cease-fire, as 
mentioned above, Morocco presented the 2007 Autonomy Plan previously 
mentioned, as if expressing good faith to rekindle negotiations, but removed 
the option for independence from the equation. Conditional self-determination 
becomes a concession from Morocco, which, as mentioned, is considered 
evidence of its ‘serious and credible efforts’ by UN bodies and world powers.
9  For more on the session, see: www.un.org/press/en/2017/gacol3311.doc.htm.
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Participation and interaction with UN mechanisms and procedures vary 
according to challenges concerning access to the institution, which depends 
on accreditation and registration as non-governmental organisations 
according to state law.10 By observing six sessions of the UN Human Rights 
Council (UNHRC) for two years and interviewing civil society actors there, I 
could list a few. For instance, the short time to speak at plenary sessions, the 
process undergone to get access to UN events, is a bureaucratic often 
prohibitive procedure given the limited resources available to civil society 
actors who face obstacles registering organisations and associations in the 
occupying states’ systems. Obstacles such as fear of reprisals from these 
states for their work, or political dilemmas regarding the  adoption of these 
states’ legal frameworks, and much more. Still, people continue to participate, 
adopting diverse tactics to surpass such challenges, as Cheikha Abdalahe, a 
young Sahrawi advocate stated in a side event at a 2018 session of the 
UNHRC. On how to ‘make it hard for them’ just to have people disappear from 
history, Abdalahe stated:
[World leaders] don’t care about us, I am sure. What can we 
do? We have tens of thousands of people to defend. They give 
us time to speak here, about 1 minute and 30 seconds. But 
how can we talk about so many years of suffering in this time? 
This is a theatre, but we have a role to play here. So, let’s play 
it right. […] Are we wrong to believe in the UN? [...] They want 
us to disappear, but guess what, we will make it hard for 
them.11
Officials and activists interviewed from both Palestine and Western Sahara 
affirm that despite their commitment to diplomacy, self-determination is non-
negotiable. After decades of waiting and being frustrated, some Sahrawis 
express concerns that some youth stopped believing in the international 
community’s efforts and are ready, though not willing, to return to armed 
struggle. On the other hand, these actors state their resolve in ‘claiming’ 
international law and the very UN for the peoples’ struggles. The problem is 
often said to be the monopolisation and manipulation of the main UN bodies 
by world powers with their stakes in these conflicts. Still, Palestinian and 
Sahrawi initiatives show historical but also ever broader engagement with 
instruments, mechanisms, mediation attempts, and in political action. 
10  To have consultative status with ECOSOC and get accreditation to participate in 
various agencies’ events and procedures, organisations must apply and submit 
documents that include their certificate of registration issued by a governmental 
authority, see: http://csonet.org/?menu=34.
11  Cheikha Abdalahe is a Sahrawi human rights activist living in Spain who frequently 
participates in many international fora. The statement that she made at the side event 
was written down by me and is reproduced here with her consent.
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However, movements can be increasingly weary of the huge efforts made for 
slow or no progress, showing suspicion towards institutions and cynicism 
regarding the lack of political will from the ‘international community’ to 
recognise their claims, even though self-determination is a UN founding 
principle. Hence, the demanding of the fulfilment of that promise by the UN is 
one aspect of Sahrawi and Palestinian resistance to colonisation and is a 
refusal to waiver on rights fought for – and a refusal to waiver on the very UN 
itself. 
References
Ahren, Raphael. 2018. “US quits the UN’s Human Rights Council, citing its 
‘chronic bias against Israel.’” The Times of Israel, 20 June 2018.  
https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-quits-the-uns-human-rights-council-citing-
its-chronic-bias-against-israel/.
Akram, Susan. 2014. “Self- Determination, Statehood, and the Refugee 
Question under International Law in Namibia, Palestine, Western Sahara, and 
Tibet.” In Still Waiting for Tomorrow: The Law and Politics of Unresolved 
Refugee Crises, edited by Tom Syring and Susan Akram, 75–140. Boston: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 
Al-Haq. 2018. “Palestinian Organizations Support Release of UN Database 
Report and Call for Third State Action to End Corporate Complicity in 
Occupation.” Accessed July 20, 2019. http://www.alhaq.org/advocacy/6280.
html. 
Archibugi, Daniele. 2003. “A Critical Analysis of the Self-determination of 
Peoples: A Cosmopolitan Perspective.” Constellations 10(2): 488–505.
Becker, Tal. 1998. “Self-determination in Perspective: Palestinian Claims to 
Statehood and the Relativity of the Right to Self-determination.” Israel Law 
Review 32(2): 301–354.
Bowring, Bill. 2008. The Degradation of the International Legal Order? The 
Rehabilitation of Law and the Possibility of Politics. New York: Routledge-
Cavendish.
Cassese, Antonio. 1995. Self-determination of Peoples: A legal reappraisal. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
121 The United Nations Friend or Foe of Self-Determination?
Dugard, John, and John Reynolds. 2013. “Apartheid, International Law, and 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory.” The European Journal of International 
Law 24(3): 867–913.
Fadel, Kamal. 1999. “The decolonisation process in Western Sahara.” 
Indigenous Law Bulletin 4, no. 23. Accessed January 15, 2019. http://classic.
austlii.edu.au/au/journals/IndigLawB/1999/66.html.
Greenstein, Ran. 2016. “Settler Colonialism: A Useful Category of Historical 
Analysis?” Jadaliyya, 6 June 2016. Accessed September 20, 2019.  
https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/33333/Settler-Colonialism-A-Useful-
Category-of-Historical-Analysis.
Halliday, Fred. 1971. “On the PFLP and the September Crisis: Interview with 
Ghassan Kannafani.” New Left Review 1(67): 50–57.
Halper, Jeff. 2015. War against the people: Israel, the Palestinians and Global 
Pacification. London: Pluto Press.
ICC. 2010. “ICC – Crime of Aggression, RC/Res.6.” Accessed November 2, 
2019.https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/reviewconference/Pages/crime%20
of%20aggression.aspx.
International Court of Justice, Western Sahara: Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 
p. 12 (16 October 1975), available from icj-cij.org/files/case-related/61/061-
19751016-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf.
Jabarin, Shawan. 2013. “The Occupied Palestinian Territory and international 
humanitarian law: a response to Peter Maurer.” International Review of the 
Red Cross 95(890): 415–428. 
Jamal, Amal. 2005. The Palestinian National Movement: Politics of 
Contention: 1967–2005. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Jovanovic, Zivadin. 2019. “Not to forget: 20 years since NATO aggression on 
Yugoslavia.” – Interview by Enrico Vigna. Belgrade Forum, March 9, 2019.  
www.beoforum.rs/en/comments-belgrade-forum-for-the-world-of-equals/614-
not-to-forget-20-years-since-nato-aggression-on-yugoslavia.html.
Khalidi, Rashid. 2006. The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle 
for Statehood. Boston: Beacon Press. 
122Self-Determination as Resistance: Sahrawi and Palestinian Struggle for the UN
Khouri, Rana B. 2011. “Western Sahara and Palestine: A Comparative Study 
of Colonialisms, Occupations, and Nationalisms.” New Middle Eastern 
Studies 1: 1–20.
Koskenniemi, Martti. 1994. “National Self-determination Today: Problems of 
Legal Theory and Practice.” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
43(2): 241–269.
Laing, Edward. 1992. “The Norm of Self-Determination: 1941–1991.” 
California Western International Law Journal 22: 209–308.
Masalha, Nur. 1992. Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of ‘Transfer’ 
in Zionist Political Thought 1882–1948. Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
Palestine Studies. 
Masalha, Nur. 2003. The Politics of Denial: Israel and the Palestinian Refugee 
Problem. London: Pluto Press.
Miguel, Carlos Ruiz. 2001. “Recientes Desarrollos del Conflicto del Sáhara 
Occidental: Autodeterminación y Estatalidad.” Anuario Mexicano de Derecho 
Internacional 1, 343–362. 
Momtaz, Djamchid. 2000. “NATO’S ‘humanitarian intervention’ in Kosovo and 
the prohibition of the use of force.” International Review of the Red Cross, no. 
837. www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/article/other/57jqcr.htm.
Morocco World News. 2018. “US Reaffirms that Morocco’s Autonomy Plan is 
‘Serious, Credible and Realistic’.” Morocco World News, 28 April 2018. www.
moroccoworldnews.com/2018/04/245366/us-reaffirms-that-morocco-
autonomy-plan-is-serious-credible-and-realistic/.
Ojeda-García, Raquel, Irene Fernández Molina, and Victoria Veguilla, eds. 
2017. Global, Regional and Local Dimensions of Western Sahara’s Protracted 
Decolonization: When a Conflict Gets Old. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Omar, Emboirik A. 2017. El movimiento nacionalista saharaui: de Zemla a la 
Organización de la Unidad Africana. Las Palmas: Mercurio. 
Pappé, Ilan. 2006. “The 1948 Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine.” The Journal of 
Palestine Studies 36(1): 6–20. 
123 The United Nations Friend or Foe of Self-Determination?
Por un Sahara Libre. 2018. “Victorias jurídicas sucesivas del Frente Polisario 
que sacuden el Reino de Marruecos.” Accessed March 30, 2018.  
http://porunsaharalibre.org/2018/03/vitorias-juridicas-sucesivas-del-frente-
polisario-que-sacuden-el-reino-de-marruecos/.
Rajagopal, Balakrishnan. 2003. “International Law and Social Movements: 
Challenges of Theorizing Resistance.” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
41(2): 397–433.
Roussellier, Jacques. 2014. “The Evolving Role of the United Nations: The 
Impossible Dual Track?” In Perspectives on Western Sahara: Myths, 
Nationalisms and Geopolitics, edited by Anouar Boukhars and Jacques 
Roussellier, 119–140. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
Ruiz Miguel, Carlos. 2001. “Recientes Desarrollos del Conflicto del Sahara 
Occidental: Autodeterminación y Estatalidad.” Anuario Mexicano de Derecho 
Internacional 1: 343–362. 
Said, Edward. 2001. The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After. New 
York: Vintage Books.
Said, Edward. 2003. The Question of Palestine. New York: Vintage Books.
Saleh, Mohsen. 2014. The Palestinian Issue: Historical Background and 
Contemporary Developments. Beirut: Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and 
Consultations. 
Sahara Rise. 2018. “Sahara Rise Manifest.” Accessed July 20, 2019.  
http://sahararise.org/en/sahara-rise-manifest/.
Shlaim, Avi. 2005. “The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process.” In 
International Relations of the Middle East, edited by Louise Fawcett, 241–
261. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Soares, Adérito de Jesus. 2012. “The Parallels and the Paradox of Timor-
Leste and Western Sahara.” In Autonomy and Separatism in South and 
Southeast Asia, edited by Michelle Miller, 77–92. Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asia Studies.
Tilley, Virginia. 2012. Beyond Occupation: Apartheid, Colonialism and 
International Law in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. London: Pluto 
Press.
124Self-Determination as Resistance: Sahrawi and Palestinian Struggle for the UN
Turner, Mandy. 2015. “Peacebuilding as counterinsurgency in the occupied 
Palestinian territories.”  Review of International Studies 41: 73–98.
United Nations. 1942. “Declaration of the United Nations.” Accessed 
November 2, 2019. 
www.un.org/en/sections/history-united-nations-charter/1942-declaration-
united-nations/index.html.
United Nations General Assembly. 2017. Report on the Right of peoples to 
self-determination: report of the Secretary General, A/72/317 (11 August 
2017), available from undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/A/72/317.
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2014. 
Report of the Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and 
equitable international order exploring the adverse impacts of military 
expenditures on the realization of a democratic and equitable international 
order, A/HRC/27/51 (17 July 2014), available from  http://ap.ohchr.org/
documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/27/51.
United Nations General Assembly. 1947. Future government of Palestine, A/
RES/181(II) (29 November 1947), available from unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/
unispal.nsf/0/7F0AF2BD897689B785256C330061D253.
United Nations General Assembly. 1948. Palestine – Progress Report of the
United Nations Mediator, A/RES/194(III) (11 December 1948), available from 
unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/
C758572B78D1CD0085256BCF0077E51A.
United Nations General Assembly. 1960. Declaration on the granting of 
independence to colonial countries and peoples, A/RES/1514(XV) (14 
December 1960).
United Nations General Assembly. 1965. Question of Ifni and Spanish 
Sahara, A/RES/2072(XX) (16 December 1965), available from undocs.org/
en/A/RES/2072(XX).
United Nations General Assembly. 1966. International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, A/RES/2200A(XXI) (16 December 1966), available from www.
un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/
globalcompact/A_RES_2200A(XXI)_civil.pdf.
125 The United Nations Friend or Foe of Self-Determination?
United Nations General Assembly. 1966. International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, A/RES/2200A(XXI) (16 December 
1966), available from www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/
generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_2200A(XXI)_economic.pdf.
United Nations General Assembly. 1974. Question of Spanish Sahara, A/
RES/3292(XXIX) (13 December 1974), available from digitallibrary.un.org/
record/190206/files/A_RES_3292%28XXIX%29-EN.pdf.
United Nations General Assembly. 1974. Question of Palestine, A/RES/3236 
(XXIX) (22 November 1974), available from undocs.org/A/RES/3236%20
(XXIX).
United Nations General Assembly. 1975. Invitation to the Palestine Liberation 
Organization to participate in the efforts for peace in the Middle East, A/
RES/3375(XXX) (10 November 1975).
United Nations General Assembly. 1975. Question of Palestine, A/
RES/3376(XXX) (10 November 1975).
United Nations General Assembly. 2005. Respect for the principles of national 
sovereignty and diversity of democratic systems in electoral processes as an 
important element for the promotion and protection of human rights, A/
RES/60/164 (16 December 2005).
United Nations General Assembly. 2017. Universal realization of the right of 
peoples to self-determination, A/RES/72/159 (19 December 2017).
United Nations. 2017. Special Committee on Decolonization Adopts 2 
Information-Related Draft Resolutions as It Opens 2017 Substantive Session.  
GA/COL/3311, 12 June 2017.
UNRWA. 2019. “UNRWA in Figures 2018.” Accessed September 10, 2019. 
https://www.unrwa.org/resources/about-unrwa/unrwa-figures-2018.
Veracini, Lorenzo. 2010. Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview. London: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
White House. 2015. “5 Things You Need to Know About the US-Israel 
Relationship Under President Obama.” Accessed July 20, 2019.  
www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/03/01/5-things-you-need-know-about-us-
israel-relationship-under-president-obama.
126Self-Determination as Resistance: Sahrawi and Palestinian Struggle for the UN
Wolfe, Patrick. 1999. Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of 
Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event. London: 
Cassell.
Zartman, I. William. 2014. “Morrocco’s Saharan Policy.” In Perspectives on 
Western Sahara: Myths, Nationalisms and Geopolitics, edited by Anouar 
Boukhars and Jacques Roussellier, 55–70. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
Zoubir, Yahia H. 2007. “Stalemate in Western Sahara: Ending International 
Legality.” Middle East Policy 14(4): 158–177. 
Zunes, Stephen, and Jacob Mundy. 2010. Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, 
and Conflict Irresolution. New York: Syracuse University Press. 
Zunes, Stephen, and Jacob Mundy. 2015. “Moroccan Settlers in Western 
Sahara: Colonists or Fifth Column?” In Settlers in Contested Lands: Territorial 
Disputes and Ethnic Conflicts, edited by Oded Haklai and Neophytus 
Loizides, 40–74. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
127 The United Nations Friend or Foe of Self-Determination?
8
Self-Determination and State 
Sovereignty: The Case of UN 
Involvement in Jammu and 
Kashmir
STEPHEN P. WESTCOTT
The year 2018 marks the 70th anniversary of the First Indo-Pakistani War over 
Jammu and Kashmir (simplified as Kashmir from hereon in) and United 
Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 47. This resolution stipulated that 
both India and Pakistan should withdraw their military forces and arrange for 
a plebiscite to be held in order to provide the people of Kashmir the choice of 
which state to join (S/RES/47). Ostensibly this resolution was an effort by the 
UN Security Council to put the right to self-determination into practice. Yet I 
argue that a closer inspection reveals that the Security Council, by limiting the 
choice for the people of Kashmir to accession into either India or Pakistan, 
and its lackadaisical efforts to implement the plebiscite the resolution called 
for, was in fact privileging another norm: the existing sovereign state’s rights. 
The basis for this decision is at the heart of the UN Charter itself. Although 
the UN Charter famously calls for the ‘equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples’ in Article 1, Article 2 also clearly states ‘nothing contained in the 
present [UN] Charter shall authorise the UN to intervene in matters that are 
essentially within the jurisdiction of any state’ (1945, 3). As the peoples 
seeking self-determination are inherently within a state, the norm of self-
determination typically finds itself in conflict with the norm of state territorial 
integrity. The situation becomes further confused when the people in question 
occupy a territory that is contested between two sovereign states, as is the 
case in Kashmir. 
The Kashmir situation is far from unique. Though few other self-determination 
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movements exist within territory actively disputed between two states, the UN 
has been consistently reluctant to recognise any self-determination move-
ments seeking to break from already recognised states. This remains the 
case whether the movements have already established a de facto state, such 
as Somaliland and Transnistria, or are aspirant independence movements, 
such as those undertaken by the Tibetans, Kurds or West Papuans. This 
chapter is dedicated to illuminating the tension that exists between the 
principle of self-determination and the rights of state sovereignty that is 
inherent within the UN. In using the case of Jammu and Kashmir, one of the 
earliest incidences where this normative clash occurred, this chapter 
demonstrates that while the UN formerly advocates for self-determination, it 
in practice upholds the principle of territorial sovereignty. However, before we 
can explore the history and ramifications of the UN Security Council’s actions 
concerning Kashmir, we must first define these terms, explore why they are 
often in conflict with each other and how the UN has sought to employ them. 
Self-Determination, Sovereign Territorial Integrity and the UN
One significant source of tension that exists within the theory and practice of 
international law is between the principle of self-determination and the norm 
of state sovereignty, especially when it concerns the state’s territorial integrity. 
Broadly defined, self-determination is the philosophical and political principle 
that people should have the right to shape their own political, economic and/
or cultural destiny. In contrast, the norm of sovereignty refers to the claim of a 
state, recognised by other states, to be the exclusive political authority within 
a specific territory. Whilst self-determination is often the foundation for a state, 
it becomes an issue when an aspirant people seek to separate from an 
established state, either attempting to establish their own separate state 
(secessionism) or to join another state (irredentism) (Taras and Ganguly 
2006, 41–44). The norm of state sovereignty has two primary components. 
The first is the principle of non-interference, or the expectation that states 
should be free to conduct their internal affairs without any outside 
interference. The second is the principle of territorial integrity, or that a state’s 
borders are sacrosanct and thereby should not be altered without the consent 
of all relevant parties. In other words, the territorial integrity aspect of the 
norm does not recognise the right of people to engage in a unilateral 
secession, whilst the non-interference requirement ensures that international 
actors cannot legitimately compel the state to do so (Makinda 1998, 103–
105). Hence, the principle of self-determination frequently finds itself in 
conflict with the norm of state sovereignty.
Interestingly, despite the UN’s well-earned reputation for being divided and 
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equivocating upon many issues, it has been surprisingly united and consistent 
in its favouring the norms of non-interference and the territorial integrity of a 
sovereign state over the self-determination of peoples. The only example of 
the UN unequivocally embracing the principle of self-determination was its 
support movement for decolonisation. This consideration was most clearly 
articulated in two General Assembly’s declarations. The first of these was 
Resolution 1514(XV), more commonly known as the Declaration Granting 
Independence to Colonial Territories, Countries and Peoples, proclaimed in 
December 1960. This declaration decreed that ‘the subjection of peoples to 
alien subjugation, domination and exploitation… is contrary to the Charter of 
the United Nations’ and proclaimed that ‘all peoples have the right to self-
determination; by virtue of this right they freely determine their political status 
and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development’ (A/
RES/1514[XV]). 
The second declaration was Resolution 2625(XXV), more commonly known 
as the Declaration on Principles of International Law, Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation Among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, proclaimed in October 1970. This declaration explicitly stated that 
the principle of self-determination’s goal was ‘to bring a speedy end to 
colonialism, having due regard for the freely expressed will of the peoples 
concerned’ (A/RES/2625[XXV]). Furthermore, it specified that ‘the estalish-
ment of a sovereign or independent state, the free association or integration 
with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status 
freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of 
self-determination’ (ibid.).
However, once the process of decolonisation is complete, the focus of the 
right to self-determination within the UN organs shifts from the people to the 
state itself. Indeed, the Declaration on Principles of International Law pro-
claimed: 
Nothing in the forgoing paragraphs shall be construed as 
authorising or encouraging any action which would dismember 
or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political 
unity of sovereign and independent states conducting them-
selves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples described above and thus possessed 
of a government representing the whole people belonging to 
the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour 
(ibid.).
In other words, the General Assembly was asserting that once the process of 
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decolonisation is complete, the state’s sovereign rights to territorial integrity 
and political autonomy take precedence. The basis of this post-colonial pivot 
towards the norm of state sovereignty is based upon the principle of uti 
possidetis. In essence, the principle of uti possidetis stipulates that when a 
former colony secedes from an empire, the new state’s borders should match 
its former administrative boundaries (Taras and Ganguly 2006, 45). Any 
alteration of these borders only occurring after an international agreement 
involving the new state or with the state’s own consent. Thus, any unilateral 
efforts by secessionist or irredentist movements to break away from an 
existing state are not recognised by any UN organs, with such actions only 
becoming legitimate if the existing state accepts the split (Chandhoke 2008, 
2–4).
In part, the adoption of the principle of uti possidetis has been purely 
pragmatic owing to the difficulty of adequately establishing a territorial state 
that does not contain some minority within it and the general reluctance for 
established states to accept being bifurcated. Yet the favouring of the nation-
state has also been partly adopted by design, with several scholars arguing 
that an unstated goal of the UN has been to freeze the political and territorial 
map after the process of de-colonisation (Saini 2001, 60–65; Taras and 
Ganguly 2006, 45–46). 
By and large, this freezing of territorial boundaries has been a boon for 
international peace as the late twentieth century saw a marked reduction of 
interstate wars over territory and for ‘national reunification’. Indeed, most of 
the international community could agree that the maintenance of colonies was 
against the principle of self-determination and that as colonies are by 
definition not part of a state’s core territory, they were hard to justify by 
appealing to their sovereignty. However, this peace has come at the UN’s 
sacrifice of a broader application of the principle of self-determination to any 
aspirant non-self-governing peoples in non-colonial states who see little 
future within their current borders or otherwise wish to break away. During the 
UN’s first five years, there were several cases of non-self-governing territories 
that the General Assembly or Security Council could have sought to apply the 
principle of self-determination to any aspirant peoples rather than defer to 
existing state interests.1 One of the most prominent of these cases was the 
India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir. 
The Origins of the Jammu and Kashmir Dispute
1  Apart for the situation in Kashmir, two of the most notable examples from this period 
are the UN General Assembly’s 1947 vote to accept the partitioning of Palestine (A/
RES/181B[II]) and 1950 vote to accept the federation of Ethiopia and Eritrea (A/
REES/390A[V]), over the objections of the Arab and Eritrean populations respectively. 
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During British rule, the subcontinent was governed in part through territories 
that British authorities directly administered and in part through a number of 
semi-autonomous vassals known as Princely States. One of the largest of 
these Princely States was Jammu and Kashmir, situated in the northwest 
corner of British India. The territory came under British suzerainty in 1846 
when the British East India Company sold the Valley of Kashmir to the Raja of 
Jammu, Gulab Singh, and recognised him as a Maharaja in return for his 
acceptance of British overlordship (Schofield 2000, 7–10). When the British 
withdrew from the subcontinent in 1947, they partitioned their former colony 
roughly along sectarian lines to create India and Pakistan in a futile effort to 
reduce the bloodshed between supporters of the bitterly feuding All India 
National Congress of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru and the Muslim 
League of Muhammad Ali Jinnah. As part of this partition, all the Princely 
States would be forced to sign the Instruments of Accession which would 
incorporate their lands into one of the new states. Although the respective 
‘princes’ could choose which state their realm would be absorbed into, they 
were encouraged by the British to consider both their geographical location 
and the demographics of their subjects (Behera 2006, 5–14). 
At the time of the British withdrawal, Kashmir was approximately 77% Muslim 
and bordering the western wing of Pakistan. This would have theoretically 
ensured that joining Pakistan would have been a natural choice. However, 
there also existed several minorities within Kashmir which favoured India, 
most notably the Buddhist Ladakhis in the north and the Sikhs and Hindu 
Dogras in the south (Behera 2006, 104–105). Additionally, the Muslim 
population of Kashmir was not homogeneous, with many following the mystic 
Sufi tradition of Islam with significant pockets of Shia and orthodox Sunni 
populations (Snedden 2013, 9–10). A final issue came from the political 
leanings of the local authorities and personalities of Kashmir. Although there 
were supporters for acceding to either India and Pakistan, the key Kashmiri 
political actors at the time were the Hindu Maharajah, Hari Singh, and the 
leader of the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, Sheikh Abdullah. 
Singh had ruled Kashmir with increasing despotism since he ascended to the 
throne in 1925, paying little attention to his ministers or local council when 
passing laws, imposing discriminatory taxes on Muslims. As a result, Singh 
was a highly unpopular ruler and often had to use his military, often with the 
assistance of British forces, to crush local unrest (Schofield 2000, 17–18). 
Nonetheless, as the Maharajah, Singh was empowered to make the decision 
whether to accede his kingdom to India or Pakistan. However, Singh 
personally disliked both Jinnah and Nehru and clearly wished to maintain his 
control over Kashmir. Thus, Singh deliberately equivocated in declaring for 
either India or Pakistan, seemingly believing that by delaying the decision he 
could achieve de facto independence for Kashmir (Subbiah 2004, 175). 
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Abdullah and the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference represented 
the main local opposition to Singh. Hence, their primary policy aims were 
concerned with ending the Maharaja’s rule and establishing a secular 
representative government in Kashmir. Yet, while Abdullah hated the 
ideological concept of Pakistan and was good friends with Nehru, his clearly 
preferred status for Kashmir since 1944 was to establish it as ‘an independent 
political unit like Switzerland in South Asia’ (Lamb 1991, 187–190; Snedden 
2013, 25).
By the end of October 1947, two months after Britain formally withdrew from 
the subcontinent, both India and Pakistan were growing impatient for Singh to 
make his accession decision. It was Pakistan, increasingly convinced that 
India was trying to smother it or at least cheat it out of economic and 
strategically important territory, that moved first (Hajari 2015, 180–189). In an 
effort to secure Kashmir for Pakistan, several members of the Pakistani 
military and government orchestrated an invasion of pro-Pakistan Islamic 
zealots from the Pashtun tribes on Pakistan’s western frontier. The 
Maharaja’s forces, already occupied trying to pacify an unrelated anti-
Maharaja pro-Pakistan rebellion in the Poonch region, were completely 
unprepared to resist such an invasion and were swiftly routed. India refused 
to assist unless Singh signed the Instrument of Accession in favour of India. 
Thus Singh, recognising that his political position had collapsed and 
desperate to gain Indian help in repulsing the invasion, formally signed the 
document in favour of India on 26 October 1947 (Schofield 2000, 41–54).
Despite the obviously coerced nature of Singh’s signature and the fact that it 
went against the pro-Pakistan or independence aspirations of many 
Kashmiris, India’s leadership was convinced that Singh’s accession gave 
India both the legal and moral right to the Princely State. This mentality was 
buttressed by the fact that India was able to rush in enough troops to halt the 
advance of Pakistan’s proxy forces upon the Kashmiri capital of Srinagar and 
even reverse some of their territorial gains. However, India was not able to 
inject enough troops into Kashmir to advance far before winter made further 
operations impossible. With the weather ending any further campaigning from 
either side, Nehru decided to call upon the Security Council to mediate 
believing the UN would compel Pakistan to withdraw (Subbiah 2004, 176–
177). Thus, on 1 January 1948, Nehru wrote a letter to the UN Security 
Council (S/628), arguing that: 
Under Article 35 of the Charter of the United Nations, any 
member may bring any situation, whose continuance is likely 
to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security to the attention of the Security Council. Such a 
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situation now exists between India and Pakistan owing to the 
aid which invaders…are drawing from Pakistan for operations 
against Jammu and Kashmir, a State which acceded to the 
Dominion of India…The Government of India requests the 
Security Council to call upon Pakistan to put to an end 
immediately…[this] act of aggression against India.2 
Pakistan responded with their own letter to the UN Security Council on 15 
January 1948 (S/646), rejecting India’s claims, outlining its own position 
concerning Kashmir and airing several other grievances regarding India’s 
conduct. 
Much to India’s indignation, the UN Security Council did not order Pakistan to 
withdraw but instead passed Resolution 39 on 20 January 1948 establishing 
the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). The UNCIP was 
empowered to investigate the facts on the ground and act as a mediator 
between India and Pakistan and to resolve the dispute (S/RES/39). 
Notwithstanding the Security Council’s efforts, combat operations began to 
resume in February, with both sides clashing as soon as the territory began to 
thaw. After a few months of deliberation, the UN Security Council passed the 
more detailed Resolution 47 on 21 April 1948 in an effort to provide the basic 
guidelines for resolving the conflict. In essence, Resolution 47 called upon 
Pakistan to secure the withdrawal of its proxies, followed by a withdrawal of 
Indian troops. The UN would then establish a temporary Plebiscite 
Administration in Kashmir, with the mandate to conduct a fair and impartial 
plebiscite ‘on the question of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan’ 
(S/RES/47). To oversee the implementation of this Resolution, the UNCIP 
was expanded and immediately dispatched to the subcontinent. 
UN Involvement in the Jammu and Kashmir Dispute
The clear intention of Resolution 47 was to put into practice the principle of 
self-determination. However, in practice the question of self-determination 
was quickly superseded by concerns about international peace. Indeed, by 
the time the UNCIP arrived in July, on the 20 April 1948 Jinnah which 
authorised the Pakistan Army to occupy the territory held by their tribal 
proxies and pro-Pakistani rebels, had begun to be pushed back by an Indian 
offensive. Although this order was given prior to Resolution 47, Pakistan 
disregarded the UN Resolution’s call for a ceasefire and withdrawal, with 
2  The Article 35 referred to in India’s letter is part of Chapter VI of the UN Charter 
which stipulates that the Security Council has the right to investigate any international 
dispute or situation likely to endanger international peace (Article 34) and recommends 
appropriate procedures or terms to resolve the dispute (Articles 36, 37 and 38). 
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Pakistani Army units arriving in force in May. Hence, the UNCIP considered 
its duty first and foremost to be brokering a truce between India and Pakistan 
rather than any efforts to determine the Kashmiris’ desires or even lay the 
groundwork for a plebiscite. To that end, the Commission passed a resolution 
on 13 August 1948 proposing that both sides issue a ceasefire and accept a 
truce overseen by the UN (S/1100, 28–30). However, this plan was largely 
unimaginative, with the UNCIP simply proposing that the ceasefire be 
monitored by UN observers before reiterating the model for resolving the 
dispute outlined in Resolution 47. 
Although both India and Pakistan eventually agreed to a ceasefire and a Line 
of Control, which came into effect on 1 January 1949, the UNCIP was unable 
to broker any agreement as to how to demilitarise Kashmir or how the 
plebiscite should be conducted (Snedden 2005, 72–74). Pakistan remained 
unwilling to withdraw its forces, believing that India had attempted to seize 
Kashmir using ‘fraud and violence’ and would not uphold its obligations 
(Subbiah 2004, 178–179). Pakistan therefore insisted upon more details as to 
how the plebiscite would be held and for any Pakistani withdrawal to be 
synchronised with India’s military (see Annex 1 in S/1196, 12–14). India for its 
part took the position that the Instrument of Accession made Kashmir 
legitimately part of India and that Pakistan had launched an unprovoked war 
of aggression to annex the territory. Hence, India considered that it was the 
UNCIP’s role to force Pakistan to withdraw, refusing to move before Pakistan 
and remaining lukewarm on the necessity of holding a plebiscite (Hajari 2015, 
246). 
Although the UNCIP’s focus had quickly turned to ending the war between 
India and Pakistan, it did at least attempt to uphold the principle of self-
determination by continuing to insist on holding a plebiscite. However, the 
history of multiple UN efforts to implement the plebiscite in Kashmir illustrates 
how it was already beginning to defer to the norm of state sovereignty 
whenever it clashed with the principle of self-determination. This policy 
approach manifested in two significant ways. Firstly, the UNCIP and its 
successors largely neglected to consult or otherwise engage with the various 
political actors within Kashmir itself. It is recorded that some UNCIP members 
did stay in Srinagar from 1 to 9 September 1948, during which time they met 
with Sheik Abdullah at least once (S/1100, 75). However, there is no mention 
or elaboration of what was discussed or observed. The Commission also 
reported receiving several letters and having an ‘informal’ meeting with the 
pro-Pakistan ‘Azad Kashmir Government’ (S/1100, 15 and 41). 
Regardless, it is evident that the Commission paid little heed to these 
Kashmiri authorities, disregarding their calls to place greater emphasis on the 
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plebiscite and recognising them only as ‘local authorities’ (Snedden 2013, 88–
89). Although the UNCIP formally recognised Sheik Abdullah as the ‘Prime 
Minister of the State of Jammu and Kashmir’, it mostly avoided engaging with 
him and his administration throughout their time on the subcontinent. The 
UNCIP also went to great lengths to avoid indirectly bestowing any legitimacy 
upon the Azad Kashmir officials, explicitly resolving to ‘avoid an action which 
might be interpreted as signifying de facto or de jure recognition of the “Azad 
Kashmir Government”’ (S/1100, 25). There is no evidence that the UNCIP 
attempted to meet, interview or correspond with Maharaja Hari Singh. These 
decisions by the UNCIP to disregard these ‘local authorities’ clearly stemmed 
from its belief that its mandate was to mediate between the governments in 
New Delhi and Karachi rather than identifying the preferences of Kashmiris. 
Hence, in choosing to recognise India and Pakistan as the only parties to the 
dispute, UNCIP was deferring to the norm of state sovereignty rather than 
engage in a genuine effort to advance the principle of self-determination. 
Secondly, the UNCIP and the Security Council clearly considered the Kashmir 
conflict to be simply a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan. Hence, 
at no point does the Security Council or its agents appear to have 
countenanced any option of independence for Kashmir. Indeed, there is no 
mention in any of the UNCIP’s three reports (S/1100, S/1196 and S/1430) of 
even a discussion over whether the proposed plebiscite should include an 
option other than a straightforward vote as to which state to join. Yet this is in 
stark contrast to the wishes of the dominant political force in Kashmir during 
this period, Sheik Abdullah. Although Abdullah clearly favoured India over 
Pakistan, he seemingly preferred to achieve Kashmiri independence or, failing 
that, ensure that Kashmir effectively remains a semi-autonomous protectorate 
rather than a regular state of India (Lamb 1991, 191–195). Indeed, during this 
period, Abdullah frequently argued, to any foreign dignitary that would listen, 
the necessity of including the option for independence on any plebiscite so 
that the people of Kashmir could determine where their ‘true well-being lies’ 
(Lamb 1991, 189–190; Snedden 2005, 83). It is unclear what support the 
option for independence had amongst the majority of Kashmiris. 
Nonetheless, the point still stands that having the option in a plebiscite would 
have more holistically encompassed their right to determine their political 
destiny that is at the heart of the principle of self-determination. In disrega-
rding such sentiments, the UNCIP and the Security Council were, intentionally 
or not, accepting that India and Pakistan were the sole successor states of 
British India and thereby tacitly implementing the principle of uti possidetis 
even at this early stage. 
In December 1949, the UNCIP submitted its final report to the Security 
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Council in which it frankly acknowledged its failure to mediate the dispute 
between India and Pakistan or convince them to demilitarise. Although, the 
UNCIP maintained that a plebiscite remained the most effective means of 
determining legitimate sovereignty over Kashmir, it did state that the frame-
work established in Resolution 47 was already ‘a rather outmoded pattern’ 
and suggested that their successors should consider alternative methods of 
resolution, including arbitration (S/1430, 78–79). Hence, the Security Council 
decided to appoint what turned out to be a series of individual representatives 
empowered with greater flexibility to mediate between India and Pakistan and 
try to pave the way for the plebiscite. 
Arguably the most notable of these was the Australian judge and diplomat, Sir 
Owen Dixon. Although Dixon, like all the Security Council’s delegations, dealt 
primarily with the governments of India and Pakistan, he was unique in that 
he based himself in Srinagar for a full month between June and July 1950. 
Interestingly, Dixon notes that he had ‘more than one interview with Sheik 
Abdullah’ but, like the UNCIP, he did not elaborate as to what was discussed 
during them (S/1791, 3). During his stay in Kashmir, Dixon travelled ext-
ensively throughout the disputed territory and therefore recognised more 
clearly than other UN officials that the straightforward plebiscite outlined in 
Resolution 47 was unworkable. Indeed, he noted in his report that ‘the State 
of Jammu and Kashmir is not really a unit geographically, demographically or 
economically. It is an agglomeration of territories brought under the power of 
one Maharajah’ (S/1791, 28). Indeed, it was evident that the Buddhist Ladakhi 
and the Hindu Dogra minorities feared being oppressed by a Muslim Kashmiri 
majority, whether this was in Pakistan or as part of an independent Kashmir 
(Behera 2006, 109–114).  
In response to this issue, and the seeming inability of India and Pakistan to 
agree on virtually anything, Dixon proposed that the plan for the plebiscite 
outlined in Resolution 47 be modified in order to resolve the Kashmir dispute. 
Specifically, Dixon argued that the situation within Kashmir ultimately required 
that it be partitioned and suggested two potential models for how to do so. 
The first proposed breaking the former Princely State into different ethno-
nationalist regions which would vote as to which country they would prefer. 
The second model proposed simply allocating those areas that were certain 
to prefer accession to either India or Pakistan respectively and then holding a 
plebiscite in the uncertain territory of the Valley of Kashmir itself (S/1791, 17–
18). Though the Indian government initially indicated it was willing to explore 
a division of Kashmir, Pakistan refused to divert from the original plebiscite 
plan ensuring that Dixon’s suggestions were ultimately rejected by both 
states. The UN Security Council also proved unwilling to force the issue and 
simply continued to exhort the two feuding states to continue negotiations 
(Snedden 2005, 75). 
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After Dixon, the UN Security Council appointed two further representatives to 
ensure the ceasefire held, and tried to induce India and Pakistan  to 
demilitarise Kashmir so the plebiscite could be held or to find some other way 
around the impasse. However, neither seriously engaged the local Kashmiri 
authorities, and instead fruitlessly attempted to coax the increasingly 
disinterested and sceptical India and Pakistan into some form of agreement 
(Lamb 1991, 175–178). India’s willingness to hold the plebiscite quickly 
waned as it began to realise that it was unlikely to win any popular vote 
regarding Kashmir’s accession. Furthermore, India grew increasingly trucu-
lent and obstructionist towards any UN proposals, believing that the Security 
Council generally, and Britain and the US especially, were biased towards 
Pakistan (Ankit 2010; Hingorani 2016, 192–217). Though Pakistan was 
ostensibly more amenable to holding a plebiscite, it remained distrustful of 
India and refused to make any first move. The prospects of holding a 
successful plebiscite were further spoiled by the frequent and ruthless 
suppression of Kashmiri rights on both sides of the Line of Control soon after 
the 1949 ceasefire. India organised the dismissal and arrest of Sheik 
Abdullah in 1953 for his pro-independence stance, replacing him with a series 
of pro-Indian puppets who were kept in office via allegedly rigged elections 
(Lamb 1991, 199–204; Snedden 2005, 75). Pakistan similarly began 
administering the areas of Kashmir it controlled autocratically, establishing a 
puppet government in Azad Kashmir and governing the northern areas of 
Gilgit and Baltistan directly. 
In late-1954, Nehru unilaterally declared that the US’s alliance with Pakistan 
had ‘changed the whole context of the Kashmir issue’ and that the plebiscite 
was no longer an option that India supported (Snedden 2005, 75–76). The 
UN Security Council eventually responded by passing Resolution 122 in 
January 1957, which expressed the UN’s frustration with the lack of progress 
and restated its position that the future of Kashmir could only be decided by a 
free and fair plebiscite (S/RES/122). However, the UN remained unwilling to 
force the issue by imposing sanctions or other measures that would 
undermine state sovereignty. Gradually the UN gave up trying to enact the 
principle of self-determination for Kashmir. In 1958, the UN neglected to 
appoint another representative for India and Pakistan, effectively washing its 
hands of the issue. Indeed, during both the 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan 
wars, the Security Council only passed resolutions demanding a ceasefire 
between the two sides, making no reference to the people of Kashmir or the 
right to self-determination (see S/RES/211 and S/RES/307). 
The UN, Self-Determination and Jammu and Kashmir Today
As the Kashmir case demonstrates, the UN’s deference to state sovereignty 
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over the principle of self-determination was demonstrated early in its history. 
Whilst there was the possibility for the UN to have strengthened the principle 
of self-determination during its earlier years, that moment has well and truly 
passed. By the 1970s, the debates within the UN General Assembly and 
Security Council established the principle that only colonised peoples had an 
explicit right to self-determination. This position has led supporters of India’s 
position, especially to point out that Kashmir is not a colony and therefore the 
arguments for Kashmiri self-determination do not apply (Hingorani 2016, 166–
171; Saini 2001, 72–73). Although the UN Security Council has largely 
accepted this logic and disengaged from the Kashmir conflict, it does continue 
to maintain a formal interest in the form of the UN Military Observer Group in 
India and Pakistan, which continues to monitor activities on both sides of the 
Line of Control.
In recent years, the focus of the UN has again turned to Kashmir, albeit due 
to the human right concerns rather than engaging in any effort to uphold the 
principle of self-determination. Since 1989, a medium-intensity insurgency 
has raged in Indian Administered Kashmir, triggered in large part by desires 
for greater self-determination and Kashmiri frustration over India’s erosion of 
local autonomy. Although the Kashmir insurgency was originally driven by 
secessionist sentiments, it was quickly hijacked by Islamist insurgents several 
of whom were supported by Pakistan. India’s response has been draconian 
only serving to alienate much of the Kashmiri population (Mohan et al. 2019). 
A new wave of unrest erupted in 2016 after Indian security forces killed 
Burhan Wani, a young and popular local insurgent commander, and the 
Indian Army and paramilitary police responded with crackdowns. This 
prompted the first significant UN action on Kashmir in decades, with the UN 
Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) publishing a report identifying 
numerous human rights abuses committed by the Indian Army during its 
efforts to crush the unrest (OHCHR 2018). While the UNHRC report also 
addressed similar issues in Pakistan Administer Kashmir, India strongly 
rejected the findings of the report, declaring it to be fallacious, prejudiced and 
a violation of its ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity’ (MEA 2018). In response, 
the UNHRC simply stated it was ‘disappointed’ with India’s reaction to the 
report, with the General Assembly and Security Council taking no action or 
making any comment (Mohan 2018).
On 5 August 2019, the last vestiges of Kashmiri self-determination in India 
were removed when the recently re-elected Bharatiya Janata Party 
government placed Kashmiri political leaders under house arrest, revoked the 
articles in the Indian Constitution which made Kashmir an autonomous Indian 
state and broke Ladakh off to be an independent province. Although Kashmiri 
self-determination has been eroded by Indian centralisation efforts in the 
past, this move makes Kashmir a Union Territory that will be directly 
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administrated from New Delhi, albeit with its own legislature to handle local 
issues (BBC 2019; Rej 2019). Pakistan vehemently condemned India’s move, 
pledging to raise the issue at the UN Security Council and potentially take it to 
the International Court of Justice (Hashim 2019). Pakistan eventually 
convinced its tacit ally China to call for an emergency closed door session of 
the Security Council on 16 August 2019, marking the first time in decades that 
the UN body had directly considered the Kashmir issue. However, the Council 
ultimately took no action, and instead urged both sides to ‘refrain from taking 
any unilateral action which might further aggravate the…situation’ (UN News 
2019). The UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, also released a 
statement appealing for ‘maximum restraint’ and reiterating the UN’s position 
that ‘the status of Jammu and Kashmir is to be settled by peaceful means, in 
accordance with the UN Charter’ (UN News 2019). 
These exchanges are characteristic of the UN’s conduct towards issues of 
self-determination more generally; the UN’s inherent preference over 
upholding state sovereign rights ensures that it remains reluctant to act or 
even pressure an existing sovereign state over issues of self-determination. 
Generally speaking, this stance by the UN has helped maintain international 
peace by establishing the state’s post-colonial borders as a clear and 
workable template for resolving interstate disputes. However, the UN’s 
commitment to non-interference and the principle of uti possidetis also means 
that the UN remains far from being a friend of self-determination as such. 
Rather, the UN’s position often ensures that any aspirant self-determination 
movement’s demands need to be accepted by existing sovereign state(s) 
before the international community can even formally engage with them. 
Thus, most contemporary self-determination movements frequently develop 
an antagonistic, if not outright combative, relationship with the state(s) they 
reside in, as the case of Kashmir also ultimately demonstrates. Without some 
dramatic change of heart from India, Pakistan or the UN Security Council, the 
people of Kashmir are unlikely to see an end to the stalemate or any genuine 
chance to choose their destiny anytime soon.
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The micro-state problem emerged in the late 1960s as many newly 
independent but very small states applied to join the United Nations (UN). 
These decolonised micro-states viewed UN membership as a means of 
confirming their sovereign status, affirming their equality with other states, 
supplementing their diplomatic connections, and as a means of furthering 
their security through the UN Charter. Following the principle of self-
determination and through the inexorable processes of decolonisation, the 
post-war dismantling of European empires saw the creation of many new 
states around the world and by the late 1960s this included many micro-
states. Duursma writes, ‘due to the decolonisation process the United Nations 
was confronted with many potential new states of which a great number were 
rather small territories’ (Duursma 1996, 135). The micro-state problem (or 
‘mini-state problem’ or ‘micro-state dilemma’) was that these very small states 
(rightly) gained sovereign independence as colonialism ended but they were 
so weak that they lacked the wherewithal to fully carry out their UN 
obligations (Schwebel 1973, 109). There were also a number of European 
micro-states in existence that have not gone through post-war decolonisation, 
namely: Andorra, Monaco, Liechtenstein, San Marino and the Vatican City.1 
Membership in the UN would mean these micro-states would have the same 
standing as larger states like Brazil, Canada or India giving them a 
disproportionate international influence relative to their size. For many 
diplomats and bureaucrats at the UN this was a problem (Kohn 1967; Gunter 
1977, 112–113).  
This chapter outlines an episode of UN history that has been largely 
1  See: https://holyseemission.org/contents//mission/mission-
55e37172a07413.52517830.php.
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forgotten. The processes of decolonisation that occurred after 1945 included 
a wide number of micro-states, and these micro-states sought UN 
membership to further legitimise their self-determination. This chapter has 
several sections each detailing aspects of the micro-state problem. The first 
section offers definitions of micro-states in order to establish the main units of 
analysis. This is followed by a section that explores the nexus of statehood 
with self-determination and UN membership. From this, the third section 
details what the micro-state problem was and provides a detailed account of 
how the UN responded. A brief section on the post-Cold War period will 
demonstrate that the micro-state problem was essentially ignored as the size 
of UN members became irrelevant. The final section will offer some 
conclusions. The theme of this chapter is that the emergence of many micro-
states reflected the norm of self-determination in international politics and that 
the UN played a significant part in promoting this. 
Defining Micro-States
It has been noted by many that there is no consensus as to what constitutes 
a small state (Benedict, 1967; Amstrup 1976; Archer and Nugent 2002; 
Ingebritsen et al. 2006; Maass 2009; Archer et al. 2014) including micro-
states. This is because there are many ways to define small states, there are 
many variables that can be used to define small states and because different 
academics are studying small states for different purposes. Archer and 
Nugent write, ‘ultimately a judgmental element must creep into the exercise of 
categorising states by size’ (2002, 5). Variables like territorial size, population 
and economic outputs are commonly cited as ways to define small states 
(Amstrup 1976; Ogashiwa 1991; Crowards, 2002; Ingebritsen et al. 2006; 
Maass 2009; Archer et al. 2014). Moreover, size is a relative concept in 
political science as all states are different sizes. Thus, Luxembourg is small 
compared to Belgium, which is small compared to France, and so on. David 
Vital (1967) proposed a two-fold means of defining small states involving a 
combination of industrial/economic capability and population size. Vital 
argued that small states were either advanced industrial states with 
populations of 10–15 million or under-developed states with populations of 
20–30 million. While this template was formulated during the Cold War, it still 
has some resonance today.  
Within small state studies, the sub-field of micro-states also has a range of 
competing definitions. Lukaszewski (2011, 74) writes, ‘in modern political 
science there is no consensus as to what might be called the ministates, 
microstates, small states and finally dwarf states.’  A range of scholars have 
produced different definitions of micro-states including Blair (1967) who uses 
a population threshold of 300,000 and Plischke (1977) who sets out a two-
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fold format in which micro-states have populations of under 100,000 or 
between 100,000–300,000 and are UN members. Ali Naseer Mohamed 
(2002) suggests a threshold of 1.5 million, while Armstrong and Read (1995) 
use a population threshold of 3 million to define micro-states.  However, many 
scholars indicate that a population threshold of 1 million is sufficient to 
constitute a micro-state. Scholars such as Gunter (1977), Anckar (2002), 
Harden (1985), Richards (1990), Warrington (1994), Christopher (2002) and 
Simpson (2008) use the one million residents or less as a means of 
identifying micro-states. Though Wivel and Oest (2010, 434) add that micro-
states, ‘[are] permanently stuck as the weak party in asymmetric relation-
ships.’ The central point is that micro-states are very small states, usually in 
both population and territorial terms. Moreover, there are important con-
sequences of this smallness such as having smaller governments, fewer 
economic resources, weaker bureaucracies, smaller militaries, and they are 
vulnerable to external pressures. Ogashiwa (1991, x) summarises, ‘micro-
states which have very small populations and land areas also in most cases 
are economically, militarily and politically vulnerable.’
Statehood, Self-Determination and UN Membership
Initiated by President Woodrow Wilson in 1918, the concept of self-
determination was and it became a guiding principle of his ‘Fourteen Points’ 
at the Versailles Peace Conference following the First World War. However, it 
became a principle of international law in 1945 at the insistence of the Soviet 
Union (Kirgis 1994, 304) and was incorporated into the UN Charter through 
Articles 1 and 55. Self-determination is, ‘the search for full independence and 
sovereignty by a community with the result to redraw international boundaries 
at the expense of the existing state’ (Danspeckgruber 2002, 3). This means 
that a ‘people’ or a ‘nation’ have the right to possess their own sovereign 
state. International law, according to Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States,2 sets out four criteria of 
statehood: a) a permanent population, b) a defined territory, c) government, 
and d) capacity to enter into relations with other states (Harden 1985, 51; 
Simpson 2008; Coggins 2014, 30). Importantly, international law does not 
specify a minimum threshold for territory or population; this allows for micro-
states. 
An unwritten fifth criterion is constitutional independence (James 1986) which 
is essential to self-determination. In 1948 the International Court of Justice 
set out five criteria for UN membership, namely that applicants a) must be a 
state, b) be peace-loving, c) accept UN obligations as set in the UN Charter, 
d) be able to carry out these obligations, e) be willing to do so (Harris 1970, 
2  See: https://www.ilsa.org/jessup/jessup15/Montevideo%20Convention.pdf.
147 The United Nations Friend or Foe of Self-Determination?
28). With UN membership being by application, this placed conditions on 
membership e.g. the term ‘peace-loving’ was – in reality – political code for 
being part of the Grand Alliance that defeated Nazism, thus excluding many 
states including neutral states. 
In 1960, UN membership increased by 17 as decolonisation accelerated and 
thereafter the rise in membership continued as European empires ended. 
Self-determination was becoming a norm in international politics and this was 
being endorsed by the UN. The Declaration on the Granting of Independence 
to Colonial Countries and Peoples of December 1960 further promoted the 
ideals of self-determination and encouraged more decolonisation. While in 
1961 the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implem-
entation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples or ‘Committee of 24’ was established at the UN to 
further facilitate decolonisation regardless of state size. This committee 
offered advice, technical support, and monitored the progress of decolon-
isation. Throughout the 1960s, many new states gained independence and 
these states applied to join the UN to further confirm their newly gained 
sovereign status. By 1967 approximately 20 UN member states out of 123 
had populations of less than a quarter million. 
In 1965, the UN Secretary-General U Thant in his annual report (United 
Nations 1965; also Gunter 1977, 110; Duursma 1996, 135) suggested there 
might be a problem regarding smaller member states. Later, in 1967, he 
wrote, ‘it appears desirable that a distinction be made between the right of 
[ministate] independence and the question of full membership in the United 
Nations’ (Gunter 1977, 111; Anand 2008, 166). Part of the difficulty was that 
UN membership activities and obligations were becoming increasingly 
diverse, more costly and involved more formal commitments such as 
maintaining permanent missions at the UN. For many newly decolonised 
micro-states this was problematic as most were economically underdev-
eloped with small populations, many lacked the diplomatic staff required, and 
they had domestic issues to deal with following independence. In addition, 
with the increasing numbers of micro-states joining the UN, there was a 
concern that UN voting might be distorted; that the micro-states would have a 
disproportionate influence in international affairs. In 1966 the United Nations 
Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) began research into the 
problems and issues raised by smaller states and territories. The UN Security 
Council also established a committee of experts, a ‘Mini-state committee’, to 
explore the issue and make recommendations (Gunter, 1977, 111; Harden 
1985, 18; Anand 2008, 167). This committee met in secret, issued one interim 
report in 1970 (Duursma 1996, 136) but came to a stalemate over the micro-
state problem, largely because matters of sovereignty and of the legal 
equality of states were perceived as being particularly sensitive, controversial 
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and difficult.  In the context of the Cold War, Soviet dominance in East Central 
Europe perhaps also illustrated why the committee met in secret.
Explaining the Micro-state Problem
In 1919 and 1920 San Marino, Monaco and Liechtenstein applied to join the 
League of Nations despite membership being by invitation only (Gunter 1974, 
497; Thorhallsson 2012, 144; also, Bartmann 2002, 362). Luxembourg made 
a successful bid. Monaco failed to supply information to the League and San 
Marino withdrew its application, but Liechtenstein pursued the matter (Gunter 
1974, 497; Harden 1985, 15). The League explored the application asking 
five important questions (Gunter 1974, 498):
 - Is the application in order?
 - Is the government recognised de jure or de facto and by which states?
 - Does the country have stable government and settled boundaries?
 - Is the country fully self-governing?
 - What has been the government conduct and assurances over ‘inter-
national obligations’ and ‘armaments’?
It was the questions over ‘self-governing’ and assurances over international 
obligations (Gunter 1974, 498) that scuppered the application. The Fifth 
Committee (admissions) concluded that Liechtenstein was a sovereign state 
but that some, ‘attributes of sovereignty’ were carried out by other neigh-
bouring states (Austria and Switzerland) including control of customs, admin-
istration of telecommunications, diplomatic representations and decisions in 
some judicial matters (Gunter 1974, 498; Anand 2008, 164–165). It was also 
noted that Liechtenstein did not have any armed forces (Bartmann 2002, 
362). Such evidence undermined the application and it was concluded that 
the Principality lacked the capacity to fulfil the obligations of the League. In 
December 1920 a vote on Liechtenstein’s application saw 28 votes against, 1 
vote for and 13 abstentions (Gunter 1974, 499). This illustrates that statehood 
alone was not sufficient in itself for membership; the size of Liechtenstein 
constrained its capacity to fully adhere to being able to carry out the League’s 
obligations. 
A year later, a sub-committee of the Assembly explored the issue of small 
state membership and suggested three proposals: a) ‘associate’ membership 
in which small states had full participation but no voting rights, b) they could 
be represented by others, and c) ‘limited participation’ with membership 
privileges being limited in alignment to cases where their own interests were 
involved (Harden 1985, 15; Gunter 1974, 499–500). These alternatives were 
not explored further, and the matter fell into desuetude. Such debates and 
149 The United Nations Friend or Foe of Self-Determination?
proposals were replicated by the UN in the late 1960s as the numbers of 
small states and micro-states increased as a consequence of decolonisation. 
The micro-state problem for both the League of Nations and the United 
Nations was that on one hand they were open to sovereign states but on the 
other hand, the micro-states were less likely or unable to fully fulfil the 
concomitant obligations that membership required.
After the Second World War, Luxembourg and Iceland joined the UN in 1945 
and 1946 as they had sided with the Allies. These micro-states also joined 
NATO as the politics of the Cold War evolved. In 1949 Liechtenstein applied 
to become party to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Kohn 1967, 556). 
Members of the UN are automatically party to the ICJ though they can opt-
out, but non-members could also be party to the Court subject to 
recommendations of the Security Council (International Court of Justice 
2019). The UN Security Council debated the application and both the Soviet 
and Ukrainian delegates questioned the sovereignty of Liechtenstein. Their 
comments echoed the earlier debate of the League of Nations. Kohn (1967, 
547) reports that the Ukrainian delegate said:
Attention must be called to the fact that Liechtenstein does not 
have an army of its own, as state-like organisations have. At 
the same time, Liechtenstein has entrusted Switzerland with 
the function of representing it in its foreign relations. The 
relationship of Liechtenstein and Switzerland towards each 
other is not entirely clear to us. We are aware that postal and 
customs unions exist with Switzerland. But we are not at all 
clear what considerations led Liechtenstein to entrust Switzer-
land with its representation abroad – one of the prerogatives of 
national sovereignty.
The dependence on Switzerland3 by Liechtenstein with its Western-orientated 
outlook was problematic for the Soviet Republics and Soviet Union (Kohn 
1967, 547–548) given the context of the Cold War. Nevertheless, they did not 
veto Liechtenstein’s admission to the International Court of Justice. Being 
party to the ICJ allowed the Principality a means to settle disputes with other 
states and to participate in the wider UN system. But full membership in the 
UN would occur after the end of the Cold War for Liechtenstein and several 
other European micro-states. However, Monaco gained observer status at the 
UN in 1956.4 (Permanent Mission of Monaco, 2019).
3  Switzerland was not a member of the United Nations until 2002 largely to maintain 
its neutrality.
4  See: https://mission-un-ny.gouv.mc/Monaco-and-the-UN. 
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UN membership steadily grew as, ‘during the twentieth century, 150 new 
states entered the international system’ (Coggins 2014, 5). This membership 
accelerated in the 1960s with many smaller states and micro-states gaining 
independence. This included Trinidad and Tobago in 1962, Malta in 1964, the 
Maldives in 1965, Barbados in 1966 and Swaziland in 1968. Self-
determination was now a norm in international politics as these examples 
demonstrate. These new states joined the UN and by the late 1960s ques-
tions over micro-state membership were raised. The Mini-state committee 
was created to help resolve the micro-state problem.
The Mini-state committee received two proposals about dealing with micro-
state membership. The first proposal came from the US in 1969 suggesting 
that a new form of UN membership should be permitted, that of ‘associate 
member’ (Anand 2008, 167). This involved five elements (Gunter 1977, 113; 
Anand 2008, 168):
a) Enjoy the rights of a member in the General Assembly except to vote or 
hold office.
b) Enjoy appropriate rights in the Security Council upon the taking of requisite 
action by the Council.
c) Enjoy appropriate rights in the Economic and Social Council and in its 
appropriate regional commission and other sub-bodies, upon the taking of 
requisite action by the Council.
d) Enjoy access to UN assistance in the economic and social fields.
e) Beat the obligations of a member except the obligation to pay financial 
assessments.
This proposal was very similar to earlier suggestions by the League of 
Nations sub-committee of 1921 on the same issue. However, the proposition 
was contrary to the one-state one-vote principle that is central to the legal 
equality of states. In 1970 the British presented an alternative plan in which 
micro-states would ‘renounce certain rights (in particular voting and election 
in certain United Nations bodies)’ (Anand 2008, 168) on a voluntary basis. In 
addition, ‘in return its financial contribution would be assessed at only a 
nominal level’ (Harden 1985, 18). Essentially, the proposal was that the 
micro-states would voluntarily give up voting rights and consequently pay less 
for UN membership. The British added that the micro-states could regain 
these rights if they gave a year’s notice and revised their financial contri-
butions. Both the US and Britain argued that their proposals would not require 
changes to the UN Charter (Anand 2008, 169) although the UN legal counsel 
thought that the proposals would be difficult to equate with the principle of 
sovereign equality of states (Thorhallsson 2012, 145). The UN legal counsel 
also felt that some UN rights were so fundamental that they could not be 
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renounced. A further (political and legal) difficulty was in defining ‘micro-
states’; the UNITAR study (Rapoport et al. 1971) that began in 1966 included 
various definitions but the French delegate said, ‘that the Committee would 
have great difficulty in producing any definition at all of a micro-state’ (Gunter 
1977, 116).
The Mini-state committee was established to explore the problem of small 
states joining the UN because of decolonisation. Two sets of proposals on the 
issue were produced but neither set of recommendations were 
commensurate with the UN Charter, and they were unpopular with many 
small states. In addition, by the time these proposals were made, there were 
already a number of micro-states in the UN. The micro-state problem could 
not be resolved, and decolonisation continued into the 1970s. More micro-
states joined the UN including Fiji in 1970, Qatar in 1971 and Grenada in 
1974. Membership in the UN was viewed as a confirmation of sovereignty 
and with that, legal equality with other states in international politics. For the 
micro-states this was particularly important given their diminutive size. This 
meant that any demotion to associate status within the UN was unacceptable 
to the micro-states. The failure to unravel the micro-state problem became a 
nuanced historical artefact that had no significant impact upon micro-state 
membership in the UN. 
The Post-Cold War Era
When the Cold War ended in 1989, an opportunity for the European micro-
states to join the UN emerged. Seven states joined the UN in the 1980s and 
six of these were micro-states or small states (Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Vanuatu, Saint Christopher and 
Nevis, and Brunei Darussalam) taking membership to 159 states by 1984. 
This showed that self-determination remained an important principle and was 
now an established norm. The difficulties of being a micro-state that were 
central to the micro-state problem were now deemed less relevant. In effect, 
the outcome of the micro-state committee became more of an academic 
exercise than anything else. Liechtenstein began lobbying for membership in 
1988 and was able to gain membership in August 1990 (Ingebritsen 2006, 
120–121). This encouraged other European micro-states to apply for 
membership. As Duursma (1996, 205) writes: 
Liechtenstein’s international behaviour has been in a certain 
sense a pioneer work for the other European micro-states, 
because it was the first European micro-state to enter actively 
into the Council of Europe and the United Nations.
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Following Liechtenstein membership, other European micro-states were able 
to join including San Marino in 1992 and both Andorra and Monaco in 1993. 
In the 1990s, UN membership saw further increases in membership as the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union saw the creation of 15 new states including 
Russia, the velvet divorce of Czechoslovakia occurred and the wars in 
Yugoslavia further catalysed state creation. While decolonisation was a 
reason for new states during the Cold War, secessionism became the main 
reason for new states in the post-Cold War period (Coggins, 2015). Other 
states were able to join the UN including the Marshall Islands and the 
Federated States of Micronesia, both micro-states. Other micro-states like 
Palau in 1994 and Kiribati, Nauru and Tonga joined the UN in 1999. This 
suggested that the micro-state problem of the 1960s–1970s had been 
forgotten in the post-Cold War world. However, it also shows that the principle 
of self-determination remains an ongoing factor in the establishment of new 
states.
Conclusions
Membership in the UN became universal after the end of the Cold War and 
the UN now has 193 member states including 44 micro-states and the Vatican 
City (United Nations, 2018). As a promoter of self-determination and as an 
instrument for peace and security in global affairs, the UN provides micro-
states with an endorsement of their sovereignty. As micro-states have an 
inherent diminished capacity due to their small size and lack of resources in 
relation to other states, membership in the UN becomes particularly impor-
tant. This importance is partly to augment their diplomatic abilities, partly to 
acknowledge their legal equality with other states, and partly to provide a 
level of security. The principle of self-determination that became prominent 
after 1945 was central in establishing many micro-states in the twentieth 
century. Following decolonisation, membership in the UN was seen as a way 
in which these micro-states could participate in international politics. It was 
also seen as legitimising and acknowledging their membership in the 
international community.
The broader purpose of self-determination when it was established after the 
First World War was to encourage peace by allowing nations to achieve 
statehood. In the post-war era, self-determination became an international 
norm as many new states (large and small) were created as decolonisation 
occurred. This was encouraged by the UN through various committees, 
advice given to prospective states, and by the opportunity to join the 
organisation. As the norm of self-determination encouraged the creation of 
new states, the UN became the global fulcrum for this encompassing states 
of all sizes, including micro-states. By promoting self-determination, the UN 
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was successfully empowering colonised territories to achieve sovereign inde-
pendence. Coggins notes that the international community, ‘…has swelled to 
nearly two hundred states’ (2015, 15).
The micro-state problem of the late 1960s illustrates that UN membership 
was not necessarily an automatic process for old or new micro-states. The 
politics of the Cold War, bureaucratic doubts and the capacity of micro-states 
to fulfil associated obligations opened up a debate about the micro-states. 
The existence of European micro-states like Liechtenstein demonstrate that 
diplomats and bureaucrats at the UN (and previously at the League of Nat-
ions) had concerns over whether such micro-states could, in fact, fulfil their 
international obligations. Such concerns were genuine; however, the ideals of 
self-determination were, in the long term, a greater catalyst for the growth of 
micro-states and in UN membership than apprehensions about the capacity 
of the micro-states. With the constraints of the Cold War over, the (non-
decolonised) European micro-states were able to gain UN membership 
alongside many decolonised micro-states. This contributed to the universal 
membership of the UN that we recognise today.
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